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Abstract
Mortgage-Backed Securities and the Effect on Financial Firm Value
Krisandra A  Guidry
One of the most important financial innovations in the past few years has 
been mortgage securitization. This dissertation examines several motives for the 
issuance of mortgage-backed securities and how the issuance of mortgage-backed 
securities affects the value of a financial intermediary. Several studies suggest that 
there is some benefit to mortgage-backed security offerings. Possible reasons for 
securitization include diversification, funding, avoidance of regulatory taxes, creation 
of value, and portfolio reshuffling. Much of the empirical literature on the issuance 
of mortgage-backed securities has focused on depository intermediary risk. However, 
the effect of mortgage-backed securities on firm value is unclear.
The principal hypothesis tested in this dissertation is that the issuances of 
mortgage-backed securities have positive impacts on the market value of a depository 
financial intermediary. The abnormal returns represent a potential wealth transfer 
between the federal deposit insurer and shareholders. The wealth transfer may 
occur if the assets which remain on the intermediary's books are those most likely 
to cause insolvency. It is postulated that there may be an asymmetry in information 
between the intermediary and the insurer in order to achieve the wealth transfer.
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important financial innovations in the past few years has 
been mortgage securitization.1 Mortgage securitization involves the "pooling" of a 
group of mortgages as collateral for the issuance of securities -- bonds, certificates, 
or notes. The issuance of mortgage-backed securities by financial intermediaries such 
as commercial banks, thrifts, mortgage bankers, pension funds, and insurance 
companies has enabled them to decompose the traditional lending process into the 
more fundamental activities of origination, servicing, guaranteeing, and funding. 
Greenbaum (1986) posits that the unbundling permits intermediaries to perform 
those activities at which they are most adept and to shift to others those activities at 
which they are not particularly skilled.2
This dissertation examines several motives for the issuance of mortgage- 
backed securities and how the issuance of mortgage-backed securities affects the 
value of a  financial intermediary. Several studies suggest that there is some benefit 
to mortgage-backed security offerings. Possible reasons for securitization include 
diversification, funding, avoidance of regulatory taxes, creation of value, and portfolio 
reshuffling. All have implications for firm value.
The principal hypothesis tested in this dissertation is that the issuances of 
mortgage-backed securities have positive impacts on the market value of a depository 
financial intermediary. The abnormal returns represent a potential wealth transfer 
between the federal deposit insurer and shareholders. The wealth transfer may occur
1
if the assets which remain on the intermediary's books are those most likely to cause 
insolvency. It is postulated that there may be an asymmetry in information between 
the intermediary and the insurer in order to achieve the wealth transfer.
Much of the empirical literature on the issuance of mortgage-backed securities 
has focused on depository intermediary risk. However, the effect of mortgage-backed 
securities on firm value is unclear. Pavel and Phillis (1987) find that the desire to 
diversify and the incidence of regulatory taxes -- capital requirements, in particular 
-  are major determinants whether intermediaries securitize. They also argue that 
regulatory taxes make low-risk, high-quality, loans unprofitable. The study is 
inconclusive as to the quality of loans that depository financial intermediaries 
securitize. Furthermore, research by Pavel (1988) shows that the effect of 
securitization on intermediary risk is statistically insignificant and that regulation does 
not play as important a role in securitization as previously thought. Pavel suggests 
that high-quality assets are probably sold immediately after origination and are never 
able to impact the intermediary's portfolio. However, Pavel's methodology is biased 
due to the use of balance sheet and income statement data. Systematic measurement 
error is likely across the various bank holding companies in each sample because of
t
the differences in accounting methods used. Furthermore, the measure of certain 
accounts such as assets or total loans is understated because of regulatory accounting 
practices. The data may provide a poor surrogate of the true economic picture.
The effect of security offerings on firm value may provide some insight into 
the problem at hand. The theory predicts that leverage decreasing transactions have 
a  negative effect on firm value (see for example, Smith, 1986). Empirical literature
focusing on security offerings has been undertaken by many researchers. Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Kowar (1986) find a negative reaction to new equity 
offerings. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) demonstrate negative stock price reactions 
to the issuance of debt and equity. Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
find strong negative reaction to debt announcements.
Little empirical evidence exists on the market response to security issuance 
by depository financial intermediaries. Because financial intermediaries operate in 
a regulated environment, informational asymmetry, which exists for the typical 
corporate offering, may be of a reduced magnitude. However, Polonchek et.al. 
(1986) studied the strength of the market response to security offerings by 
commercial banks. They find valuation impacts that are similar to those reported by 
nonfinancial corporations: significant negative responses to bank offerings of
common stock or convertible preferred stock; insignificant responses to debt or debt- 
related offerings. Similar results are reported by Wansley and Dhillon (1987).
Therefore, the examination of the effect of mortgage-backed security offerings 
on financial firm value will take the following form: Chapter II presents some 
institutional background on mortgage-backed securities. Chapter III contains a 
review of the theory and empirical evidence. The research design, which is based on 
event study methodology, is presented in Chapter IV. Sample selection and data are 
found in Chapter V. Empirical results are presented in Chapter VI. Testing on 
relative yield spreads between mortgage-backed securities and Treasury bonds is 
discussed in Chapter VII. Chapter VIII discusses some conclusions.
CHAPTER II 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
This chapter outlines the institutional background of mortgage-backed 
securities and derivative mortgage-backed securities. It presents a description of the 
securities, their cash flow possibilities, risk and return characteristics, and 
explanations for the creation of each security.
A. Features of Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Mortgage securitization involves the "pooling" of a group of mortgages for the 
issuance of securities. Investors in these securities receive a share of the interest, 
principal, and prepayment amounts collected from the mortgages. Generally, when 
a mortgage has been securitized, the original lender continues to collect the monthly 
payments from the borrower. These payments are ultimately passed through to 
investors with a slight delay.
Securitization has served to increase mortgage liquidity and help direct the 
flow of credit to the mortgage market, facilitating a m ore efficient distribution of 
available financing. The introduction of mortgage-backed securities has also served 
to expand the trading opportunities available to investors. As a result, the depth of 
the asset markets is enhanced as well as the welfare benefits to the market 
participants by the trading of mortgage-backed securities.
Van O rder and Villani (1981) identify three features that MBS investors find 
attractive: packaging, marketability, and risk.
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Packaging. Securitization decomposes the traditional lending process into the 
more fundam ental activities of origination, servicing, guaranteeing, and funding. 
Thus, the investor need not have any experience in mortgage underwriting or have 
a staff for servicing loans in order to invest in mortgages. Furtherm ore, an investor 
in MBSs may make a mortgage investment of whatever magnitude he chooses 
without examining each mortgage individually.
M arketability. Shares in a pool of loans are m ore m arketable to investors 
than whole mortgage loans. This is because investment in whole loans would require 
a  great deal of research to determ ine the quality of the loans. Mortgages which 
enter pools are typically filtered. Furtherm ore, some mortgage-backed securities 
carry investment ratings similar to that given to corporate bonds. These pools can 
be actively traded, thus increasing liquidity.
Risk. Mortgage-backed securities reduce investor risk through diversification. 
Investors would prefer MBSs over whole loans because of the diversification feature. 
However, there is still the possibility of default on the underlying mortgages which 
m ake up the pool. This risk is kept to a  minimum through: (1) underwriting 
standards and, (2) mortgage insurance and guarantees.
Mortgage-backed security value is dependent upon the path and volatility of 
future interest rates and upon prepayment. Most mortgage-backed securities increase 
in value as yields drop and vice versa.1 Actually, MBSs possess some of the same 
characteristics as traditional fixed income securities and are exposed to the same 
types of price and reinvestment (interest rate) risk. However, the similarities end 
here. There is a  higher degree of risk associated with mortgage-backed securities.
This may in part be due to the frequency of payments. The coupon reinvestment risk 
associated with MBSs is greater than that of traditional fixed income securities 
because MBS payments usually occur monthly, rather than semiannually. Investors 
must make more frequent reinvestment decisions. If rates fall, security holders 
receive a lower return on investment.
Interest rate risk is also affected by mortgage prepayment rates. The expected 
cash flows of mortgage-backed securities are heavily influenced by prepayments in 
the mortgage pool. Thus, since most mortgages are callable, the amount of the pool's 
monthly payments to investors is uncertain. As interest rates fall, the borrower may 
prepay his mortgage, which forces reinvestment at lower market rates; if rates rise, 
however, the option to repay may expire without exercise, which does not allow 
reinvestment at higher rates.2
Interest rate fluctuations are the most important source of variability in the 
prices of mortgage securities. Increases in interest rate volatility tend to decrease 
MBS value due to the fact that such volatility forces the pool's embedded 
prepayment options to increase in value. Duration has long been used as a measure 
of interest rate sensitivity or price volatility for traditional fixed income securities 
(see Macauley, 1938). However, the calculation of duration for MBSs is hampered 
by the uncertainty associated with its payments (particularly for instruments trading 
near par or at a premium). Pinkus and Chandoha (1986) introduce a relative price 
volatility analysis and a market implied duration measure which take into 
consideration the impact of prepayments.
B. Types of Mortgage-Backed Securities 
All mortgage-backed securities generally have the same basic structure, but differ 
according to:
1. the nature of the underlying mortgages,
2. the method of determining and distributing payments to investors, and,
3. the guarantees on the security and the mortgages.
Table 1 gives a summary of the various secondary market instruments. 
Financing mortgages in the secondary market may take the form of the sale of whole 
loans (row 1) or Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) purchases and 
Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) advances (row 7). However, the most 
popular mortgage-backed securities are the pass-through certificate and the 
mortgage-backed bond (rows 2-6).
Pass-through certificates. Pass-through certificates represent investor 
ownership in a pool of mortgages similar in maturity, interest rate, and risk. Interest 
and principal are passed through to investors. However, since most mortgages have 
prepayment clauses, the amount of these payments and the maturities of the 
securities are uncertain. Thus, an investor's prorated share and the maturity of the 
certificate depend on when prepayment occurs.
The most common form of pass-through certificate is the Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA) pass-through. Begun in 1970, the GNMA 
program was viewed as a means of channeling funds from the security markets into 
the housing market. Funds received from security issuance could be used to make 
new loans. The GNMA pass-through allows investors to invest in mortgages without
8
Table 1 Secondary Market Financing Vehicles
C h a ra c te r is t ic s  of Mortgage Financing Vehicles
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M ertgage X X X X X X
Loans
2 .  P r iva te
MBBs X ? X X ? X X X
3 .  P rivate
MBBs X X X X ? X X X
4 .  FHLMC
PCs X X X X X X
5 .  FHLMC A
GMCs X ? ? ? X X X
6 .  GNMA
Pools X X X X X X X X
7 . FNMA
Debt X X X X X X X X X
Source: J. Tuccillo, R. Van Order, and K. Villani. "Homeownerhsip Policies and 
Mortgage Markets, 1960 to 1980.'* Housing Finance Review. 1 (1982), p. 10.
inspecting individual loans. Each security represents a share in pools which consist 
o f mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) or guaranteed by the 
Veterans Administration (VA).
The GNM A certificate carries the full faith and credit of the United States 
government as guarantee of complete and timely payment. Furtherm ore, the FHA 
and VA mortgages which comprise the pools upon which the securities are issued, 
also carry the guarantee of the government agencies. While it is the case that 
GNM A guarantees payment of principal and interest, ultimately it is the issuer's 
responsibility to make the payments if the borrower does not. The issuer actually 
guarantees the payments and GNM A warrantees the financial health of the issuers.
The mortgage pools are assembled by issuers which are then sold to security 
dealers, and eventually to investors. There are primary and secondary "cash" markets 
in GNM A securities, providing for both immediate and forward delivery.
The original GNMA securities included a straight pass-through (a 30-year 
fixed maturity security in which only the funds collected by the issuer would be 
rem itted to the investor) and the fully modified pass-through (a 30-year fixed 
maturity security that promised payment of principal and interest to investors 
whether or not collected by the issuer). Since then, GNM A has introduced securities 
backed by 15-year single family mortgages, graduated payment mortgages, mobile 
home mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages.
GNMA pass-through rates are stated on the face of the certificate. The rate 
represents the interest rate on the pool of mortgages, less a guaranty fee of six basis 
points and a servicing fee set by GNM A at 44 basis points.
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The valuation of GNMA pass-throughs has become a major concern in the 
field of finance. Drawing from work by Brennan and Schwartz (1977) and Cox and 
Ross (1976), Dunn and McConnell (1981) and Buser and Hendershott (1984) 
developed a model for pricing GNMA pass-throughs. Models for pricing the 
standard, fixed rate, long term mortgage assuming no default risk are based on the 
notion that interest rates are the only "state" or exogenous variables of concern and 
are driven by the instantaneous short rate. With no transactions costs, a portfolio of 
Treasury securities whose flows match that of the mortgage is constructed. A long 
position in the mortgage and a short one in the portfolio requires no wealth, has no 
instantaneous risk and no return. Therefore, the instantaneous expected yield on the 
mortgage must equal the risk free short rate plus a risk adjustment factor.
Dunn and McConnell (1981) also consider the possibility of prepayment that 
would occur for other than financial reasons by including a Poisson process in their 
model. With the imposition of appropriate boundaiy and terminal conditions, the 
value of the mortgage-backed security can be obtained.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) also develop a GNMA pricing model. They 
contend that mortgage pricing can best be modelled by two state variables. Brennan 
and Schwartz assume different processes for the short rate and the rate on a consol 
bond. The instantaneous yield is equal to the risk free rate plus adjustments for the 
risk of the short and long-rate changing. Brennan and Schwartz also include a 
Poisson process to account for prepayment.
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Default risk is not considered in any of these models because the GNMA
pass-through security is default free. However, according to Kau, et.al. (1986),
"... default carries through to the security holder as prepayment, so to 
the extent that such terminations are correlated with an underlying real 
variable in the economy they must be treated in the valuation 
equations. This again points out the necessity to include both 
prepayment and default in a general discussion of any mortgage-backed 
security."3
Kau et.al. (1986), Rosenberg (1986), and Titman and Torous (1986) model 
defaultable mortgages with the option to prepay by using house price and the 
instantaneous spot rate as exogenous variables. Asay (1978), Masulis (1982), 
Cunningham and Hendershott (1984), and Epperson et.al. (1985) also look at the 
value of a  mortgage allowing for default but not prepayment. Using different 
methodology, Leung (1986) similarly derives the value of a fixed rate defaultable 
mortgage as depending on the house price and interest rates. Kau et.al. (1985) 
attem pt to evaluate insurance against default on fixed rate mortgages by treating the 
insurance and the mortgage as European puts. The insurance and the mortgage are 
so valued "because no rational borrower would never choose to default until 
prepayment is due."4 The values of both the assets were found to be functions of 
the volatility of the house price and the volatility of the spot interest rate.
Mortgage pass-through certificates are also sold by other federal agencies or 
private issuers with a guarantee that the federal agency or some private insurer will 
m eet the scheduled monthly payments to investors.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLM C) issues and 
guarantees mortgage pass-throughs. Like other mortgage pass-throughs, the FHLMC 
issue passes interest and principal payments through to its investors. The FHLMC
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pass-through, called the participation certificate (PC), was the first pass-through ever 
offered for conventional mortgages. The pools which act as collateral for these 
securities are either seasoned or newly originated and acquired from private lenders 
by the FHLMC.
The Standard Program and the Guarantor Program are two methods in which 
the FHLMC can purchase mortgages from lending institutions. U nder the Standard 
Program, FHLMC pays cash for the mortgages it acquires. The Guarantor Program 
allows the lender to swap its mortgages for an equal amount of PCs.
Similarly, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) engages in the 
issuance and guarantee of mortgage pass-through securities. FNMA is a federally 
sponsored enterprise which is owned by private stockholders. FNMA entered into 
its mortgage-backed security program in 1982. Until then, FNMA bought mortgages 
for its own portfolio, financing the purchases by borrowing in the money and capital 
markets.
FNMA mortgage pools usually consist of seasoned or newly originated 
conventional, fixed-rate residential mortgages. However, FNMA is not restricted to 
issuing MBSs using these mortgages. Pools may consist of adjustable rate mortgages, 
conventional multifamily residential mortgages, or a  mixture of such loans. FNMA 
mortgages must meet FNMA loan purchase requirements and must be insured 
against default if their loan to value ratios are greater than 80%.
FNMA issues can be sold two ways. In the first way, FNMA (like FHLMC) 
permits private institutions to swap mortgage pools for FNMA pass-throughs. The 
second channel allows FNMA to pool mortgages from its own portfolio and sell
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pass-throughs by public offerings or private placements.5
By the late 1970's, securities were created for mortgages other than those 
insured by the U.S. government or federal agency guaranteed.
Private issuance of mortgage pass-throughs involves the conveyance of 
conventional mortgage loans into a trust, of which undivided interests are sold to 
investors. Investors receive principal and interest payments from  the pool's trustee. 
These certificates carry a  bank letter of credit or the services of a  private insurer to 
guarantee timely payment.
The volume of issues by private institutions has been limited. This may be 
due to their inability to compete on a price/cost basis with federally guaranteed 
securities.
Mortgage-backed bonds. M ortgage-backed bonds (MBBs) are bonds whose 
payments are backed by a mortgage or a  pool o f mortgages as collateral. 
Mortgage-backed bonds are similar to ordinary corporate bonds in that (1) investors 
receive principal repayment at a stated maturity date and interest payments at 
semiannual intervals, and (2) the MBB is a debt obligation of the issuer.6 Such 
securities were originally designed to attract funds at a  lower cost than that of issuing 
pass-through certificates.7
Mortgage-backed bonds are frequently overcollateralized. Brick (1984) 
identifies three reasons for overcollateralization. First, since the issuer of the MBB 
owns the collateral and can retain all cash flows generated by the collateral, the 
amount outstanding on the pool may decline faster than the principal on the MBBs. 
Therefore, the issuer must be prepared to assume the risk of losses or gains if there
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is a timing difference between the flow patterns of the bonds and mortgages due to 
a change in interest rates or if prepayment occurs. Second, overcollateralization 
protects bondholders in the event of mortgage borrower default. Finally, 
bondholders are protected against declines in the market value of the pool between 
valuation dates. Collateral is inspected four times a year. If collateral value falls 
below that stated on the bond indenture, more mortgages are added to the pool.
In the event of bond default, the collateral is sold and the proceeds are used 
to redeem the MBBs. "A major concern, of course, is that no legal or regulatory 
impediment prevents the timely liquidation of the collateral if the issuer defaults.'6 
Bankruptcy laws affect the liquidation of capital. Issuers not subject to such laws, 
such as commercial banks, thrifts, and federal agencies, would incur no difficulty 
upon insolvency.
Mortgage-backed bonds usually carry investment ratings which indicate the 
payment capability of the issuer. The ratings help determine the interest paid on the 
issue. Quality of the underlying pool, the type of pool, and the pool's value relative 
to the amount of borrowing influence the rating of the issue.
The first MBB issue was in September, 1975. The size of the issue was $50 
million. By 1978, almost $1 billion in MBBs had been sold. The volume had tripled 
by the end of the next year.
C. Resecuritization of Securities 
Resecuritization involves the issuance of securities which derive their cash flows 
from mortgage pass-throughs or pool of whole mortgage loans. Derivative mortgage
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securities, as these assets are called, are an "unbundling" innovation. Cash flows 
from pass-throughs or pools are split into several pieces called tranches. Terms may 
specify that each tranche has a fixed interest payment and that all principal payments 
(including prepayments) go to the highest tranche until the security is paid off. After 
the first class is retired, principal payments are then applied to the next highest class 
of securities until they have been paid off also, and so on, until all classes of the 
original issue are retired.
Payments are made to owners of residual equity interests on a periodic basis. 
After the required interest and principal payments have been made, any excess cash 
flow can be paid on a pro rata basis to owners of equity interests.
The primary source of residual cash flow is the positive spread between the 
coupons on the underlying collateral. Other sources include income from investing 
cash flows until it is dispersed, and excess prepayments.
Other unbundling innovations may have terms such that one tranche receives 
principal repayment and another receives interest payments.
The issuance volume of derivative securities as a percentage of pass-throughs 
has increased tremendously over the 1983 - 1987 time period. Figure 1 demonstrates 
that in 1983, this percentage was 5%. By 1987, it had jumped to nearly 35%.
1. Use of Derivative Securities
The creation of derivative securities grew out of the need of pass-through 
investors to hedge against prepayment and interest rate risk. The maturity of 
pass-through securities is uncertain due to the mortgagor's option to prepay the loan
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after some specified date with no penalty, thus, making these securities unattractive 
to some investors. As interest rate fall, the borrower prepays. Investors in 
pass-throughs must then reinvest their principal at these lower interest rates. If rates 
rise, the option to prepay expires without exercise. However, investors would want 
their principal at this time in order to reinvest a t higher yields, but are unable to do 
so because of the actions of the borrower.
The segmentation of cash flows from the pass-throughs or the pools of 
mortgage loans address these problems. Flows can be tailored to match investor 
preferences. Early prepayments go to the first class of securities, those purchased by 
short term  investors. After this class is paid off, prepayments are first allocated to 
intermediate term investors and then to long term investors.
The segmentation of cash flow can also take the form of principal only and 
interest only tranches. W hen interest rates fall, accelerating prepayment speeds 
reduce future interest payments and expected value. However, the value of future 
principal payments accelerate. W hen rates rise, the opposite occurs. "Strips," as 
these securities are called, are sold to investors with opposite interest rate 
expectations.
Resecuritization allows the issuer to effectively compete in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, the different tranches can be sold at differing prices.
Derivative securities-can also provide credit enhancement. Nonconforming 
loan pools3 are guaranteed by mortgage insurance companies. However, only a few 
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securities were formed. Some types of derivative securities, such as 
senior/subordinated pass-throughs, provide inexpensive credit enhancement.
Specific cases in which derivative securities provide hedging benefits, maturity 
certainty, and credit enhancement are discussed in the next section.
2. Types of Derivative Securities10
There has been a surge in the types of derivative securities available to meet 
the needs of both investors and issuers. Types of derivative securities include the 
collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO), planned amortization classes of CMOs, 
floating and reverse floating rate tranches of CMOs, deep discount coupon bonds of 
CMOs, pass-throughs with senior/subordinated structure, stripped mortgage 
securities and CMO residuals.
Collateralized mortgage obligation. The collateralized mortgage obligation 
(CMO) was first issued in 1983 by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(FHLMC) to address the problems of prepayment and active cash flow management. 
By 1985, the volume of CMO issuance had reached $20 billion.11
The CMO is a special type of bond which has several maturity classes. 
Interest is paid semiannually. However, principal payments and prepayments are 
passed on to the highest class of bondholders. After the first class is retired, 
principal payments are them applied to the next highest class of bonds until they 
have been paid off also, and so on, until all classes of the original issue are retired. 
The last class is often a "Z bond" or full accrual bond issue which receives no 
interest payments prior to the repayment of principal. The funds are used to help
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pay off the tranche receiving principal payments. W hen the Z  bond begins to 
receive its principal payments, its accrued interest is added to its principal balance.
CMOs attract investors with different preferences for the maturity of their 
investments. S&Ls usually invest in the fast paying tranches, while pension funds and 
insurance companies have traditionally purchased the interm ediate and slow paying 
classes. Dorfm an (1985) finds that many investors are  interested in CMOs because 
they resemble discounted loan purchases with enhanced creditworthiness. The 
enhanced creditworthiness is due to the fact that all payments are passed through to 
the bondholder, just as if he owned the whole loans. Extreme overcollateralization 
and collateral value maintenance (as that used for mortgage-backed bonds) are not 
needed.
There are two types of CMOs which are based on the form of the underlying 
collateral. The first type has the issuer holding a  pool of whole mortgages or 
pass-throughs in his portfolio upon which the securities are issued. In many cases, 
the whole loans are converted into pass-throughs before the CMOs are issued. In 
the second type of CMO, the issuer must purchase a  pool of pass-throughs before 
selling the CMOs. This provides the issuer with the possibility of arbitrage profits 
if the CMO sale price surpasses the cost of the pass-throughs.
CMOs address the problem of prepayment risk upon a mortgage pool serving 
as collateral for securities. However, the multiclass structure of CMOs does not 
eliminate prepaym ent risk. According to Smith and D 'Annolfo (1986), prepayment 
risk is redistributed, but not equally; it is shared on a sequential basis by each 
tranche in the pool. Table 2 shows that each bond still holds substantial prepayment
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risk. The year of projected maturity and the yield of each tranche would change 
radically if prepayments speed up.
CMOs are further complicated by the fact that each tranche usually earns a 
different coupon rate. Problems arise when the underlying pool has a lower interest 
rate than that promised on one of the long term tranches and all the other tranches 
have been prepaid. Overcollateralization is often used to ward off such potential 
problems. Thus, when principal is paid back by borrowers, not all of it is used to 
retire the first tranche. The outstanding CMO tranches must be small enough that 
the cash flows from any remaining collateral be such that all coupon payments can 
be made to investors.
Mortgage pricing methodology can be used to price CMOs. However, 
Hendershott and Van Order (1987) state that this is so only if the parts (tranches) 
sum up to the whole. The pure arbitrage assumption has to be relaxed in order for 
the securities to have economic value. Furthermore, optimal call models with no 
transactions costs (or equal costs for all borrowers) assume that all tranches prepay 
at the same time, thus ignoring the reason for which these securities were created.
Planned amortization classes. The planned amortization class (PAC) is a 
CMO tranche with priority for principal repayment. There is little uncertainty about 
PAC maturity in response to an increase or decrease in prepayments because of its 
priority in receiving principal. After a certain amount of principal is paid to the 
PAC, the excess (if any) goes to the other tranches. The PAC was developed in 
response to investor demand for maturity certainty.
7,1
Table 2
Rapid Prepayment Shortens Average Life o f 
Securities
(Projected maturity and average life in years)
A B C Z ero coupon residual
tranche tranche tranche bond equity
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100% 4.5 2.45 6.5 5.45 10 833 29 15.78 none 3
200% 3 1.59 4 3.45 7.45 5.59 29 13.98 none 2.5
300% 2 1.25 3 2.56 5.5 424 29 9.44 none 2
Source: "REM IC Structure, Market Impact Must be Understood,” Savings 
Institutions. 108 (1987), p. 147 and U.S. League Investment Services, Inc.
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To reiterate this point, the comparison of two $100 million CMOs is presented 
in Table 3. The first CMO has four regular tranches; the second CMO has three 
regular tranches and one PAC. Both securities have collateral of GNMA 9.5s. At a 
pricing speed of 115%, the third regular tranche in CMO-1 and the PAC in CMO-2 
both have average lives expected to be about 10 years.
Because of the PAC's certainty in maturity, its offering yield spread over Treasury 
is 30 basis points lower than CM O-l's third regular tranche. Figure 2 shows the 
PAC's certainty in maturity. For a wide array of prepayment speeds, 0 - 549%, the 
PAC's maturity remains relatively stable, between 10.6 and 6.7 years. Under the 
same configuration of prepayment speeds, the GNMA pass-throughs will have a wide 
range of expected average lives ranging between 21.3 and 3.4 years.
Floating rate CMO tranches. The floating rate tranche was developed to meet 
the demand for short term adjustable rate assets. When floaters were first 
developed, they were structured to be the first tranche. However, as the floater 
gained acceptance in the investment community, more tranches became floaters. It 
is estimated that since inception, the dollar volume of floater issuance has amounted 
to $27 billion.
The floater's adjustable interest rate is reset at certain intervals at a spread over 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).12 The interest rate reset is not to 
exceed a prescribed maximum called the cap. The cap can be a single fixed interest 
rate or a series of interest rates.
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I 22.8 8.0 98-05 10.3 2.4 100bp(2yr)
II 25.3 9.0 97-23 15.8 5.7 120 (5)
in 42.7 9.0 93-02 21.5 10.9 135 (10)

















I 27.8 9.16 100-00 11.8 2.4 125bp(2yr)
n 22.7 9.50 98-26 15.3 5.7 145 (5)
m 30.7 9.50 96-27 25.0 10.6 105 (10)
IV 18.8 9.50 80-23 30.0 18.8 225 (30)
The expected average life of the securities is based on quarterly pay; pricing speed 
at 115% PSA (Public Securities Association prepayment model) for the underlying 
collateral of GNMA 9.5s priced at 97-28 with a  360-month weighted average 
remaining maturity.
The fourth bond class is an interest accrual bond.
Source: J. Hu. "Derivative Mortgage Securities: An Overview," Journal of Real 








Figure 2 Average Life and Prepayment of PAC vs. Generic GNMA 9.5s
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Source: J. Hu. "Derivative Mortgage Securities: An Overview," Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics. 1 (1988), p. 103 and Shearson Lehman Mortgage 
Securities.
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Two types of floating rate CMO tranches have emerged: the sequential pay 
floater and the simultaneous pay floater. The sequential pay floater allows the 
principal outstanding to be paid down like other fixed rate tranches. The 
simultaneous pay floater, innovated more recently, shares the principal repayments 
with other fixed rate tranches. Simultaneous pay floaters carry deep discount 
coupons.
Table 4 demonstrates the structure of a simultaneous pay floater and reinforces 
the fact the floaters are relatively short term investments. The CMO contains a 
floater in its first tranche and fixed rate, deep discount coupons in its other four 
tranches. Tranches 2, 3, and 4 receive principal paydown simultaneously with the 
floating rate tranche. With a 115% pricing speed, the floater has an expected 
average life of 6.3 years, although the stated maturity is 3 times longer. The 
weighted average life of tranches 2, 3, and 4 is also expected to be 6.3 years. Figure 
3 shows the principal cash flow of the floating rate CMO.
Deep discount coupon bonds. Deep discount coupon bonds are a by-product of 
floating rate CMOs. They were created so that investors would be assured that the 
mortgage collateral for floaters could generate its prescribed interest payment. Deep 
discount bonds are priced such that the difference between the deep discount on the 
bonds and the coupon rate on the underlying mortgage collateral releases enough 
cash flow to pay the interest on the floater, even if LIBOR remained capped for the 
floater's duration. The deep discount bond is "attractive to investors who hold 
different views from floating rate investors. Thus, the same
26
Table 4 Floating R ate CMO Tranche
Original
CMO Principal Bond Bond Stated Expected Offering Yield
Bond Balance Coupon Price Maturity Average Spread in bp
Class (Srail) Rate (yr) Life(yr) Treasury (yr)
I 48.7 7.60 100-00 20.8 6.3 3-mo LIBOR
II 15.4 6.00 91-19 13.5 3.3 105 (3 yr)
III 9.3 6.00 80-04 18.0 7.5 125 (7)
IV 7.8 6.00 73-17 20.8 10.9 135 (10)
V 18.8 6.00 44-01 30.0 19.8 195 (30)
The expected average life of the securities is based on quarterly pay; pricing speed 
at 115% PSA for the underlying collateral of GNMA 9.5s priced at 97-28 with a 
360-month weighted average remaining maturity.
The first bond class is a floating rate tranche; initial 3-month LIBOR: 7%; spread: 
60 basis points; lifetime cap: 12%.
The fifth bond class is an interest accrual bond.
Source: J. Hu. "Derivative Mortgage Securities: An Overview," Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics.1 1 (1988), p. 105 and Shearson Lehman Mortgage 
Securities.
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mortgage collateral can satisfy two groups of investors with varying interest rate 
outlooks.1'13
Reverse floating rate CMOs. The reverse floater's adjustable interest rate is reset 
periodically in reverse of the LIBOR.14 It is structured to offset the impact of the 
index possibly rising on the regular floater.
A  reverse floater can be simulated by investors who purchase a  long term fixed 
rate bond and finance a portion of it a t LIBOR. Investors in reverse floaters believe 
that the future yield curve will be positively sloped.
Senior/subordinated pass-throughs. In a senior/subordinated pass-through, the 
senior interest cash flow is supported by the flow of the subordinated class. The 
subordinated interest, which is usually uninsured, insures the senior interest. The 
quality of collateral determines the amount of the subordinated interest. The 
senior/subordinated structure allows the issuer to obtain rated security pricing for 
nonconforming loans.
Nonconforming loan pools are usually guaranteed by mortgage insurance 
companies. However, only a few insurers rem ain financially healthy enough to do 
so. Furthermore, those able to insure charge such a high price for insurance that 
many intermediaries are kept from participating in the securities market. 
Senior/subordinated pass-throughs eliminate the need for third party insurers by 
providing inexpensive credit enhancement. Novick and Sabath (1987) argue that 
portfolio liquidity can also be increased because senior/subordinated pass-throughs 
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Figure 4 Three-month LIBOR vs. Hypothetical Reverse Floater Rates 
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The senior/subordinated pass-through is m ade up of at least two classes. The 
senior interest combines a  liquidity facility, a  reserve fund, and a  subordinated 
amount. The liquidity facility is a cash deposit advanced from the issuer and is used 
to cover short term  cash needs. The reserve fund is composed of cash flow that 
would have otherwise gone to subordinated interests. The subordinated amount is 
that which the subordinated interest holders may lose if it is needed to m eet the 
payments prom ised to the senior interest holders. The senior interest can be offered 
through a public or private placement. Senior interests behave just like mortgage 
pass-throughs.
The subordinated interest is the remaining, undivided minority interest in the 
pool. These interests have a secondary right to receive principal and interest. 
Subordinated classes are offered to investors through private placem ent or kept by 
the issuer.
In the event of delinquencies or defaults, cash flow from the subordinated class 
or some other source ensures that the senior interest will not suffer any interruption 
in cash flow.
Stripped mortgage backed securities. "Strips" are created when the cash flow 
from the underlying mortgage pool has been separated into principal and interest to 
form principal only (PO) and interest only (IO) securities, as well as securities which 
have pre-set allocations of principal and interest. This isolates the benefit of 
prepayment (the early return of principal) from the cost of prepaym ent (forgone 
future interest payments on the prepaid principal).
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The cash flow behavior of the strips is heavily dependent on the coupon of the 
underlying pass-throughs. Figure 5 shows the price/yield relation for GNMA 9.5 
pass- throughs. We observe that the prices of strips are substantially lower than the 
underlying pass-throughs because IOs and POs appear to be risky investments. They 
have more volatile price behavior than ordinary pass-throughs -- their values are 
more sensitive to the underlying security coupon and settlement date; their returns 
more affected by market rate volatility and changes in interest rates. Furthermore, 
the price of a PO increases as interest rates decrease; the price of an IO increases 
as interest rates increase (but act like the PO at high interest rates).
IOs and POs enhance liquidity and allow investors to create whatever synthetic 
coupon they desire. Two methods can be used to create synthetic coupons: 
combining IOs with POs and combining IOs or POs with pass-throughs. Asay and 
Sears (1988) find that combining IOs or POs with pass-throughs is the cheapest way 
to create a synthetic coupon since the costs to issue strips are generally included in 
IO and PO prices. However, combining IOs with POs guarantees that the synthetic 
coupon will continue to exist over time as the principal is repaid. The other method 
cannot promise the coupon for more than one month in advance.
Strips'are used to provide a desired risk/reward profile. They are instruments 
with strong option characteristics. The use of strips as option positions can be 
accomplished through strategies involving Treasury securities. However, futures or 
mortgage securities may also be used. Figure 6 presents the bond and option 
equivalent positions of strips. For example, an investor in a current coupon PO holds
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Figure 5 Price/Y ield Relationship of GNM A 9.5% IOs, POs,
and Generic Pass-throughs
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7 0 1 0
3 0 PO
C M Y  ( % )
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1 0 . 5 9 6
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8 . 0 3 2 8
7 . 5 4 3 0
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Source: J. Hu. "Derivative Mortgage Securities: A n Overview," Journal of Real 
E state Finance and Economics. 1 (1988), p. I l l  and Shearson Lehm an Mortgage 
Securities.
33
a position that is equivalent to a long bond and a long call (on the bond). Likewise, 
in investor in a  current coupon IO holds a position that is equivalent to a short bond 
and a short call. Figure 6 helps explain why some strips have high yields, while 
others have low yields. Investors in strips equivalent to short option positions receive 
relatively high yields compared to other securities of similar duration. Investors 
holding strips which are equivalent to long option positions must pay a premium and 
thus receive relative low yields when compared to other securities of similar duration.
However, yield is a  poor measure of expected return for strips because yield is 
a measure of return for a single scenario of unchanged interest rates. Expected 
return is a weighted average of many scenarios. Stripped MBSs often have 
asymmetric outcomes for different interest rate movements. Current coupon IOs and 
high coupon POs have high quoted yields but much lower expected returns. Current 
coupon POs and high coupon IOs have low quoted yields but higher expected 
returns.
Principal only securities (PO) are used to hedge servicing portfolios and portfolios 
of premium MBS securities or whole loans because they reduce prepayment risk. 
Interest only securities (IO), which are very similar to fixed rate residuals, hedge 
fixed income assets and shorten the duration of assets in asset-liability GAP 
management. Strips give their issuers flexibility in restructuring their portfolios. By 
adding only small amounts of IOs or POs, portfolios can be drastically changed. A
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list of portfolio applications was issued by the Federal H om e Loan Bank Board 
(1988). Principal only securities can be used by thrifts to:
1. reduce loan servicing portfolio prepayment risk,
2. increase convexity,
3. balance taxable and accounting income during m arket rallies,
4. restructure loan portfolios dominated by fixed rate mortgages (retention of POs 
shrinks the thrift's assets and reduces its prepayment sensitivity), and
5. create synthetic coupons.
Similarly, interest only securities can be used to:
1. reduce portfolio risk during periods of rising interest rates,
2. reduce portfolio interest rate sensitivity,
3. replace or for use in conjunction with options, futures, and rate swaps,
4. balance taxable and accounting income during market downturns, and
5. create synthetic coupons.
Strip pricing is affected by the coupon on the collateral, weighted average 
maturity, settlem ent date, yield quotation convention and the pool's prepayment 
quotation. The price of a PO is stated as a  percentage of its face value. Since IOs 
have no claim to principal, a  notional face value, which refers to the current 
outstanding balance of the underlying mortgage collateral, is assigned to them. IO 
price is expressed as a percentage of its notional face value. H endershott and Van 
O rder (1987) state that pricing strips is only an extension of pricing the collateral.
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Source: M. Asay and T. Sears. Stripped Mortgage-Backed Securities. Goldman 
Sachs, January 1988.
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CMO residuals. Residuals are cash flow interests left after all payments are 
m ade to the regular bondholders. The residual cash flow may come from  any of the 
following sources: the differential between the coupon on the collateral and the 
coupons on the CMO bonds, release o f overcollateralization, excess reinvestment 
income, recapture of reserve funds, or the exercise of calls.
CMO residuals are used to hedge against rising interest rates. As interest rates 
rise, mortgage prepayments decline, thus extending the cash flow to the residual 
holder and increasing the investment's return. As interest rates decline, prepayments 
will accelerate, decreasing residual cash flow and depressing its expected return. A 
portfolio of residuals can also diversify risk over a variety of collateral coupons and 
CM O structures. CMO residuals have short pay back periods (two to four years) and 
are similar to interest only stripped mortgage backed securities.
CMO residuals may be created from either fixed rate  or floating rate tranches. 
The cash flows available to fixed rate residuals investors are dependent upon the 
structure of the CMO. The residual cash flow is derived from the difference between 
the weighted average coupon on the underlying mortgage collateral and the coupon 
on the tranches. The flow is largest in the first few years of a  CM O because the 
early tranches usually have smaller coupons. The size of the flow will also be 
proportional to the outstanding principal of the collateral. Thus, fixed rate CMO 
residuals are sensitive to mortgage prepayments. Falling interest rates and increasing 
prepayments produce shorter average cash flow stream s and a lower return on 
residuals. Rising rates and falling prepayments produce longer average cash flow 
streams and release a larger portion of cash flows to residual holders. Figure 7 











Figure 7 Fixed R ate Residual Cash Flows at Three Prepayment Speeds
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12% current mortgage yield (CMY), the projected prepaym ent speed will be 76%. 
-A t 10 and 8% CMY, the projected prepaym ent speeds will increase to 115% 
and 328%, respectively, while the value of the residual cash flow becomes smaller.
Fixed rate  residuals hedge fixed income assets and shorten the duration of assets 
in asset-liability G A P management. They offer higher yields than interest only 
certificates.
The floating rate  residual is inherently more complicated than the fixed rate 
residual. Its cash flow is sensitive to the size and structure of the CM O's floater. 
Floating rate residuals usually have high stable yields. However, these yields decline 
with interest rate  and prepaym ent movements. Its return  is sensitive to the slope of 
the yield curve. Nonparallel shifts in short and long rates may have a significant 
impact on total residual cash flow because the coupon differential is tied to short 
rates while prepayments are influenced by the level of long rates.
D. Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit
The real estate mortgage investment conduit (REM IC), a  pass-through tax entity 
created by the Tax Reform  Act of 1986, has greatly facilitated the further issuance 
of derivative securities. REM ICs are not a  type of mortgage security. However, 
REM IC provisions are intended to reduce the tax considerations involved in any of 
the above mortgage securities. Previously, entities which issued multiple classes of 
investor interests backed by a mortgage pool were subject to double taxation. The 
creation of a REM IC can avoid this situation. Any income, loss, gain, or deduction 
is passed on to its investors.
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Levitin (1987) provides a  detailed description of what may constitute a REMIC's 
assets. These assets may include qualified mortgages, foreclosure property, cash flow 
investments, and qualified reserve funds. Qualified mortgages are those obligations 
secured by interests in real property — commercial and residential mortgages, PCs, 
pass-throughs, strips, senior/subordinated pass-throughs, and interest in other 
R EM IC pools. A  REM IC may not acquire new mortgages nor may they sell them 
off after the conduit has been established. Foreclosure property is property acquired 
in the event of default. Cash flow investments are m ade solely for the purpose of 
reinvesting cash flows from mortgages rather than paying them  out to investors. 
Qualified reserve funds pay for the conduit's management costs as well as insure 
investors against the possibility of default on the qualified mortgages.
For financial reporting purposes, the issuer will be able to choose whether the 
transaction will be treated as an asset sale or as a debt financing. If an issue is 
treated as an asset sale, the assets are removed from the issuer's balance sheet and 
transferred to a third party. Gains or losses are immediately recognized. A  financing 
structure allows the gain or loss to be reported over the life of the issue.
REM IC interests can take the form of bonds, certificates, corporate stock, or 
partnership interests. Investor participation consists of one or more classes of regular 
interest and one class of residual interest. Regular interests operate like CMOs. A 
pool of mortgages is assembled as collateral, and several classes of securities (in 
terms of payoff priority) can then be issued.
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The residual interest is m ade up of only one class of interest and is defined as any 
interest which is not a regular interest. The residual interest resembles that o f a 
stockholder in a corporation. It has the right to payments which are dependent on 
the speed of prepayments. Residual interests also include any excess earnings in 
the qualified reserve fund. Payments are m ade on a  pro ra ta  basis to all holders.
CHAPTER III
REVIEW  OF THEORY AND EM PIRICAL EVIDENCE
This chapter examines several motives for the issuance of mortgage-backed 
securities and how the issuance of mortgage-backed securities affects the value of a 
financial intermediary. A review of the empirical literature on security offerings will 
also be presented. Much of the research suggests that capital structure decisions 
which serve to decrease leverage impact firm value in a negative manner; leverage 
increasing transactions are reported to have a zero or non-positive effect on value. 
To date, however, no literature exists which examines the effect of mortgage-backed 
security offerings on financial firm value. The ultimate objective of this dissertation 
is to examine this interrelationship.
A. Motives for Issuance of Mortgage-Backed Securities and 
Effects on Firm Value 
Several studies suggest there is some benefit to mortgage-backed security 
offerings. Possible reasons for securitization include diversification, funding, 
avoidance of regulatory taxes, creation of value, and portfolio reshuffling.1 All have 
implications for firm value.
1. Diversification
As advanced by Markowitz (1952), portfolio theory states that the more 
negative (or less positive) the correlation between asset returns, the greater the risk
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reducing benefits of diversification. Interm ediaries may choose to securitize, selling 
certain types of mortgages in order to buy or originate other assets that have a 
negative (or low positive) correlation with existing assets, thus altering its 
diversification.
Pavel and Phillis (1987) investigate why a bank may want to alter the 
diversification of its loan portfolio. They estimate two logit models to predict the 
probability that a  bank will securitize: one model estimates the probability that a 
bank will securitize either constantly or on occasion; the other model estimates the 
probability that a  bank that does securitize, i.e., does so all of the time. Each model 
is specified as a  function of the reasons as to why depository financial intermediaries 
securitize mortgages.
Pavel and Phillis note that banks which are less diversified are those most 
likely to securitize in order to re-organize their portfolios. Thus, the model variable 
which represents diversification, which takes on greater values for lower degrees of 
diversification, would be expected to have a  positive sign.
Results from the first model show that undiversified banks are those most 
likely to securitize. Over the sample period, the level of diversification did increase 
for banks which securitized and rem ained constant for banks which did not securitize.
Pavel and Phillis7 (1987) second model focuses on the factors why 
interm ediaries securitize mortgages. They found the result that diversification was 
found to have a significant impact (at the one percent level) on the bank7s decision 
to securitize.
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A follow up study by Pavel (1988) found that banks which increased their 
diversification increased their riskiness at a rate lower than banks which decreased 
their diversification, but this result is not statistically significant. Furthermore, banks 
which took part in intense securitization over the sample period decreased their risk, 
while banks which occasionally securitized increased their risk. Pavel argues that 
diversification appears to be an important reason behind mortgage securitization. 
Diversification decreases intermediary riskiness. However, securitization is but one 
method to achieve this diversification. Pavel (1988) maintains that banks which 
securitize decrease their riskiness, but not any more so than banks which choose 
alternative methods of diversification. Santomero (1987) argues that when asset 
quality is easily verifiable, there is no additional risk in the intermediary's portfolio 
of assets held relative to those securitized provided that portfolio risk is diversified 
and interest rate risk is hedged.
Traditional finance literature touts that firms need not diversify away risk 
because investors can undertake diversification for their own portfolios, therefore 
leading to the conclusion that banks and thrifts need not diversify. However, many 
banks and thrifts are closely held corporations. Diversification of the owner's 
portfolio may take the form of diversification of the bank or thrift.
2. Funding
Securitization can also be used as a funding device. An intermediary may 
choose to securitize in order to buy or originate other loans, or it may simply 
underwrite, holding the mortgages until they are eventually sold. Pavel (1988)
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reasons that an intermediary which is riskier than the mortgage it is originating might 
choose to underwrite (sell) rather than issue risky debt and/or equity in order to 
"book" the loan. Many times the cost of funding the loan will exceed the rate that 
the intermediary can charge on the loan. Therefore, the intermediary could simply 
underwrite the mortgage. Choosing not to make the loan at all may damage customer 
relations.
However, anytime the seller has more information about the asset being sold 
than does the buyer, a "market of lemons" may develop. In Akerlofs (1970) "market 
for lemons," where only poor quality merchandise reaches the market, intermediaries 
will securitize risky mortgages. In this scenario, asymmetric information arises 
between MBS issuers and investors. Investors are unable to assess the quality of the 
pool's underlying mortgages without incurring great expense (in terms of money and 
effort). The price for such assets will be based on a pool of average quality because 
investors are aware of the fact that part of the pool is made up of low-quality assets. 
Issuers then have an incentive to sell bad credits, thus, lowering the overall price. 
Eventually, only bad credits reach the market. Issuers will then be left with 
portfolios composed of high-quality assets. Originating and holding lower risk loans 
might lower the overall riskiness of the intermediary, thus allowing it to fund these 
loans more cheaply.
Sinkey (1989) reasons that a "market for lemons" is unlikely when 
intermediaries are concerned with their reputations. If an intermediary securitizes 
its risky mortgages, it will gain a reputation for doing so and its creditability in the 
marketplace will be damaged. Intermediary liquidity will decline. Therefore, an
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intermediary will choose to market only its best assets in order to preserve its 
reputation in the credit market.2 Intermediaries will be left with portfolios composed 
of low-quality assets. Risk and firm value will increase. Pavel (1989) and Jaffee and 
Rosen (1988) also agree that the "lemons" problem is improbable in the market for 
mortgage-backed securities. The structure of such issues eliminates problems 
associated with asymmetric information and moral hazard .3 However, if most (or all) 
of the intermediaries which securitize are insolvent, it is unlikely that they will be 
concerned with their reputations. Their decision to market their best assets will be 
based on the fact that they will be left with portfolios composed of low-quality assets. 
Pavel (1988) found that the riskiest banks securitized over three and a half times the 
amount of loans securitized by banks deemed "least risky." She offers this as 
evidence that funding is an important motivation behind securitization.
However, if a bank uses securitization as an inexpensive funding device, it 
should not book loans less risky (or more risky) than itself. If this is so, securitization 
would then have no implications for risk. Pavel (1988) tested this by comparing the 
change in risk for banks that were risky (above the median) and sold a high 
proportion of loans with banks that were risky and sold a low proportion of loans. 
Both sets of banks reduced their risk, however, the difference is not significant. 
Pavel's results imply that funding seems to be a valid reason for securitization, but 
it has little impact on risk and firm value.
According to Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), the choice of funding is based 
on a cost-benefit analysis. That method which is least costly and provides the most 
benefits will be chosen to fund the intermediary's assets. In Greenbaum  and
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Thakor's environment, an intermediary may fund a loan in two ways. One is by 
emitting deposits (deposit funding mode, DFM). The other is securitization 
(securitized funding mode, SFM). They assume that
(1) the bank's capital, K, is fixed and is greater than zero,
(2 ) each bank makes a $1 loan to its borrower,
(3) both the bank and the borrower are risk neutral; the depositors (in the case
of the DFM) or the investors (in the case of the SFM) are risk averse,
(4) the borrower invests his $1 loan into a project which pays off R with
probability 6 and 0  with probability (1 - 6 ), and
(5) the bank invests all of its capital. K, into the riskless asset.
In the case of symmetric information, everyone knows the borrower's 6 . Under 
the DFM, the bank's problem is to maximize the borrower's expected utility subject 
to the depositors reservation return and the bank's return on equity. Mathematically, 
the problem is to
max 6 [ R - e ( 6 ) - r ( 5 ) ] R / 1
e ( 6 ) , r ( 6 )
subject to 6U(r  (6 ) )  + [ 1 - 6 ]U(KRf) >u, and
6[ e  (6)+KRf ]>KRf
where e ( 6 ) is the risk premium or management fee required by the bank's 
shareholders to undertake the risky loan and r(6 ) is the deposit interest factor. The 
sum e ( 6 ) + r ( 6 ) is the interest rate paid by the borrower on his $1 loan, and 
R  f is one plus the risk free interest factor.
It is assumed that the credit market is perfectly competitive and similar to
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that assumed by Besanko and Thakor (1987). The bank's problem (in this
environment and all others) is to maximize the borrower's expected utility rather
than its own profits. The constraints on the objective function impart that the
depositors must attain a certain level of utility, u , and that the bank must earn the
risk free rate. Furthermore, should the borrower default in his repayment of the
loan, the bank's capital is used to repay depositors; the shareholders receive nothing.
According to this market structure, all regulatory subsidies are passed on to
borrowers. The borrowers choose the bank's funding mode. Explicitly, Greenbaum
and Thakor (1987) state,
"This approach of maximizing borrowers' surplus makes sense in an 
environment where free entry precludes capture by bank shareholders 
of any of the surplus related to borrower investment projects, and a  
competitive liability market ensures that depositors receive no less than 
their (competitive) reservation return ." 4
Under the SFM, the bank agrees to pay investors e %  of the loan if the 
borrower defaults. With symmetric information, the amount of the guarantee is 
chosen by the borrower and available at no cost. The bank's problem is to 
max S [R-e ( 6 , Q* ( 5 ) )  - r  ( 6 , 0 *  ( 5 ) )  ]Rf’1
e ( 6 ) , r ( 6 , e * ( 6 ) )
subject to 5 U ( r ( 5 / 9 * ( 5 )  ) + [ l - $ ] U ( 0 * ( S ) r ( < S , 0 * ( S ) ) )>u,  and
S [ e  ( 5 , 0 *  (6) )+KRf ] + [ l - 6 ]  [KRf—0* (6)  r ( 6  , B* (6)  ) ] >KRf •
With symmetric information, the two methods of funding are equivalent when the 
borrower sets 9 , the guarantee, at the maximum permitted by the bank's capital. 
However, the. SFM problem is deficient in that it does not, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, take into account the fees earned by the bank for servicing and originating.
With asymmetric information and no regulation, only the borrower knows his 
S .  The bank and the depositors spend Cb and Cn, respectively, to discover the 
borrower's S . These costs are borne exclusively by the borrower. U nder the DFM, 
the bank's problem is to
max S [R-e  ( S )  - r ( 6 )  ]Rf'1-Cb-Cn
e ( S ) , r ( 6 )
subject to 5U(r(<S) ) + [ l - S ]U (K Rf ) >u,  and
6 [ € (6)  +KRf ] >KRf .
U nder the SFM, the bank's problem is to 
max 6 [ R - r ( © * ( 6 ) ) ]Rf'1- P ( S , e * ( 6 ) )
p ( 6 , e * ( 6 ) ) , r ( e * ( 6 ) )
subject to p ( 6 , G * ( 6 )  ) > c b + [ l - 6 ] 6 * ( 6 ) r ( e * ( f i )  )Rf‘\  and
6 U ( r ( G * ( 6 ) ) ) + [ l - 5 ] U ( e * ( 6 ) r ( 9 * ( 6 ) ) )>u .
The borrower's utility is reduced by p ( 5 , 0 * ( « 5 ) ) ,  the premium paid by the 
borrower to the bank for guaranteeing G %  of the loan. Under asymmetric 
information, the guarantee demands a nonzero price set at the bank's cost. 
p ( 5 , 0 * ( 6 ) )  actually communicates 5 to investors so they need not spend Cn 
anymore. This is the savings advantage of the SFM over the DFM.
There is a  disadvantage to the SFM, an incompleteness of insurance. For 
some <5's, borrowers provide investors with less insurance under the SFM than under 
the DFM, i.e., (© * (6 ) r ( 0* ( <5 ) ) < KR f. Borrowers with high 5 's will choose 
higher levels of insurance under the SFM because high levels of insurance reduce the 
interest rate paid on the loan (paid only if the project is successful). The amount of
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insurance approaches the maximum feasible with K. Furthermore, high quality 
borrowers enjoy higher levels of utility because of the high associated 6 's and the 
high level of e  chosen by the borrower which lowers the yield on the securitized 
loan. Thus, high quality borrowers choose the SFM and the low quality borrowers 
choose the DFM.
The borrower's expected utility should be maximized when he receives his 
requested loan at the lowest interest rate possible. The borrower will be able to 
invest in his project and anticipate cash flows from that investment. The borrower's 
utility will be maximized when the net present value of his project's cash flows is 
greatest. How the bank chooses to fund the loan should be irrelevant to the 
borrower. Only if the funding mode affects the interest rate offered by the bank, will 
the borrower be concerned with the bank's funding.
On the other hand, James (1987) posits that the choice between funding 
depends on to whom the benefit accrues. If the benefits from "holding" the asset 
accrues to depositors rather than shareholders, then the asset will be securitized. 
This finding is reinforced when the intermediary's riskiness is high and the asset's 
riskiness is low. In Greenbaum and Thakor's analysis (1987), any benefit from 
funding is passed on to borrowers; to whom the benefit accrues does not affect the 
choice of funding. Funding will be chosen based on a cost-benefit breakdown.
3. Avoidance of Regulatory Taxes
Pavel and Phillis (1987) have found that regulatory taxes -- capital 
requirements, in particular — have a major impact on whether or not institutions
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choose to securitize. They also advance the notion that regulatory taxes make low- 
risk, high-quality loans unprofitable. Securitization will be preferred for high-quality 
assets because regulatory requirements (flat rate deposit insurance premiums, 
foregone interest on reserve requirements, and capital requirements) in excess of 
what intermediaries would hold in absence of regulation make high-quality assets an 
inefficient use of resources. Financial depository institutions sell off high-quality 
assets and are left with high-risk assets. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Flannery 
(1987) also argue that the presence of regulations force intermediaries to favor 
balance sheets composed of risky assets.
Greenbaum  and Thakor (1987) analyze the avoidance of regulatory taxes in 
an  environment of asymmetric information. Federal insurers provide the banks with 
deposit insurance. Thus, depositors do not need to screen borrowers. Even if the 
borrower defaults, the depositors will get their reservation return and achieve their 
desired level of utility due to the insurance. Regulators levy taxes (a )  on the banks 
explicitly in the form of capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums, 
implicitly as foregone interest on reserve requirements. These taxes are paid out of 
the bank's capital. Mathematically, under the DFM, the bank's problem is to
i
max 5 [R-e  (5) - f - J R/ ’-Cb
6 ( 5 ) , f
subject to U (£■) > u ,  and
5 [ e  (5)+Rf{K-a} ]Rf*1>KRf .
The bank's problem under the SFM is identical to that with asymmetric information 
and no regulatory intervention. Low-quality loans will continue to be funded through
51
the DFM. However, when regulation is present, which funding mode will be chosen 
for high-quality loans will depend on both the size of a  and the size of K. If both 
a  and K are low so that even high-quality assets have incomplete insurance coverage 
under the SFM, the DFM will be preferred .5 When the costs of regulatory taxes 
reach a certain level, intermediaries will choose to securitize high-quality loans. 
Low-quality loans will remain on the intermediary's balance sheet.
The avoidance of regulatory taxes also leads to increased fee income (i.e., off 
balance sheet income) for the intermediary. Prior to securitization, all assets require 
regulatory taxes be paid against them. Securitization, especially in the case of 
mortgage pass-throughs and certain forms of REMICs, removes mortgage assets 
from an intermediary's balance sheet, thus no longer requiring regulatory taxes. The 
assets are transferred to a third party in return for cash. These additional funds 
generated by securitization allow lenders to originate new loans, thus generating 
origination fees. They also receive revenue from servicing the securitized pools. 
This in turn helps to increase the bank's return on assets and equity, all other things 
being equal.
4. Creation of Value
Secondary mortgage market financing vehicles were practically unheard of 
some ten years ago. However, by 1986, over $529 billion of mortgage debt had 
already been securitized. The market's success is a sign that it satisfies a need by 
investors that was previously unmet.
Securitization has served to increase mortgage liquidity and help direct the
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flow of credit to the mortgage market, facilitating a  more efficient distribution of 
available financing. The secondary mortgage market's purchase and then sale of 
existing mortgages has helped ease the strain o f cyclical funds shortages in the 
mortgage market.
Furthermore, it is well documented in the literature by Hirshleifer (1970) and 
Litzenberger and Sossin (1977a, 1977b) that financial innovations, such as options or 
mortgage-backed securities, serve to expand the trading opportunities available to 
investors. As a result, the depth of the asset markets is enhanced as well as the 
welfare benefits to the market participants by the trading of these innovations. 
Mortgage-backed securities have helped bring the capital m arket closer to 
"completeness." W hen the number of future states of nature is equal to the number 
of unique linearly independent securities, the m arket is deemed complete. 
Uncertainty about future wealth exits this environment given a  complete market. It 
would not make any difference which state of nature would occur in the future; all 
contingencies could be covered. By partitioning wealth among the securities in a 
certain way, an investor could be assured of a certain payoff in every possible state 
of nature, even though the payoffs of individual securities varied over states.
In other words, mortgage-backed securities must possess certain qualities and 
characteristics that are difficult or practically impossible to replicate with other 
securities. Some of those characteristics more than likely include their ability to 
"unbundle," to tailor cash flows and maturities to meet investor preferences. The 
market's success could also be attributed to low transactions costs. Risk and return 
characteristics attributable to other combinations of fixed income securities may be
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replicated less expensively and more efficiently through the purchase of mortgage- 
backed securities.
Therefore, since these securities serve to enhance completeness and reduce 
uncertainty, it is expected that they also create value to be captured by the issuers. 
Sherlock and Chen (1987) argue that the splitting of pool or pass-through cash flows 
creates a mortgage security that performs differently from the underlying collateral. 
A greater value is obtained for the "bundled" asset by redistributing its income 
stream into different securities. Because of this redistribution, mortgage-backed 
securities have greater prepayment or interest rate sensitivity than the underlying 
mortgage pool. Thus, they yield a higher return than the pool. It can be said, 
therefore, that in the case of mortgage-backed securities, the sum is greater than the 
parts. Thus, issuers offer mortgage-backed securities in hopes of attaining arbitrage 
profits in order to enhance their firm values. In effect, the offering may be viewed 
as a positive net present value project by the issuer (at least until the clientele is 
satisfied).
Roll (1987) posits that the creation of value associated with the introduction 
of mortgage-backed securities is evident because mortgages now sell for lower yields 
than before the issuance of MBSs. Roll links the introduction of collateralized 
mortgage obligation (CMOs) with a spread reduction between mortgages and 
Treasuries. Chloweicki (1985) quantifies this reduction. CMO issuance reduced 
spreads 5 to 10 basis points. Nothaft, Gabriel, and Rothberg (1987) conclude that 
the reduction was closer to 13 basis points.
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Jameson, Dewan, and Sirmans (1988) find that derivative securities, 
collateralized mortgage obligations, in particular, provide an excellent opportunity 
for examining the quantitative welfare effects of financial innovation. Because the 
"unbundled" innovation is allowed to trade alongside its underlying asset, the price 
and welfare effects of the derivative are reflected in the price behavior of the 
bundled security. Jameson, Dewan, and Sirmans test two hypotheses: (1) CMOs 
have traded in significant volume, thus indicating an important financial innovation, 
and (2) CMOs have had an effect on the price of its underlying asset — mortgages. 
Numerical evidence supports the first hypothesis. CMO issuance has increased from 
a m ere $4.68 billion in 1983 to $59.94 billion in 1987.6 Jameson, Dewan, and 
Sirmans look at mortgage-Treasury spreads to determine whether or not CMO 
issuance has effect on mortgage yields. Their data confirm that CMOs narrowed 
the spread between mortgages and Treasuries.
It is a possibility that the arbitrage profits associated with mortgage-backed 
securities are short-lived. Issuing intermediaries which enter the markets for new 
securities are those which capture the gains, i.e., the early bird catches the worm. 
As more issuers are attracted to the market by the arbitage profits, they are quickly 
competed away. However, it can be observed that firms partake in issuing such 
securities many times, probably well after the profits from doing so are gone. 
Therefore, the attainm ent of arbitrage profits may be a valid reason for securitization 
when the market for a particular security is in its infancy, but is unlikely to be the 
motivation behind securitization over the long term.
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In another vein, the creation of value through securitization may be attributed 
to the accompanying divestiture. Certain instruments, such as pass-through 
certificates, are seen as a sale of assets. The mortgage assets are transferred to a 
third party, and are removed from the issuer's balance sheet in return for cash or 
securities.7
Some of the possible motives underlying the divestiture decision include (1) 
raising capital, (2) retiring debt, (3) desiring to specialize in a particular operation, 
and (4) liquidating unprofitable assets. However, the assets which are sold off are 
likely to be worth more to someone else than to the seller firm. As suggested by 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), these assets may be undervalued due to an 
informational asymmetry -- the seller is not fully informed about the asset's future 
cash flows. Empirical evidence from Boudreaux (1975), Klein (1982), Alexander 
et.al. (1984), Jain (1985), and Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) finds that both sellers 
and buyers earn positive abnormal returns around the announcement of asset sales.8
Therefore, the buyer can then redeploy the assets into a higher value use. In 
the case of securitization, this is especially true since MBS investors do not have to 
screen borrowers. Through securitization, investors need not have any experience 
in mortgage underwriting or have a staff for servicing loans in order to invest in 
mortgages. Furthermore, an investor in MBSs may make a mortgage investment of 
whatever magnitude he chooses without examining each mortgage individually. Thus, 
securitization has served to lower the transaction costs associated with investing in 
a  mortgage and value is created.
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5. Portfolio Restructuring
The portfolios of many intermediaries were badly in need of restructuring 
after deposit rate deregulation took place in the late 1970s. During that time, 
interest rates rose unexpectedly. When the short term  cost of funds increased over 
that yielded by 30-year fixed rates mortgages, many intermediaries were locked into 
low-balance, long-term instruments. Such intermediaries were later forced into 
bankruptcy.
Much of the finance literature has touted securitization as a method of 
portfolio restructuring. It has been said that securitization has (1) reduced 
intermediary exposure to interest rate risk by allowing them  to liquify their mortgage 
related assets which earn less than their short term  cost of funds, (2 ) increased 
intermediary liquidity by converting formerly illiquid 30-year mortgage assets into 
cash (or securities), and (3) helped intermediaries attain higher yields because MBSs 
allow lenders to sell or borrow against their loan portfolios and re-invest the 
proceeds at the current market rate as well as derive servicing fees from the 
securitized loans.
Portfolio restructuring models which use risk and return as criteria are fairly 
common in the academic banking literature and are of two general types. In both, 
the bank is viewed as a single period risk averse utility maximizer.9
The objective function used in models by Kahane (1977), Koehn and 
Santomero (1980), and Kim and Santomero (1988) is approximated by a Taylor 
series expansion of a certain type of risk averse utility functions truncated after the 
second moment, i.e., when K is initial wealth (or capital), R  is the random return on
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equity capital, and V is the utility function, derivation of the utility function takes the 
following form:
E [ V ( K + R * K )  ] = E [ V ( K )  + V 1 (K) • ( R * K ) + W ' ( K )  • ( R * K ) 2+ 0 3 ]
= V ( K ) + V '  (K) • D [ E  (R) { E ( R ) 2+C72} ]
= U [ E ( R ) , a ] .
E  is the expectations operator and r = - K [ V "  ( K ) / V '  (K) ] .  The allocation among 
assets is the choice variable deriving the mean rate of return per unit of capital and 
the variance of that return. Asset choice is restricted to the efficient frontier. The 
bank selects a point on the efficient frontier where the objective function's marginal 
rate of substitution between risk and return is equated with the m arket's opportunity 
cost. To find the efficient frontier, the bank solves a quadratic programming 
problem like that detailed in Merton (1972).
Other portfolio choice models (see Pyle, 1971, 1972; Parkin, 1970; Hart and 
Jaffee, 1974; and Sealey, 1980) view the bank as maximizing a concave function in 
end of period profit, with a quadratic or exponential function used to represent the 
firm's preference ordering 
E ( t )  -  ( b/ 2) a ir2 
where profit and variance are defined as
TT=2 ,r AiA ,-S jr DjD j
tf-FT2=E[ (Tr-E(Tr) )2] -  
These models differ from the first type of portfolio choice models in that the capital 
and leverage decision is ignored.
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It is obvious that securitization is never explicitly (nor implicitly) mentioned 
in any of the portfolio choice models. This section will introduce a model which 
takes into consideration the effects of securitization on a financial depository 
intermediary's portfolio. This mean-variance model, which has been employed by 
Kim and Santomero (1988), demonstrates that in the presence of capital regulation, 
financial depository intermediaries take on more risky assets. The model has been 
altered slightly in order to take into consideration the effects of securitization. First, 
however, some foundation must be laid before continuing.
The model proposed by Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) views the supply of 
mortgage funds emanating from only one source -- commercial banks or thrifts. 
They are provided with a type of subsidy from a federal deposit insurer in the form 
of deposit insurance supplied at less than actuarially fair prices. Deposit insurance 
is levied at a flat rate against deposits without any regard for risks. Due to financial 
and time constraints, insurers are unable to access accurately the quality of the 
lender's portfolio. Therefore, asymmetric information arises between lenders and 
federal insurers. W ork by Buser, Chen and Kane (1981), Kane (1985), and Benston 
et.al. (1986) has shown that the introduction of deposit insurance produces moral 
hazard because the incentive for intermediaries to manage their assets safely is 
removed. This encourages intermediaries to hold riskier assets. However, regulatory 
capital requirements also encourage intermediaries to hold risky assets, especially 
when the requirements disregard asset quality. (Again, capital requirements, like 
deposit insurance premiums, are drawn up without regard for individual bank asset 
quality due to financial and time constraints. A  broad regulation is enforced which
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is thought to capture all ends of the spectrum of intermediaries.) Pavel and Phillis 
(1987), Koehn and Santomero (1980), and Flannery (1987) contend that capital 
requirements force intermediaries to favor balance sheets composed of risky assets. 
Regulatory requirements in excess of what intermediaries would hold in absence of 
regulation make high-quality assets an inefficient use of funds. Brickley and James 
(1986) also posit that the subsidy occurs to the intermediary due to the increased 
risk in its portfolio. According to Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), this subsidy is 
passed on to borrowers, thereby increasing their expected levels of utility. This type 
of activity -- the holding of high-risk assets -- is evident in the real world 
marketplace. Federal insurers have stepped up their employment of examiners as 
well as the number of audits performed.
An alternative argument to that proposed by Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) 
is that in a competitive market where all lenders are price takers, the subsidy is 
captured by the intermediary then passed on to its shareholders in the form of 
greater returns. Any surplus related to borrower investment projects is handed over 
to shareholders.
In reality, there are several major lenders in the mortgage market. Federal 
deposit insurance and capital requirements provide insured lenders with a subsidy or 
cost advantage over the other lenders.10 When one lender has costs advantages over 
another, Hendershott and Villani (1980) argue that that lender will bid away 
mortgages from the others by accepting a lower yield, given unlimited access to 
funds. Therefore, the cost advantage or "subsidy" should force the other lenders out 
of the market for making loans.
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Hendershott (1984) notes that when access to funds is limited (or 
diseconomies of scale exist), firms in the next "lowest cost" industry will determine 
the equilibrium interest rate charged on the mortgages. O f course, those 
intermediaries which may offer loans at less than the equilibrium rate will survive 
and earn excess profits. Intermediaries unable to do so will flee from the market.
The mean-variance model which takes into consideration the effects of 
securitization on a financial depository intermediary's portfolio is based on the 
following assumptions:
1. The financial depositoiy intermediary is a price taker.
2. The intermediary holds three types of assets in its portfolio: low risk
mortgages, high risk mortgages and risk free securities 11 with expected 
returns, t^, i^, and Uf,,. The low risk mortgages have a variance of ctl 2 and 
the high risk mortgages have a variance of a h2, where a h2> aL2.
The intermediary holds one liability -- deposits. The deposits have an 
expected cost of Uj, and variance of od2. The assets and the liability each have 
returns which follow a joint normal distribution.
3. The intermediary is a single period risk averse expected utility maximizer.
Its strictly quasi concave utility function, U, can be determined by the mean 
and variance of final wealth. Risk preference is defined by Pratt's (1964) 
relative risk aversion param eter r .
4. Federal regulators try to limit the probability of bank insolvency by the
imposition of capital requirements.
The intermediary solves the following minimization problem in order to determine
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its efficient portfolio in mean-variance space and its appropriate asset holdings for 
each efficient portfolio.
m in ^ak2= ^ x ' V x = [ l - 1/k»x i 1 ]
X 1
r̂ v, x-v]
Jv, v 2 x, j
subject to
Ek-<1- 1/k>ua+V ° i
' / k= x t ' e
x ,> 0  and  0 <k<l  
where
1. k is a given equity to asset ratio. It implies a fixed deposit to equity ratio
d - V k ) .
2 . Ua is the mean cost of deposit of deposits, a d2 is the variance of the cost of
deposits.
3. U1 is a 3x1 vector of asset returns [uh u L uRf] .
4. VI is a 3x1 vector of covariance between deposit cost and asset returns
tU dh U dL U dRf ̂ *
V2 is a 3x3 positive definite variance-covariance matrix of asset returns
V a hL 2 a hRf
a hL a LRf
a hRf CTLRf 0
5. X, is a 3x1 vector [x L xh x rf] of each asset's holding as a proportion of 
equity capital. X, is equal to or greater than [0 0 0] because of restrictions 
on short selling.
6 . e = (1 1 0). Thus, X /e  = 1/k.
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7. The mean and standard deviation of return per unit of equity capital are
and ok.
The solution to the problem indicates that as k increases (less leverage), the 
intermediary's efficient portfolio is located downward and to the left in E - a 2 space 
(see Figure 8 , efficient frontier Rf G1 R2); as k decreases (more leveraged), the 
efficient frontier is located upward and to the right of the less risky frontier (Figure8 , 
efficient frontier R f P i P2). The global frontier, Rf G1 G2, is an envelope of 
efficient frontiers with various levels of k.
The intermediary's utility function determines its portfolio choice from its 
opportunity set. A  unique solution to the portfolio choice problem is guaranteed by 
the strictly quasi concave objective function and is determined by equating the 
intermediary's marginal rate of substitution between risk and return 
'UE/ Uj=r • a/ ( i - r .E) * to marginal rate of transformation along the efficient frontier. 
The optimum is characterized by [ E ( r )  ,ct(T) ,k(r) ,x, (T) ] which depends on 
r.
Intermediary insolvency occurs when E  < -1. When the return on equity is 
normally distributed, the probability of insolvency, p, can be determined for any 
(E ,o )
• r -  ~  -* 1 _  p #prob  [E<-1]  = probj~E-E < -1-E~j
. Lct a jTherefore, E=-l-(f)(p) »cr and -(bfpl =E+l
a
where (J) ( • )  is the inverse of the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
This equation represents the line connecting E  = -1 with a particular portfolio on
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Figure 8  The Effect of Capital Regulation on Financial Depository 
Intermediary Insolvency in Mean-Variance Space
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the efficient frontier. The line's slope is (E+l ) / c r .  The steeper the line, the better 
shape the intermediary is in financially (lower insolvency risk).
Regulators step in and control prob [E<-1]  by bounding it at a,  which is 
determined by "considering the tradeoff between the regulators' safety goal and 
preservation of economic efficiency as well as a 1 s  consistency with mispriced deposit 
insurance. " 12
With normality, prob [ E < - 1 ] becom esE>-i-4>(ct) • a .  According to Figure 
8 , only portfolios to the left of Lr: E=-l-ct>(a:) » a = - l [  (Er+ l ) / c r r ] »ct meet the 
solvency standard. The intermediary's portfolio can be classified as safe. P I is 
classified as a risky portfolio because the line L has a  flatter slope than the 
regulators' line Lr.
The capital ratio requirement is enforced in order to achieve the solvency 
standard. Since at kr on Figure 8 , Rf G1 R2 and the global frontier R f G1 G2 are 
in unison at R f G l, regulators instruct intermediaries to operate with a k of at least 
kr. They hope that when k > kr intermediaries will invest in portfolios along Rf G l 
rather than those along G l G2, like that represented by PI. However, capital 
constraints reduces the opportunity set available intermediaries. For example, 
intermediaries which are risky cannot invest in certain portfolios, such as that 
represented by G l, in an attempt to satisfy k > kr. The area between G l G2 and G l 
R2 is infeasible. However, the constrained set is not limited to R f G l. Portfolios 
G l R2 are still feasible. When an intermediary chooses a  portfolio on G l R2, it has 
met its capital requirement but not its solvency standard. Intermediaries with r 1 s  
less than the critical risk aversion param eter at which the marginal rate of
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substitution is equal to the marginal rate  of transformation at R f G l would choose 
a portfolio along G l  R2. Such intermediaries increase their risk by taking on lower 
quality assets (or disposing of higher quality assets) in order to offset the impact of 
capital regulations (lower leverage).
A  bank may fund a loan in two ways. O ne is to  emit deposits. The other, 
securitization, involves the issuance of securities to investors. Thus, the investor may 
own the loan by directly purchasing securities which are collateralized by the loan, 
or indirectly by holding bank deposits. Securitization is one means of reshuffling a 
portfolio in order to take on more risk. High-quality, low-risk assets will be 
securitized, and low-quality, high-risk assets will be held in response to inefficiently 
priced deposit insurance and stringent capital regulation. R ather than hold a less 
risky portfolio, like that along R f G l, intermediaries may choose to rearrange their 
asset holdings through the use of securitization, selling off their high-quality assets 
and holding a risky portfolio, like that lying along the G l R2 frontier in Figure 8 . 
The intermediary will have met its capital requirem ent through this rebalancing, but 
is now more at risk for becoming insolvent. An intermediary with high-risk assets is 
in effect subsidized at the expense of the insurer. The subsidy is passed on to 
shareholders.
B. Evidence on Security Offerings 
Previous research on capital structure focuses on security offerings by 
industrial firms. With corporate taxes, Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that the 
use of debt financing rather than equity financing results in a  higher total market
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value for the firm's outstanding securities because interest on debt is deductible for 
purposes of computing a firm's tax bill.13 Smith's (1986) analysis of security offerings 
focused not only on capital structure effects, but also implied cash flow changes, 
unanticipated announcements, changes in ownership, and informational asymmetry. 
However, due to the possible significance of such market imperfections as corporate 
and personal taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information, and agency costs, the 
relevance of capital structure changes and security offerings becomes an empirical 
issue.
There exists a body of empirical literature which suggests that capital structure 
decisions impact industrial firm value. For example, the announcement effects of 
tender offers on the market value of corporate securities have been studied by 
Masulis (1980a), Dann (1981), and Vermaelen (1981).14 Masulis (1980b, 1983) used 
corporate exchange offers to examine the effects of capital structure changes on 
security prices. More or less the same results were reported by all the researchers: 
leverage increasing transactions have a positive impact on firm value. Likewise, 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Kowar (1986) find a  negative reaction 
to new equity offerings. On the other hand, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
demonstrate negative stock price reactions to the issuance of equity and debt. Eckbo 
(1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find strong negative reaction to debt 
announcements.
The attention to bank and S&L capital structure (and security offerings) is 
significantly less than that granted to other, less regulated industries. There is, 
however, substantial justification for investigating the financial policies of depository
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institutions. Banks and S&Ls generally have financial characteristics unparalleled 
among other industries. For instance, since the balance sheet of a thrift is very 
different from that of most other industrial firms, financial policy decisions may be 
based on factors unique only to thrifts.
Another reason why the financial policy of banks and S&Ls may be based on 
determinants different from that of other industries is advanced by Gupta and 
Walker (1975). They contend that regulatory requirements may be an important 
factor taken into consideration by management when financial policy is determined. 
The regulatory environment may mitigate the informational asymmetry which exists 
for a typical corporate offering. The market response to the announcement of 
depository financial intermediary issues may be similar to the stock price reactions 
to the announcement of security offerings by other regulated firms, such as utilities.
Asquith and Mullins (1986) find differences in security announcement effects 
between industrials and utilities. They explain that security offerings by utilities are 
more predictable in the capital market than offerings by industrial companies due to 
the increased disclosure required by regulators. Masulis and Kowar (1986) examine 
seasoned equity offerings by both industrial firms and utilities. They conclude that 
the determinants of the response for the industrials were different from that for the 
utilities because of the regulatory process involved. According to Dann and 
Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986), the issuance of 
debt by utilities produces no significant announcement effect.
However, the regulatory process under which commercial banks and S&Ls 
operate is different from that for utilities. These differences still allow for different
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types of announcement effects. Polonchek et.al. (1986) studied the strength of the 
market response to security offerings by commercial banks. They find valuation 
impacts that are similar to those reported by nonfinancial corporations: significant 
negative responses to bank offerings of common stock or convertible preferred stock; 
insignificant responses to debt or debt-related offerings.
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to examine the capital m arket response to mortgage-backed security 
offerings of depository financial intermediaries, it is necessary to investigate the 
possible presence of abnormal returns using event study methodology. If asset 
securitization by intermediaries involves the potential for a wealth transfer to occur 
between the deposit insurers and intermediaries' shareholders, then we should expect 
to observe an increase in their stock prices during announcements of MBS issuance.
A. The M arket Model Approach 
The m arket model is one of the simplest empirical methods in use today. Not 
supported by any theory, it assumes that the returns on a particular security are 
linearly related to returns on a "market" portfolio .1
It is hypothesized that the issuances of mortgage-backed securities have 
positive impacts on the m arket value of a depository financial intermediary. The 
abnorm al returns represent a potential wealth transfer betw een the federal deposit 
insurer and shareholders. The wealth transfer may occur if the assets which remain 
on the intermediary's books are those most likely to cause insolvency. It is 
postulated that there may be an asymmetry in information between the intermediaiy 
and the insurer in order to achieve the wealth transfer. Interm ediaries which are not 




A direct test of the above hypothesis based on methodology advanced by 
Brown and Warner (1980) is used to estimate the return
= a , + + e ,
where
R = the rate of return on security i during day t,
a , = the constant term for security i's regression equation.
B, = the slope term for security i's regression equation.
R m = the return on the market on day t, and
e .. = the unsystematic component of security i's returns on day t.
The unsystematic component, or "error" term. e.. is the measure of security i's 
abnormal return on day t, since it represents the deviation of security i's return from 
its expected return, conditional upon the realized return on the market portfolio. In 
an efficient market, where returns are not allowed to systematically differ from those 
which are predicted, e. must be such that
E(e.) = [E(e.\l = 0)]p(I =0) + [E(^:\I = l)]p(I= 1) = 0 
where I is an integer which is equal to 0 when an event takes place and equal to 1 
when an event does not take place. Furthermore, the variance of e. is 
a 2( e iT) .
The expected rate of return for security i during day t, given the realized 
market return is
&it — + (^mt ^
where 2, and B, are ordinary least squares estimates of a , and B The expected 
rate of return for each security is estimated over a comparison period from day -K
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through -L. The comparison period is chosen so that it precedes and does not 
coincide with the announcement period (where t = 0 is the announcement day of a 
MBS offering by firm i).
Therefore, at each day t for each security i, the excess return is the difference 
between the forecasted and the actual amount of return
® i t  ~  ^ i t  — ~  ^ i ^ m t
where
8„ = the excess return on security i at time t.
The market model is applied to all firms in the sample and the excess returns
are calculated for each day relative to the announcement day.
The excess returns are averaged across N firms on each event day t to form
an average portfolio excess return 
_  N
e t = 1/N Z e i t . 
i = l
The e. are accumulated between days r and r + j  to obtain a cumulative 
average excess return
T + j _
CAER r , r + j  =  Z e .
t  = T
where CAER r , T + j  is the cumulative excess return from day t = t to t = r+ j  .
Similar to that employed by Dodd and Warner (1988), a Z-statistic is used to 
evaluate the significance of the cumulative average excess return.2 It is computed 
according to the following process.
The excess return, 8lt, for each security i is standardized by its estimated 
forecast standard deviation for each of the days (j+ l)  *n l^e period under study
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^ I 1 + Lj +
t = l
Li
= (R»t -  R«)
s2 is the estimated residual variance from the market model regression for security 
i. R m is the average market return over the L, days used for the regression.
For each security i, the standardized excess returns for each of the days in the 
period under study are added together to form a standardized cumulative excess 
return
If the excess returns, e., are normal and independent across t, then the
SCAER , is distributed Student-t with (L,-2) degrees of freedom. However, .if L,
is large (between 200 and 300) SCAER is assumed to be unit normal.
The statistical significance of SCAER in a sample of N securities is tested by
computing
z  =  SCAER 7 n
SCAER =  ( 1 / N )  Z SCAERj .
i = l
If the SCAERs are independent across securities, then the mean of the SER is equal 
to 0 and the Z-statistic will be distributed unit normal.3
SCAER,
r+ j
Z S E R it
i




B. The M ean Adjusted Returns Approach 
In addition to the market model, the m ean adjusted returns approach (as 
described by Brown and W arner, 1980) will be used to investigate the effect of 
mortgage-backed security issuance on financial firm value .4
The m ean adjusted returns model assumes that security i has an ex-ante 
expected return that is equal to some constant. The predicted ex-post return on 
security i at time t is also equal to this constant. For each event day t for each 
sample security i, the excess return is calculated as the difference between the actual 
return and the predicted return 
qt = R  u ■ E (R  lt)
where
= excess return to security i at time t,
R  ,t = rate  of return to security i at time t, and
E (R  lt) = expected rate of return  to security i a t time t, a constant.
The expected rate o f return for each sample security E (R  „), is estimated over the 
same comparison period as that used in the m arket model, day -K through -L. It is 
the m ean of security i's raw return during the comparison period.
The excess returns are averaged across N firms on each event day t to form
an average portfolio excess return
_  N
e t = 1 /N  S e i t . 
i = l
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An estimate of the variance of the average ^  is calculated over some other period
which precedes and does not coincide with the announcement period such as -X
through -Y days which is equal to a period of Nc days.
— - y  _
a2 ( e t ) = 1 /N c S ( e t -  e ) z
t = - x
where e is the mean excess return over the Nc trading days.
The cumulative average excess returns are determined by summing over event 
time excess portfolio returns:
T+j _
CAERr, r+j = 2 e t 
t  = T
where CAER r , r+ j  is the cumulative average excess return from day r until day 
r + j .
We test whether the excess returns are significant by calculating t-statistics.
The t-statistics for ^  and CAER t , r+ j  are calculated by
t ( e t ) = e t/ a  (e"t )
and
t (CAER r , r + j ) = CAER T, r+j  /  a(CAER r , T+j )
where
a  ( e t ) = standard deviation of ^  estimated over the period -X through -Y 
a (CAER r , r + j ) = standard deviation of CAER r , r+j  
= (0 ' + l ) v a r ( | ) f s.
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C. Analysis of Variance
To examine the determinants of the excess returns associated with MBS 
offerings, we will use an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model. The analysis of 
variance model is a statistical tool used to study the relation between a dependent 
variable and one or m ore independent variables which are term ed factors.
ANOVA models are very similar to regression models in a num ber of ways. 
They both study the relation between dependent and independent variables. 
Application of these models is appropriate for observational data and data from 
experiments. Furtherm ore, like regression, the dependent variable analyzed in an 
ANOVA model is a quantitative variable. W hen the independent variables are 
qualitative, there is no difference between ordinary regression and ANOVA models. 
Regression analysis with the use of indicator variables does not make any 
assumptions about the nature of the statistical relationship and provides the same 
results as that from an ANOVA model. ANOVA models exist because the "structure 
of the independent indicator variables permits computational simplifications that are 
explicitly recognized in the statistical procedures for the analysis of variance ." 5 Thus, 
rather than perform  cross sectional least squares regressions, the ANOVA model is 
used to examine the determ inants of the excess returns associated with MBS 
offerings.6
In an ANOVA model, there are r levels of the factor under study (in this 
investigation, there are two factor levels -- two types of intermediaries, insured and 
uninsured or two types of securities -- primary and derivative). These factor levels 
will be identified by the index i (i = 1 , . . ., r). The num ber of observations in each
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nT = S rij
The index j is used to identify a given observation for a particular factor level.
The single factor ANOVA model can be stated as follows:
y .. = it. + e . -* i j  \  j
where
Y(j = the value response variable in the jth trial for the ith factor level 
treatment,
/i,. = parameters, and
eij = random error terms, independent and normally distributed with mean 
0  and variance a 2 .
There are several important features of the ANOVA model which should be
noted.
1. Since E(e,j) = 0, then E(Y,j) = /Zj. All observations in the ith factor level 
have the same expectation /x{.
2. All observations have the same variance. Since /x,- is a constant, 
a2 (Yjj) = a2(ejj) = a2.
3. Yjj is independent and normally distributed since ey is independent and 
normally distributed.
The parameters of the ANOVA model are estimated from sample data. The 
method of least squares is used to fit the model and provide estimators of the
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param eters.
An F test is used to determ ine whether or not the factor level means are 
equal.7 The alternative conclusions we wish to consider are 
Ho: I*, = n z = . . . = t*r 
Ha: not all the are equal.
The test statistic used for choosing between the alternatives is 
F* = M STR/M SE
where
MSTR -  treatm ent m ean square, and 
MSE = error mean square.
W hen we conclude Ha, that the factor level means are not all equal, there is a 
relation between the dependent variable and the factor level.
W hen the F  test leads us to conclude that the factor level means are not all 
equal, the estimation of a difference or con trast8 between the factor level means 
is usually employed in the estimation of factor level effects. Therefore, several 
methods of multiple comparisons -- Tukey, Scheffe', and Bonferroni -- are applied 
to m ake the analysis m ore complete. These methods provide confidence intervals 
which are deem ed significant when the interval does not cover zero .9
The Tukey m ethod of multiple comparisons, which uses the studentized range 
distribution, q, provides intervals for all pairwise comparisons, -  m,- 1 • The 




T = J 2  q (1 -  a ;  r ,  nT -  r )  .
This method is exact when all q 's are equal. It is a conservative method of 
multiple comparisons when the sample sizes are unequal with family confidence 
coefficient of at least 1 - a .
The Scheffe' method is also used in the estimation of factor level effects. It 
applies when the family of statements is the set of all possible contrasts among the 
factor level means:
L =  SCjjLtj
where
SCj = 0.
The confidence intervals for the Scheffe' method are computed as follows: 
L jh  Ss(H)
where
L = S C j / i j ,
s z (L) = MSE Sc,.2, and
n i
S2 = ( r  -  1) F (1 -  a ;  r  -  1 , n T -  r )  .
The Scheffe' method is exact whether or not all the q 's  are equal.
The Bonferroni method is applicable whether contrasts, pairwise comparisons, 
linear combinations, or any combination of the above are to be estimated. The
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num ber of statements to be estim ated is denoted by g. The confidence intervals for 
the Bonferroni m ethod are computed as follows:
Lj + B s(L j)  i = l ,  . . . , g
where
B = t ( l  -  a  /  2 g ;  n T -  r )  .
The Bonferroni method is also exact whether or not all the i^'s are equal.10
CHAPTER V 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of mortgage-backed security 
offerings on financial firm value. This chapter details the sample and data sources 
used in the study.
A. Sample Selection 
The sample was collected by examining all MBS issuance announcements by 
intermediaries in the period between 1978-1988. All firms that issued MBSs during 
the 1978-1988 period were eligible for inclusion in the sample, subject to data 
availability. Issuance information concerning offering date, issuing institution, 
underwriters, issue amounts, and terms of the issue (type of security, maturity date, 
number of tranches, coupon rate, yield, rating, and price) is published monthly in 
American Banker. Issuers include thrifts and commercial banks, which have access 
to federal deposit insurance, as well as investment banking houses, government 
agencies, and conduits set up for the specific purpose of MBS issuance. The latter 
group of issuers obviously does not have access to federal deposit insurance.
i
Information detailing whether an intermediary is federally insured is obtained from 
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual. Appendix B gives detailed information of the 
MBS offerings used in the event study.
O f course, to be included in the final sample the issuing intermediary had to 
be listed on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily return file at
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the time of the announcements. Otherwise, it would be impossible to test the effect 
of MBS issuance on financial firm value. Daily common stock returns to each of the 
MBS issuers were used to m easure the m arket's reaction to MBS offerings on 
financial firm value. Returns for 200 days prior to the announcem ent date are used 
to estimate the control equation for each security .1
D ata for the event study does not include years 1978-1982 because issuing 
intermediaries from these years did not appear on the CRSP tape. Furtherm ore, 
returns for 1988 are not available. Also excluded from the sample used to perform 
the event study are issues of the FNMA and FHLM C because they are nondepository 
government agencies, created to help facilitate the flow of funds to the mortgage 
market. Any comparison between U.S. government agencies and other issuers in the 
secondary mortgage m arket would be unfair because the agency securities are backed 
by the full faith and credit of the Federal government. Private issues from banks, 
S&Ls, conduits, and investment banking houses are at a  clear disadvantage. In the 
final analysis, a  total of 194 offerings over the 1983-1987 period is used in the event 
study. Forty-four of the announcements were m ade by insured intermediaries; the 
remaining 150 announcements were m ade by the uninsured intermediaries.
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B. Announcement Dates 
As in any investigation using event study methodology, it is pertinent to 
determine accurate public announcement dates. The first public announcement of 
a pending MBS offering by an issuer is considered day zero (the announcement 
day). Offering dates and issues are published monthly in the American Banker. 
After the offerings were collected, all were researched in the Wall Street Journal 
Index for one year prior to the offering date for any mention of an upcoming MBS 
offering. None of the issues were mentioned in the Wall Street Journal prior to (or 
after) the offering date. Only government agency issues of the FNMA and FHLMC 
warranted coverage in the Journal prior to the offering date. Therefore, the first 
public information associated with the MBS issues in this study was released on the 
offering date. Since no other announcements related to these issuers could be found, 
any abnormal returns associated with the mortgage-backed security offerings will be 
interpreted as related solely to the offerings.
CHAPTER VI 
EM PIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter presents the empirical results of the investigation of the effect 
of mortgage backed security offerings on financial firm value. The reaction of 
m arket prices to such offerings are examined using the methodology presented in 
Chapter IV.
A. Insured Interm ediaries 
Table 5 presents the average excess returns and the cumulative average excess 
returns as defined in Chapter IV for insured interm ediaries for 60 days prior to the 
event (announcem ent) date on through 10 days afterward using the m arket model 
with a value weighted index as a proxy for the m arket portfolio. (Appendix C 
presents results using the market model with the S&P 500 Index as the market 
proxy.) Z  statistics are presented in order to evaluate the statistical significance of 
the excess returns. These statistics allow us to test the null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal perform ance on any particular day o r days.
Most of the daily m ean residuals (average excess returns) prior to the
i
announcement date are positive (32 out of the 60 days preceding the announcement 
exceed zero). O f these, the average excess returns on days -59, -47, -44, -36, and 
-29 are significant according to the Z  statistics.1 These returns occur far from the 
event date and are probably just random noise. However, there may be some 
information leakage concerning the issue which has not been picked up by the Wall
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Table 5 Daily Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries Generated by
Market Model (value weighted market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z  Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0001 -0.063 44 -0.0001 -0.06 -0.063 44
-59 0.0091 2.432* 44 0.0089 1.76 1.766 44
-58 0.0024 0.991 44 0.0113 2.01* 2.012* 44
-57 0.0048 1.234 44 0.0162 2.36* 2.357* 44
-56 -0.0037 -0.517 44 0.0125 1.88 1.869 44
-55 -0.0036 -0.670 44 0.0089 1.44 1.426 44
-54 -0.0007 -0.108 44 0.0082 1.29 1.277 44
-53 0.0031 0.035 44 0.0113 1.22 1.201 44
-52 -0.0023 -0.089 44 0.0090 1.12 1.109 44
-50 0.0065 1.179 44 0.0155 1.44 1.414 44
-50 0.0010 -0.302 44 0.0165 1.28 1.258 44
-49 0.0008 0.086 44 0.0173 1.25 1.329 44
-48 -0.0023 -0.089 44 0.0090 1.12 1.109 44
-47 0.0065 1.179 44 0.0155 1.44 1.414 44
-46 -0.0007 0.295 44 0.0171 1.34 1.426 44
-45 0.0039 0.897 44 0.0210 1.52 1.669 44
-44 0.0023 2.178* 44 0.0232 2.01* 2.143* 44
-43 0.0052 0.685 44 0.0284 2.11* 2.275* 44
-42 -0.0060 -1.182 44 0.0224 1.78 1.951 44
-41 0.0023 0.147 44 0.0247 1.77 1.913 44
-40 -0.0022 -0.591 44 0.0225 1.60 1.731 44
-39 0.0093 1.784 44 0.0317 1.94 2.051* 44
-38 -0.0009 -0.450 44 0.0308 2.00* 2.087* 44
-37 -0.0044 -1.819 44 0.0264 1.58 1.682 44
-36 0.0109 3.095** 44 0.0373 2.17* 2.222* 44
-35 -0.0018 -1.008 44 0.0355 1.93 2.005* 44
-34 -0.0045 -1.084 44 0.0310 1.68 1.766 44
-33 -0.0030 -0.419 44 0.0280 1.58 1.648 44
-32 -0.0046 -0.954 44 0.0234 1.37 1.454 44
-31 0.0029 0.257 44 0.0263 1.39 1.466 44
-30 -0.0015 -0.923 44 0.0249 1.54 1.546 44
-29 0.0090 2.254* 44 0.0339 1.91 1.886 44
-28 -0.0005 -1.081 44 0.0333 1.69 1.685 44
-27 0.0037 0.483 44 0.0370 1.75 1.750 44
-26 0.0012 0.547 44 0.0382 1.82 1.803 44
-25 0.0155 1.841 44 0.0534 2.10* 2.053* 44
-24 0.0027 1.170 44 0.0560 2.26* 2.180* 44
-23 0.0020 0.587 44 0.0580 2.13* 2.059* 44












-21 0.0037 0.943 44 0.0582 2.14* 2.057* 44
-20 0.0012 0.436 44 0.0594 2.05* 1.967* 44
-19 -0.0030 -0.042 44 0.0565 2.02* 1.931 44
-18 -0.0043 -1.319 44 0.0523 1.79 1.728 44
-17 0.0021 0.121 44 0.0543 1.79 1.721 44
-16 -0.0033 -0.141 44 0.0511 1.75 1.686 44
-15 0.0024 0.035 44 0.0534 1.73 1.643 44
-14 0.0013 0.448 44 0.0548 1.77 1.671 44
-13 -0.0032 -0.360 44 0.0516 1.70 1.604 44
-12 0.0018 0.091 44 0.0533 1.67 1.578 44
-11 0.0032 0.487 44 0.0565 1.72 1.613 44
-10 -0.0042 -1.014 44 0.0524 1.57 1.466 44
-9 -0.0008 -0.656 44 0.0517 1.46 1.372 44
-8 0.0082 1.811 44 0.0597 1.69 1.569 44
-7 -0.0051 -0.814 44 0.0547 1.57 1.461 44
-6 -0.0010 -0.158 44 -.0538 1.58 1.475 44
-5 0.0027 0.214 44 0.0564 1.53 1.491 44
-4 0.0057 1.693 44 0.0620 1.74 1.714 44
-3 -0.0011 -0.505 44 0.0609 1.66 1.636 44
-2 0.0016 0.282 44 0.0625 1.68 1.652 44
-1 -0.0017 -0.354 44 0.0608 1.62 1.592 44
0 0.0064 0.978 44 0.0671 1.73 1.680 44
1 0.0029 2.050* 44 0.0699 1.98* 1.887 44
2 -0.0101 -0.252 44 0.0601 1.65 1.608 44
3 -0.0022 -1.006 44 0.0580 1.52 1.542 44
4 0.0057 1.693 44 0.0620 1.74 17.14 44
5 0.0185 2.197* 44 0.0807 1.92 1.883 44
6 0.0046 1.643 44 0.0853 2.10* 2.023* 44
7 -0.0031 -0.700 44 0.0822 2.00* 1.931 44
8 -0.0025 -0.312 44 0.0797 1.95 1.879 44
9 0.0036 0.524 44 0.0833 2.00* 1.913 44
10 0.0072 1.488 44 0.0905 2.15* 2.049* 44
•significant at .05 level 
••significant at .01 level
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Street Journal. This seems likely since MBS offerings are very structured and involve 
a great deal of people. Some information about the issue is bound to become public 
knowledge prior to the event date. The average residual on the announcement day, 
0.0064, is positive, but statistically insignificant. However, sixty-one percent of the 
residuals on the announcement date are positive. The two-day announcement period 
return is 0.93 per cent and, with a Z  statistic of 2.14, it is statistically different from 
zero at the 0.05 level of significance (see Table 6 ). Sixty-seven percent of these 
residuals are positive. This suggests that mortgage-backed security offerings can 
affect the riskiness of depository (insured) intermediaries and can result in a wealth 
transfer from deposit insurers to shareholders.
We also measured the returns associated with our MBS issuance announcements 
by employing the mean adjusted return approach to our sample, t statistics evaluate 
the statistical significance of the excess return. Table 7 presents the average excess 
returns and cumulative average excess returns as defined in Chapter IV for insured 
intermediaries for 60 days prior to the event (announcement) date on through 10 
days afterward using the mean adjusted returns model. The pattern of average 
excess returns (mean residuals) obtained when using the mean adjusted returns 
model is similar to that obtained from the market model with a value weighted 
market proxy. A  majority of the returns in the period under investigation are 
positive. The mean residuals for days -43, -36, -22, and +3 are positive and 
statistically significant. The announcement day return is positive, but has an 
accompanying t of only 0.23. Fifty-six percent of the residuals on the announcement 
date are positive. The CAERs in Tables 7 and 8  show no significance (except for
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CAER-60(. 57). Furtherm ore, the CAERs for such intervals as -1 to 0 and 0 to + 1, 
which were positive when the m arket model was applied, are now negative (though 
insignificant). However, differences between the results from the models are not 
surprising "in veiw of the fact that the two methods would be perfectly consistent ex­
post only if ex-post m arket returns were constant over the entire estimation 
period . " 2
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Table 6 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), Selected Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 .0340 1.31 1.520 44
-10 to -1 .0044 .12 .410 44
+1 to +10 .0232 1.47 1.508 44
-1 to +1 .0076 1.54 1.535 44
-1 to 0 .0047 .44 .484 44
0 to 1 .0093 2.14* 2.098* 44
‘significant at .05 level 
‘ •significant at .01 level
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Table 7 Daily Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries Generated by
Mean Adjusted Returns Model, 1983-1987
Mean t t
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic N
-60 -0.0020 -0.45 44 -0.0020 -0.45 44
-59 0.0102 1.27 44 0.0082 0.14 44
-58 0.0013 0.70 44 0.0093 1.66 44
-57 0.0013 1.33 44 0.0150 2.10* 44
-56 0.0030 0.80 44 0.0105 1.51 44
-55 -0.0030 -0.40 44 0.0075 1.22 44
-54 -0.0012 -0.21 44 0.0063 1.05 44
-53 0.0048 0.72 44 0.0111 1.23 44
-52 0.0048 1.25 44 0.0100 1.25 44
-51 0.0041 0.58 44 0.0141 1.36 44
-50 0.0051 0.94 44 0.0141 1.20 44
-49 0.0041 0.91 44 0.0081 0.80 44
-48 -0.0072 -1.77 44 0.0008 0.28 44
-47 0.0058 0.77 44 0.0066 0.71 44
-46 -0.0031 -0.92 44 0.0034 0.45 44
-45 -0.0006 -0.21 44 0.0029 0.38 44
-44 -0.0017 -0.38 44 0.0011 0.87 44
-43 0.0080 2.16* 44 0.0091 0.54 44
-42 -0.0051 -1.20 44 0.0013 0.89 44
-41 0.0028 0.54 44 0.0042 0.79 44
-40 0.0016 0.02 44 0.0005 1.10 44
-39 0.0105 1.93 44 0.0100 0.69 44
-38 0.0053 0.80 44 0.0090 0.61 44
-37 -0.0024 -0.85 44 0.0066 0.81 44
-36 0.0129 2.08* 44 0.0195 0.10 44
-35 0.0059 0.03 44 0.0149 0.43 44
-34 -0.0027 -0.98 44 0.0052 0.87 44
-33 -0.0007 -0.15 44 0.0045 0.91 44
-32 0.0011 1.27 44 0.0024 1.19 44
-31 0.0032 0.49 44 0.0007 1.10 44
-30 0.0048 1.10 44 0.0005 0.91 44
-29 0.0076 0.15 44 0.0070 0.63 44
-28 -0.0026 -0.88 44 0.0045 0.89 44
-27 0.0050 0.75 44 0.0095 0.77 44
-26 0.0007 0.17 44 0.0102 0.75 44
-25 0.0161 0.86 44 0.0260 0.40 44
-24 0.0042 0.18 44 0.0301 0.14 44
-23 0.0027 0.23 44 0.0327 0.20 44










-21 0.0044 0.91 44 0.0334 0.21 44
-20 0.0001 0.45 44 0.0335 0.29 44
-19 -0.0019 -0.31 44 0.0317 0.26 44
-18 0.0021 0.75 44 0.0286 0.44 44
-17 0.0031 0.47 44 0.0317 0.39 44
-16 -0.0021 -0.55 44 0.0271 0.51 44
-15 0.0035 1.04 44 0.0305 0.45 44
-14 0.0031 0.93 44 0.0336 0.33 44
-13 0.0118 0.63 44 0.0313 0.38 44
-12 -0.0020 -0.56 44 0.0293 0.52 44
-11 0.0056 1.18 44 0.0348 0.36 44
-10 -0.0030 -0.69 44 0.0318 0.47 44
-9 0.0039 1.45 44 0.0316 0.56 44
-8 0.0104 1.08 44 0.0417 0.22 44
-7 -0.0004 -0.45 44 0.0341 0.44 44
-6 -0.0025 -0.75 44 0.0295 0.58 44
-5 -0.0007 -0.03 44 0.0253 0.80 44
-4 0.0024 0.42 44 0.0276 0.66 44
-3 0.0037 1.00 44 0.0312 0.54 44
-2 0.0060 1.27 44 0.0320 0.58 44
-1 -0.0042 -0.73 44 0.0278 0.68 44
0 0.0032 0.23 44 0.0310 0.66 44
1 -0.0034 -0.72 44 0.0267 0.76 44
2 0.0032 0.50 44 0.0168 1.08 44
3 0.0092 2.28^ 44 0.0169 1.08 44
4 0.0037 1.08 44 0.0205 0.96 44
5 0.0219 1.78 44 0.0414 0.57 44
6 0.0041 1.49 44 0.0452 0.40 44
7 0.0035 0.71 44 0.0426 0.47 44
8 0.0061 1.73 44 0.0403 0.54 44
9 0.0048 0.86 44 0.0447 0.45 44
10 0.0061 1.25 44 0.0502 0.31 44
♦significant at .05 level 
♦♦significant at .01 level
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Table 8 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries
Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, Selected Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER t Statistic N
-10 to 10 .0781 .43 44
-10 to -1 .0156 .55 44
1 to 10 .0593 1.10 44
-1 to 1 -.0044 -.70 44
0 to 1 -.0002 -.34 44
•significant at .05 level
••significant at .01 level
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B. Uninsured Intermediaries
Results for uninsured intermediaries using the market model with a value 
weighted index are presented in Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9 gives the average and cumulative average excess returns for 60 days 
prior to the event on through ten days afterward. Most of the average excess returns 
are negative, but insignificant. Prior to the event day, only two days show statistical 
significance. Day -46 has a positive and significant return, while day -39 has a 
negative, but significant return. These are probably random effects. The 
announcement day has a positive return, but a Z  statistic of only 0,506. However, 
sixty percent of the residuals on this date are non-negative. The period after the 
announcement day shows no significant average excess returns.
The cumulative average excess returns seem to be consistently negative, but 
insignificant, except for CAER_60 +3, CAER_60+4, and CAER_60+5, which have Z 
statistics of -2.03, -1.98, and -1.96, respectively. However, the Z lBps deem these 
CAERs insignificant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, these results lend credence to the 
hypothesis that uninsured intermediaries do not have an incentive to reshuffle their 
portfolios toward more risky assets due to their lack of federal insurance and other 
regulatory constraints.
Table 10 presents cumulative average excess returns for certain intervals while 
using the value weighted index as a proxy for the market. Periods from day -10 to 
day +10 and day -10 to day -1 are negative and significant according to both the Z 
and 2^p statistics.
We aiso measured the return associated with MBS issuance announcements 
by uninsured intermediaries by employing the mean adjusted returns approach.
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Table 9 Daily Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Uninsured Intermediaries Generated
by market Model (value weighted market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z  Z  Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0003 -0.565 150 -0.0003 -0.56 -0.565 150
-59 0.0003 -0.088 150 0.0000 -0.46 -0.447 150
-58 -0.0016 -0.317 150 -0.0016 -0.56 -0.538 150
-57 0.0006 0.697 150 -0.0010 -0.14 -0.116 150
-56 0.0009 1.022 150 -010002 0.34 0.357 150
-55 0.0007 0.374 150 0.0005 0.46 0.475 150
-54 -0.0013 -0.414 150 -0.0008 0.27 0.280 150
-53 0.0010 0.910 150 0.0002 0.57 0.582 150
-52 -0.0020 -1.331 150 -0.0017 0.10 0.115 150
-51 -0.0013 -0.816 150 -0.0030 -.017 -0.139 150
-50 -0.0015 -0.373 150 -0.0045 -0.27 -0.320 150
-49 0.0015 0.494 150 -0.0030 -0.12 -0.166 150
-48 -0.0009 -0.489 . 150 -0.0039 -0.25 -0.284 150
-47 -0.0014 -0.535 150 -0.0053 -0.38 -0.413 150
-46 0.0025 2.227* 150 -0.0028 0.21 0.161 150
-45 -0.0026 -1.389 150 -0.0054 -0.15 -0.185 150
-44 -0.0032 -1.463 150 -0.0086 -0.50 -0.544 150
-43 0.0024 1.091 150 -0.0062 -0.23 -0.267 150
-42 -0.0019 -1.007 150 -0.0081 -0.45 -0.530 150
-41 0.0012 0.845 150 -0.0070 -0.25 -0.334 150
-40 -0.0021 -1.538 150 -0.0091 -0.58 -0.662 150
-39 -0.0036 -2.414* 150 -0.0127 -1.08 -1.130 150
-38 0.0018 0.806 150 -0.0109 -0.89 -0.925 150
-37 0.0012 0.534 150 -0.0097 -0.76 -0.785 150
-36 -0.0003 -0.356 150 -0.0099 -0.82 -0.835 150
-35 -0.0013 -1.088 150 -0.0113 -1.02 -1.027 150
-34 0.0016 0.923 150 -0.0096 -0.82 -0.839 150
-33 0.0003 0.194 150 -0.0094 -0.77 -0.788 150
-32 0.0001 0.095 150 -0.0092 -0.74 -0.754 150
-31 0.0003 -0.074 150 -0.0090 -0.74 -0.751 150
-30 0.0005 0.587 150 -0.0085 -0.62 -0.637 150
-29 -0.0013 -0.720 150 -0.0097 -0.74 -0.745 150
-28 0.0011 0.419 150 -0.0086 -0.65 -0.665 150
-27 0.0001 0.363 150 -0.0085 -0.58 -0.595 150
-26 -0.0019 -0.711 150 -0.0104 -0.69 -0.736 150
-25 0.0027 1.550 150 -0.0077 -0.43 -0.488 150
-24 -0.0006 -0.330 150 -0.0083 -0.47 -0.531 150
-23 -0.0008 -0.229 150 -0.0091 -0.51 -0.559 150












-21 -0.0012 -0.825 150 -0.0090 -0.48 -0.529 150
-20 0.0021 0.987 150 -0.0070 -0.32 -0.367 150
-19 0.0001 0.275 150 -0.0069 -0.27 -0.323 150
-18 -0.0009 -0.317 150 -0.0078 -0.32 -0.361 150
-17 -0.0012 -0.770 150 -0.0089 -0.43 -0.465 150
-16 -0.0024 -1.439 150 -0.0113 -0.64 -0.654 150
-15 -0.0011 -1.016 150 -0.0125 -0.78 -0.782 150
-14 -0.0017 -0.764 150 -0.0141 -0.89 -0.872 150
-13 0.0009 0.403 150 -0.0132 -0.82 -0.805 150
-12 -0.0016 -0.704 149 -0.0148 -0.91 -0.881 150
-11 -0.0004 -0.190 149 -0.0152 -0.93 -0.911 150
-10 -0.0002 -0.200 150 -0.0154 -0.95 -0.923 150
-9 -0.0009 -1.002 150 -0.0163 -1.08 -1.035 150
-8 -0.0020 -1.057 150 -0.0184 -1.21 -1.151 150
-7 -0.0012 -1.200 150 -0.0195 -1.37 -1.286 150
-6 -0.0010 -0.067 150 -0.0206 -1.36 -1.275 150
-5 -0.0025 -1.485 150 -0.0231 -1.55 -1.439 150
-4 -0.0032 -1.854 150 -0.0263 -1.78 -1.643 150
-3 0.0016 0.894 150 -0.0247 -1.65 -1.521 150
-2 -0.0009 -1.247 150 -0.0256 -1.80 -1.650 150
-1 -0.0001 0.356 150 -0.0257 -1.73 -1.592 150
0 0.0014 0.506 150 -0.0243 -1.66 -1.519 150
1 -0.0005 -0.494 150 -0.0248 -1.71 -1.559 150
2 -0.0023 -1.775 150 -0.0270 -1.91 -1.738 150
3 -0.0029 -1.353 150 -0.0399 -2.07* -1.869 150
4 0.0006 0.569 150 -0.0293 -1.98* -1.790 150
5 0.0004 0.071 150 -0.0289 -1.96* -1.777 150
6 0.0016 1.010 150 -0.0273 -1.82 -1.653 150
7 -0.0012 -0.0007 150 -0.0285 -1.81 -1.638 150
8 -0.0015 -0.650 150 -0.0300 -1.87 -1.687 150
9 -0.0003 -0.154 150 -0.0303 -1.88 -1.684 150
10 -0.0009 -0.399 150 -0.0311 -1.91 -1.697 150
•significant at .05 level 
••significant at .01 level
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Table 10 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Uninsured 
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), Selected 
___________ Intervals, 1983-1987_________________________________________________________________
Interval CAER Z Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 -.0159 -2.08* -1.98* 150
-10 to -1 -.0105 -2.17* -2.117* 150
+1 to +10 -.0068 -1.00 - .951 150
-1 to +1 .0008 .21 .215 150
-1 to 0 .0013 .61 .611 150
0 to +1 .0009 .01 .010 150
•significant at .05 level
••significant at .01 level
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Table 11 presents the daily average excess returns associated with MBS issuance by 
uninsured intermediaries generated by the mean adjusted returns model. Most of 
the mean residuals are negative and several show significance (days -50, -47, -45, - 
40, -39, + 2, + 8). Furthermore, the CAERs in the same table show significance 
toward the end of the investigation period. Table 12's examination of the CAERs 
during selected intervals report the same evidence: negative and significant returns. 
The appearance of these returns (especially those close to the event date) are 
difficult to justify economically since uninsured intermediaries have no incentive to 
split their assets into "good" and "bad" performers. Perhaps, the negative returns are 
related to the firms' cash needs, which are met by the selling off of assets. The 
market may perceive the selling off of assets by uninsured intermediaries as an 
indication that the intermediaries' future cash flows are expected to be low, thus 
leading to negative returns. The only observation which can be made which is 
consistent with our original hypothesis is that the period surrounding the event day 
(and including it, days -1, 0 , and + 1) shows positive returns, even though those 
returns are statistically insignificant (where sixty-three percent of these residuals are 
positive).
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Table 11 Daily Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Uninsured Intermediaries Generated
by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, 1983-1987 
Mean t t
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic N
-60 0.0006 -0.30 150 0.0006 -0.30 150
-59 -0.0007 -0.57 150 -0.0001 -0.61 150
-58 -0.0008 0.04 150 -0.0010 -0.48 150
-57 0.0024 1.73 150 0.0015 0.45 150
-56 0.0014 1.36 150 0.0018 0.82 150
-55 0.0007 0.54 150 0.0025 0.97 150
-54 0.0001 -0.08 150 0.0026 0.87 150
-53 -0.0005 -0.19 150 0.0021 0.82 150
-52 -0.0017 -1.13 150 0.0004 0.40 150
-51 -0.0018 -1.09 150 -0.0018 -0.01 150
-50 -0.0042 -2.12* 150 -0.0060 -0.65 150
-49 0.0027 1.28 150 -0.0034 -0.25 150
-48 0.0003 0.33 150 •0.0031 -0.15 150
-47 -0.0039 -2.58* 150 -0.0070 -0.59 150
-46 0.0016 1.21 150 -0.0054 -0.26 150
-45 -0.0050 -2.53* 150 -0.0106 -0.91 150
-44 -0.0035 -1.89 150 -0.0141 -1.34 150
-43 0.0027 1.56 150 -0.0124 -1.02 150
-42 -0.0029 -1.48 150 -0.0152 -1.33 150
-41 0.0019 0.91 150 -0.0134 -1.10 150
-40 -0.0035 -2.19* 150 -0.0181 -1.66 150
-39 -0.0049 -2.72** 150 -0.0230 -2.20* 150
-38 0.0037 1.62 150 -0.0193 -1.82 150
-37 -0.0005 -0.27 150 -0.0202 -1.86 150
-36 0.0005 0.38 150 -0.0197 -1.75 150
-35 -0.0021 -1.29 150 -0.0218 -1.97 150
-34 0.0025 1.10 150 -0.0195 -1.74 150
-33 0.0024 1.12 150 -0.0184 -1.59 150
-32 0.0022 1.18 150 -0.0162 -1.34 150
-31 0.0021 0.75 150 -0.0141 -1.18 150
-30 0.0009 0.61 150 -0.0142 -1.11 150
-39 -0.0012 -0.73 150 -0.0156 -1.24 150
-28 0.0022 0.91 150 -0.0133 -1.00 150
-27 0.0002 0.51 150 -0.0139 -1.00 150
-26 -0.0034 -1.50 150 -0.0177 -1.27 150
-25 0.0034 1.78 150 -0.0145 -0.97 150
-24 0.0003 0.07 150 -0.0149 -0.97 150
-23 -0.0018 -0.99 150 -0.0167 -1.13 150










-21 -0.0024 -1.39 150 -0.0183 -1.23 150
-20 0.0028 1.43 150 -0.0155 -1.00 150
-19 0.0006 0.57 150 -0.0151 -0.91 150
-18 0.0002 0.34 150 -0.0149 -0.84 150
-17 -0.0011 -0.72 150 -0.0174 -1.01 150
-16 0.0013 -0.94 150 -0.0192 -1.16 150
-15 -0.0008 -0.78 150 -0.0201 -1.28 150
-14 -0.0020 -1.19 150 -0.0221 -1.44 150
-13 0.0002 0.03 150 -0.0224 -1.44 150
-12 -0.0003 -0.17 150 -0.0226 -1.45 150
-11 -0.0025 -1.46 150 -0.0260 -1.69 150
-10 0.0006 0.26 150 -0.0255 -1.64 150
-9 0.0006 0.08 150 -0.0257 -1.65 150
-8 -0.0020 -1.27 150 -0.0277 -1.81 150
-7 -0.0008 -0.71 150 -0.0286 -1.90 150
-6 -0.0020 -0.51 150 -0.0306 -1.95 150
-5 -0.0004 0.04 150 -0.0318 -1.97* 150
-4 -0.0034 -1.65 150 -0.0354 - 2.18* 150
-3 0.0018 0.82 150 -0.0336 - 2.06* 150
-2 -0.0009 -0.87 150 -0.0351 - 2.18* 150
-1 0.0006 0.34 150 -0.0350 - 2.14* 150
0 0.0026 1.16 150 -0.0324 - 1.97* 150
1 0.0004 0.01 150 -0.0326 -1.98* 150
2 -0.0043 -2.71 ♦♦ 150 -0.0369 -2.31 ♦ 150
3 -0.0028 -1.13 150 -0.0397 - 2.43* 150
4 -0.0020 -1.12 150 -0.0324 - 1.97* 150
5 -0.0026 -1.79 150 -0.0442 - 2.78* * 150
6 0.0021 1.07 150 -0.0421 - 2.60* * 150
7 -0.0008 0.32 150 -0.0429 - 2.54* 150
8 -0.0043 -2.22* 150 -0.0471 - 2.79* * 150
9 -0.0010 -0.71 150 -0.0480 -2.85** 150
10 0.0011 0.43 150 -0.0474 -2.80** 150
♦significant at .05 level 
♦♦significant at .01 level
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Table 12 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Uninsured 
Intermediaries Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, Selected Intervals, 1983i1987
Interval CAER t Statistic N
-10 to 10 -.0176 -2.42* 150
-10 to -1 -.0059 -1.29 150
1 to 10 -.0143 -2.59* * 150
-1 to 1 .0036 .79 150
-1 to 0 .0032 .97 150
0 to 1 .0030 .73 150
•significant at .05 level
*’ significant at .01 level
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C. ANOVA Results
Single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) models will be used to analyze 
the effects of the independent variables under study on the dependent variable.
The independent variables (or factors) measure the type of intermediary -- 
insured or uninsured -- or the type of MBS issued -- primary or derivative. (The type 
of MBS issued is also investigated using event study methodology in Appendix C. 
However, the results are somewhat ambiguous. The ANOVA results are more 
determinate.)
The dependent variable is the average excess return on day zero or the 
cumulative average excess return for one of the following intervals: -60 to + 10, -10 
to + 10 , -1 to + 1, -1 to 0 , 0  to l .3
First, we will look at the results generated by the ANOVA models which use 
the market model returns. Table 13 presents the results when the returns from 
insured intermediaries are compared to that from uninsured intermediaries. The F 
statistic is used to determine whether or not the factor level means are equal. When 
the F  statistic is significant, several methods of multiple comparisons -  Tukey, 
Scheffe', and Bonferonni -  are applied to estimate the factor level effects of interest.
The results from equations I, II, and V lead us to conclude that the factor 
level means are not equal, or that the two different types of intermediaries do not 
lead to the same mean residual. Thus, we conclude that there is a relation between 
type of intermediaiy and returns. Furthermore, through the multiple comparisons, 
we conclude with confidence coefficient 0.95 that mean returns for the uninsured 
intermediaries fall below those for the insured intermediaries by somewhere between
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0.0468 and 0.1750, and 0.0396 and 0.0409, and 0.0008 and 0.0209, respectively for 
equations I, II, and V.
Now we will examine the results which use the m ean adjusted returns model 
generated returns. Table 14 presents the results when the returns from insured 
interm ediaries are compared to that from uninsured intermediaries. The results from 
equations IV and V provide us with evidence to infer that insured and noninsured 
interm ediaries do not lead to the same m ean residual. We conclude that there is a 
relation between type of intermediary and excess returns. We estim ate with 
confidence coefficient 0.95 that the m ean residuals for insured interm ediaries are 
higher than those for uninsured intermediaries by somewhere between 0.0303 and 
0.0837, and 0.0424 and 0.0820, respectively for equations IV and V.
Table 15 examined only the insured intermediaries and tries to determine 
whether or not there is any relation between type of security issued (primary or 
derivative) and m ean residuals generated by the m arket model. The ANOVA model 
provides us with evidence that no relation exists. The F  statistics for all of the 
equations do not even approach significance. The factor level means are equal, thus, 
the two different types of securities lead to the same m ean residual for insured
t
intermediaries. Table 16 also examines the insured interm ediaries and tries to 
determ ine whether or not there is any relation between type of security issued and 
residuals from the m ean adjusted returns model. There is no evidence to indicate 
that any relationship exists.
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Table 17 and 18's results for uninsured intermediaries lead to the same 
conclusion regarding type of security issued and the returns from the market model 
and the mean adjusted returns model, respectively — no relation exists.
Table 13 ANOVA Results: Insured vs. Uninsured Intermediaries, Market Model (value weighted market proxy) Return
Estimates
D ependent
Variable Treatment F R2 Tukev Bonferronl Scheffe*








II. CAER.1010 .06621102 4.87* .023 0.0396715
0.0409885
0.396714


























significance tested  at .05 level
Table 14 ANOVA Results: Insured vs. Uninsured Intermediaries, Mean Adjusted Return Estimates
Method of Multiple Comparisons*
D ependent
Variable Treatm ent F R2 Tukey Bonferronl Scheffe'

























V. CAER10 0.15754828 11.35* 0.052 0.0424289













“significance tested  at .05 leveF
Table 15 ANOVA Results: Insured Interm ediaries, Primary vs. Derivative Securities, Market Model (value w eighted market
proxy) Return Estimates
_____________________________________________________________________________________ Method of Multiple Comparisons*______
D ependent
Variable Treatm ent F R2 Tukey Bonferroni Scheffe'




































significance tested  at 0.05 level
Table 16 ANOVA Results: Insured Intermediaries, Primary vs. Derivative Securities, Mean Adjusted Return Estimates
 _________   Method of Multiple Comparisons*
Dependent
Variable Treatment F R2 Tukey Bonferronl Scheffe'






































"significance tested  at 0.05 level
Table 17 ANOVA Results: Uninsured Intermediaries! Primary vs. Derivative Securities. Market Model (value weighted market
proxy) Return Estimates
_____________________________________________________________________________________ Method of Multiple Comparisons"______
Dependent
Variable Treatment F R2 Tukey Bonferroni Scheffe'






































‘’significance tested  at 0.05 level
Table 18 ANOVA Results: Uninsured Intermediaries, Primary vs. Derivative Securities, Mean Adjusted Return Estimates
_____________________________________________________________________________________ Method of Multiple Comparisons*______
Dependent
Variable Treatment F R2 Tukey Bonferroni Scheffe'










































TESTS ON RELATIVE YIELD SPREADS BETW EEN 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
AND TREASURY BONDS
This chapter will investigate yield spreads between mortgage-backed securities 
and treasury bonds. It is hypothesized that if insured institutions securitize high- 
quality loans, then we might expect to see differences in yield spreads between 
mortgage-backed securities issued by insured versus uninsured intermediaries. 
Previous literature on yield spreads between mortgage-backed securities and 
government securities is relatively sparse. The sample upon which the test will be 
performed and its corresponding methodology will also be discussed.
A. Literature on Yield Spreads 
Calculating the yield on mortgage-backed securities is a subject rich in 
controversy. There is no doubt that the nature of the underlying mortgages plays 
an important role in determining the yield of the security.
However, there are some problems associated with mortgage yield. First, the 
possibility of all of the remaining principal balance prepaying on one date is not 
likely for a pool consisting of a large number of mortgages. Second, "mortgage yield 
for a given type of security is always based on the same assumptions of years to 




Hendershott, Shilling, and Villani (1982) overcome the difficulty associated 
with comparing mortgages and Treasury securities. They compare government 
agency issues with a portfolio of Treasury bonds. The yield on the portfolio consisted 
of a weighted average of the yields on Treasury securities which become due at the 
same time at which prepayments are expected to be made by mortgage borrowers, 
i.e., if 2 0 % of the mortgage pool were assumed to be prepaid in year one, 2 0 % of 
the portfolio yield would consist of one year Treasury bonds. This accounts for 
scheduled timing differences and expected early terminations. They found that the 
spread between Treasuries and GNMA pass-throughs were due to the valuation of 
the call option given to mortgage borrowers and the exemption from certain taxes 
given investors in Treasury securities.
Several other researchers have also investigated yield spreads between MBSs 
and Treasury bonds.2 The introduction of certain forms of MBSs into the 
marketplace is viewed as a market completing innovation, providing for more trading 
opportunities for investors. Roll (1987) states that financial innovations, CMOs in 
particular, are responsible for a reduction in spreads between mortgages (and 
mortgage-backed securities) and treasuries. More competition in the market means 
that similar securities must provide similar benefits in the form of rates of return. 
When capital markets are efficient, the risk adjusted after tax expected yields for all 
securities will be the same. Through the use of yield spreads between GNMAs and 
Treasury bonds, Chloewicki (1985) and Nothaft, Gabriel, and Rothberg (1987) also 
conclude that the introduction of derivative securities affects mortgage pricing.
I l l
Jameson, Dewan, and Sirmans (1988) look a t mortgage- Treasury spreads 
directly. The absolute and relative spreads were regressed against explanatory 
variables representing default premium, CMO introduction, yield curve slope, short 
term  interest rate, and total mortgage volume. All were significant. However, the 
variable under strictest scrutiny represented CMO introduction. A significant 
negative effect on yield spreads (a 31 basis point reduction for the absolute spread 
model and a 2 .8 % reduction for the percentage spread model) due to the 
introduction of CMOs was reported, reaffirming the findings of the other researchers. 
Jameson, Dewan, and Sirmans quantify the welfare gain associated with the 
narrowing of the mortgage-Treasury spread and estimate it to be between $3.5 and 
4.5 billion.
B. Relative Yield Spread Testing 
To present further evidence concerning yield spreads, the relative yield 
spreads between mortgage-backed securities and Treasury bonds will be examined.
The yields to both Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities should be 
identical, if the capital markets were efficient. However, this is not so due to 
differences in the instruments (see Hendershott and Villani, 1980 and Black, 
Garbade, and Silber, 1981). It is postulated that the yields between Treasury bonds 
and mortgage-backed securities differ due to differences in term  to maturity, 
refinancing options, type of intermediary and rating.
Therefore, the yield on a Treasury security, YT, is thought to be composed of 
YT = r + 1% + tj.
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where
r  = a risk adjusted after tax expected yield,
tr = term  effect for Treasury securities.
The yield on a MBS issued by an insured intermediary, YMBSINS, is comprised 
of the following:
Ymbsins = r  + nms + c
where
r^s = rating on the MBS,
Imbs = term  effect for MBSs, and
c = call premium.
The yield on a MBS issued by a noninsured intermediary, Y ^ hoh, is comprised 
of the following:
Y hbSNON = r + Tmbs + + c + bba
where
Vffls = prem ium  due to type of interm ediary issuing the MBS.
Therefore, the yield spreads examined (where Y^.. represents the yield on a 
MBS issued by either an insured or a noninsured intermediary), is a function of the 
following
Ymbs - Yt = f  (term, type of intermediary, rating, call premium).
The yield from a MBS will be compared to  a  Treasury bond of identical 
maturity. Each tranche of a  MBS, which has separate differing yields and maturity 
dates, will be treated as a separate security. Tranches will be broken down into 
short-term  intermediate-term , and long-term tranches.
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The type of intermediary represents whether the issuer of the MBS is insured. 
The yield spread between issues of insured intermediaries and Treasury bonds are 
expected to be narrower than that between the issues of noninsured intermediaries 
and Treasury bonds. Insured intermediaries are backed by the full faith and credit 
of the United States government. That is, if the principal and interest on 
mortgage-backed securities are guaranteed by each issuing commercial bank or S&L 
and if the federal deposit insurers (FDIC or FSLIC) are able to make restitution on 
all contingent liabilities of insolvent intermediaries, then indirectly, the federal 
deposit insurers are guaranteeing the securities. This will be reflected in their 
market price. Furthermore, it has already been postulated that banks and S&Ls will 
choose to securitize only their "best" assets, leaving behind on the intermediary's 
balance sheet those assets which are riskier. The MBS issues of insured 
intermediaries will be composed of high-quality assets. They will be less risky and 
have lower yields than issues of noninsured intermediaries, whose issues of MBSs will 
be composed of an array of high- and low-quality assets.
MBSs are usually assigned a rating of triple A, double A, or A  by Moody's 
and /o r Standard and Poor's rating service. The yield spread between high-grade 
securities and Treasury bonds is not as distinct as that between low-grade securities 
and the Treasuries.3
Some issues, however, are not rated at all. Moody's official position is that 
it will consider rating any issue, whether or not requested to do so by the issuer if it 
believes the rating will provide value to investors. However, according to Alterescu 
and Hinkle (1988), "there is no certainty that a Moody's rating will be assigned to a
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particular transaction, or if assigned, when it will be assigned . " 4 Standard and 
Poor's, on the other hand, provides ratings only when requested to do so by the 
issuer. Therefore, when an issue is not rated, it does not necessarily imply that the 
issue is below investment grade.
The refinancing option is thought to have a large impact on yield spreads. 
The underlying collateral for MBS's is made up of a pool of mortgage loans which 
usually have prepaym ent clauses. They allow the borrower to prepay the loan after 
some specified date with no penalty. As interest rates fall, the borrower prepays; if 
rates rise, the option to prepay expires without exercise. Mortgage loan contracts 
operate like call options -  the borrower can "call" his mortgages and buy it back for 
a certain payment. Therefore, the prepayment clause has a definite effect on MBS's. 
The cash flows, and thus the yield, of a MBS depend on the timing and amount of 
principal prepayments. As prepayments are m ade on a pool, the investor's payment 
of interest and principal declines, because the prepaym ent reduces the amount 
outstanding on which interest is collected.
The call option would ideally be measured by calculating the yield spreads 
between callable and noncallable corporate bonds. However, almost all bonds have 
call features. Thus, an empirical study comparing the yields on callable and 
noncallable bonds is not possible. It is possible to compare the yields of newly issued 
bonds with an immediate call privilege with those which have a deferred call.5 
Therefore, the call option will be calculated by measuring the yield between utility 
and industrial bonds. Utility bonds are usually not callable for five years after the
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issue; industrial bonds are not callable for ten years. A  match is made between the 
maturity on the tranche and the maturities of the utility and industrial bonds.
C. Sample Selection and Data 
The sample used to investigate yield spreads consists of CMO and REMIC 
issues by financial intermediaries in the period between 1985-1988. Only CMOs and 
REMICs were investigated because their length of maturity is much easier to 
estimate than that of pass-throughs, bonds, and strips. However, this sample was 
much larger than that used in the event study because (1) the issuers need not be 
listed on the CRSP tape, (2) issues for 1988 are included in the sample, and (3) each 
tranche is treated as a separate security.6 Yields and stated maturities for each 
tranche of each security issue is published monthly in American Banker. Information 
about this sample is detailed in Table 19. The top part of Table 19 breaks down the 
sample by year of issue. Even though CMOs were first issued in 1983, public 
announcement of CMO issuance by private financial intermediaries did not occur 
until 1985 (only the government agencies were issuers of CMOs in the early 1980's). 
Most of the issues used in this study occurred in 1987. Furthermore, about 20% of 
the entire sample consists of issues by insured intermediaries. The bottom part of 
Table 19 shows the distribution of the yield spread data by maturity and ratings. 
Most of the tranches have long-term maturities. Unrated tranches make up most of 
the sample, about 70%.
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Table 19. Distribution of Yield Spread D ata
A. By Year, 1985-1988 
Number of Issues Num ber of Tranches
Year insured uninsured total insured uninsured total
1985 •3 11 14 10 32 42
1986 26 103 129 73 322 395
1987 52 196 248 159 754 913
B. By Maturity and Ratings
Num ber of Tranches
maturity unrated rated total
short-term  (_< 9 years) 32 5 37
interm ediate-term  (10-18 years) 2 1 2 72 284
long-term ( > 1 9  years) 1043 451 1494
Total 1287 528 1815
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Additional information needed to perform the relative yield spread 
comparison includes Treasury yields. Treasury bonds are matched to each tranche 
of the MBS's on the basis of issue date and maturity date. T-bond maturities and 
yields are collected from the Wall Street Journal. Information concerning the access 
to federal deposit insurance (insured or not insured) is obtained in Moodv's Bank 
and Finance Manual. MBS rating (if rated at all) is published monthly in American 
Banker along with the offerings. The information for the call option is retrieved 
from the Wall Street Journal.
D. Empirical Results
The spreads between insured issues, uninsured issues, and Treasury bonds of 
comparable maturity are plotted in Figure 9. Each dot represents the average spread 
of each issue. As can be seen, the spread for the insured intermediaries is smaller 
than the spread for the uninsured intermediaries.
To examine the determinants of the relative yield spread between mortgage- 
backed securities and Treasury bonds, we first estimated the following regression:
SPREAD = b0 + bi RATING + bJN S  + t^CALL + b,ST + b5IT
where
SPREAD = yield on MBS - yield on Treasury bonds,
RATING = 1 if MBS is unrated
0 otherwise,
INS = 1 if intermediary has access to federal deposit insurance
0  otherwise,
Figure 9
Spreads Between Insured Issues, Uninsured Issues, 
and Treasury Bonds of Comparable Maturity
bJ
<o
SIN IO d SISV0
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CALL = yield on utility bond - yield on corporate bond,
ST = 1 if tranche has a stated maturity less than or equal to 9 years
0  otherwise,
IT = 1 if tranche has a stated maturity between 10 and 18 years
0  otherwise,
The issues were then broken down into the three groups of maturities-short- 
term, intermediate-term, and long-term (as defined in Table 19B). Regression 
equations were then estimated using the variables RATING, INS, and CALL.
Table 20 provides the estimated least squares regression equations using the 
sample data. The first equation uses the entire sample as input for the model with 
dummy variables representing stated maturity. The parameter coefficient for 
RATING is positive since the yield spread between unrated securities and Treasury 
bonds is more distinct than that between rated securities and Treasuries. There is 
a negative relation between SPREAD and whether the intermediary has access to 
federal deposit insurance. This adheres to the previous hypothesis that the MBS 
issues of insured intermediaries will be composed of high quality assets. They will 
be less risky and have lower yields than issues of noninsured intermediaries, whose
i
issues of MBSs will be composed of an array of high-and low-quality issues. The 
positive relation between CALL and SPREAD is due to the fact that the cash flows 
of the MBS depend on the timing and the amount of the principal repayments. The 
signs for both maturity dummy variables are negative.
The F statistic for the first equation of 19.285 leads to the conclusion that 
SPREAD is related to ratings, access to insurance, and term to maturity. The
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coefficients for RATING, INS, and IT  are significant according to the related t- 
statistics.
The second equation in Table 20 regresses RATING, INS, and CALL on the 
spread for short-term maturities. All of the independent variables exhibit the 
expected signs, but the entire equation is not significant (nor are any of the 
param eter coefficients).
In the third equation, the model examines the determinants of the spread for 
intermediate-term  maturities. The coefficient for CALL has the expected sign ( +) 
and is significantly different from zero, indicating that this variable plays an 
important role in the determination of the relative yield spread between 
intermediate-term  mortgage-backed securities and Treasury bonds. The param eter 
estimates for RATING and INS are as hypothesized, but insignificant. The F statistic 
of 4.099 leads to the conclusion that intermediate-term spreads are related to security 
ratings, access to federal deposit insurance, and an embedded call option.
The fourth equation from Table 20 regresses RATING, INS, and CALL on 
the spread for long-term maturities. The equation is significant, as are the param eter 
estimates for RATING and INS (all of the independent variables exhibit the correct 
signs). The param eter estimate for CALL is not significant in this equation; however 
it has steadily decreased as maturity has increased (equations II, III, and IV). This 
is anticipated for as the maturity increases, there is more call protection for such 
securities and we would expect to see a decline in the coefficient measuring the call 
option.
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The same regressions are run again, however, a new variable, TERM, is 
added to account for the term structure of interest rates. It has already been 
mentioned that derivative MBSs (such as CMOs) are viewed as an "unbundling" 
innovation. Cash flows from pass-throughs or pools are split into several tranches. 
Terms may specify that each tranche has a fixed interest payment and that all 
principal payments (including prepayments) go to the highest tranche until the 
security is paid off. After the first class (short-term tranche) is retired, principal 
payments are then applied to the next highest class of securities until they have been 
paid off also, and so on, until all classes of the original issue are retired. Thus, cash 
flows are tailored to match investor preferences for maturity-short-term  or long­
term. Therefore, it can be reasoned that the term structure of interest rates is crucial 
to CMO pricing. Dokko, Edelstein, and Rosen (1989) postulate that as the spread 
between long-term and short-term rates increase, the sum of the prices of the 
"unbundled" innovation (individual tranches) is greater than the price of the 
underlying "bundled" security. Their results show that CMO value is enhanced as the 
spread between long-term and short-term rates widen. It is hypothesized that the 
variable TERM  will have a negative effect on the spread between the yield on a 
MBS and the yield on a Treasury bond.
Table 20.
R esults of the Estimated Least Squares Regression 




CALL ST IT R2 F
entire 0.69292866 0.19022628 -0.50322878 0.004489520 -0.27277437 •0.38647673 0.0597 19285**
sam ple (32.836)** (5.671)** (-2.449)* (0.405) (-1.649) (-6.810)**
short­ 0.50303334 0.04415109 -0.11894431 0.07391151 0.0963 1.030
term (6.587)** (0.179) (-0.7434) (1.585)
Interm ediate- 0.47004392 0.01332417 -0.06164996 0.03429811 0.462 4.099**
term (17.998) (0.257) (-0.241) (3.438)**
long­ 0.69491702 0.23131016 -0.54632478 0.01042835 0.0352 14366**
term (29.483)** (5.884)** (-2.606)** (0.990)
*t statistics In paren theses
* significant at 0.05 level
** significant at 0.01 level
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The results of these regressions with the new variable T ER M  are presented in 
Table 21. TERM  represents the interest rate  percentage difference betw een 30 year 
and 1 year Treasury bonds.7 The data was extracted from the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin for each month represented in the sample.
The F  statistic for the first equation (entire sample) of 32.239 leads to the 
conclusion that spread is related to ratings, access to  insurance, term  to maturity, and 
the term  structure of interest rates. All of the param eter coefficients are of the 
correct sign and most are significant.
The equation representing the short-term  m aturities is not significant, but the 
coefficient for TERM  is significant.
In the third equation of Table 21, the coefficients for CALL and TERM  have 
the expected signs and are significantly different from  zero. The param eter estimates 
for RA TIN G  and INS are as hypothesized, but insignificant. The F statistic of 10.788 
leads to the conclusion that interm ediate-term  spreads are related to security ratings, 
access to federal deposit insurance, an em bedded call option, and the term structure 
o f interest rates.
The last equation is significant, as are all of the param eter estimates, except for 
CALL. However, CALL has steadily decreased as maturity has increased.
I
Table 21.
R esults of th« Estim ated L a n t Squares R egression 
Equations with the D ependent Variable SPREAD 
(including term  structure variable)*
Maturity Independent Variables




























































*t stetlstles In parentheses
* significant at 0.05 level
•* significant at 0.01 level
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS
A  study of mortgage-backed security offerings by financial firms may provide 
understanding into the areas of financial policy and firm value. This study provides 
an empirical analysis of MBS issuance announcements by financial intermediaries.
It was hypothesized that the issuances of mortgage-backed securities had 
positive impacts on the m arket value of a  depository financial intermediary (i.e., 
those financial firms which have access to federal deposit insurance). The abnormal 
returns represented a potential wealth transfer between the federal deposit insurer 
and shareholders. The wealth transfer occurs if the assets which remain on the 
intermediary's books are those most likely to cause insolvency. It was postulated that 
there may be an asymmetry in information between the intermediary and the insurer 
in order to achieve the wealth transfer. Interm ediaries which were not federally 
insured were thought not to have an incentive to split assets into "good" and "bad" 
perform ers for the purpose of securitization.
Commercial banks and thrifts are provided with a  type of subsidy from a 
federal deposit insurer in the form of deposit insurance supplied at less than
t
actuarially fair prices. Deposit insurance is levied at a  flat rate  against deposits 
without any regard for risks. Due to  financial and time constraints, insurers are 
unable to access accurately the quality of the lender's portfolio. Therefore, 
asymmetric information arises between lenders and federal insurers. The 
introduction of deposit insurance produces a  moral hazard because the incentive for
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intermediaries to manage their assets safely is removed. This encourages 
intermediaries to hold riskier assets. However, regulatory capital requirements also 
encourage intermediaries to hold risky assets, especially when the requirements 
disregard asset quality. Regulatory requirements in excess of what intermediaries 
would hold in absence of regulation make high-quality assets an inefficient use of 
funds. It was hypothesized in this study that the subsidy was captured by the 
intermediary then passed on to its shareholders in the form of greater returns, 
provided a  competitive market where all lenders are price takers.
In order to examine the capital market response to mortgage-backed security 
offerings of financial intermediaries, it was necessary to investigate the possible 
presence of abnormal returns using event study methodology -- the market model and 
the mean adjusted returns model. In the final analysis, a  total of 194 offerings over 
the 1983-1987 period were used in the event study. Forty-four of the announcements 
were made by insured intermediaries; the remaining 150 announcements were made 
by the uninsured intermediaries.
Most of the daily mean residuals in the period under observation (60 days 
prior to the event on through 10 days afterward) were positive for the insured 
intermediaries. Mean residuals around the announcement date were often positive 
and statistically significant from zero. This has suggested that mortgage-backed 
security offerings can affect the riskiness of depositoiy (insured) intermediaries and 
can result in a wealth transfer from deposit insurers to shareholders.
Results for uninsured intermediaries were somewhat mixed. Returns on and 
around the announcement date were positive and statistically insignificant. These
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results have lent credence to the hypothesis that uninsured intermediaries do not 
have an incentive to reshuffle their portfolios toward more risky assets due to their 
lack of federal insurance and other regulatory constraints. However, some residuals 
were negative and significant. The appearance of these returns are difficult to justify 
economically since uninsured intermediaries have no incentive to split their assets 
into "good" and "bad" performers. Perhaps, the negative returns are related to the 
firms' cash needs, which are m et by the selling off of assets. The market may 
perceive the selling off of assets by uninsured intermediaries as an indication that the 
intermediaries' future cash flows are expected to be low, thus leading to negative 
returns.
ANOVA results lead us to conclude that there is a relation between type of 
intermediary (insured or uninsured) and returns. The m ean returns for uninsured 
intermediaries fall below those for insured intermediaries.
ANOVA models were also used to determine whether or not there was any 
relation between type of security issued (primary or derivative) and mean residuals 
for insured and uninsured intermediaries. The ANOVA model provided us with 
evidence that no relation existed.
The final chapter investigated the relative yield spreads between mortgage- 
backed securities and Treasury bonds. It was postulated that the yields between 
Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities differed due to differences in type 
of intermediary, rating, terms to maturity, refinancing options and the term structure 
of interest rates. The call option was calculated by measuring the yield between 
utility and industrial bonds. The yield from a MBS was compared to a Treasury
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bond of identical maturity. Each tranche of a MBS was treated as a separate 
security. Tranches were broken down into short-term intermediate-term, and long­
term  tranches. The term structure was proxied by the interest rate percentage 
difference between 30 year and 1 year Treasury bonds. Results of the estimated least 
squares regression equations imply that the spread between Treasury bonds and 
mortgage-backed securities is related to security ratings, access to federal deposit 
insurance, an imbedded call option, and the term structure of interest rates.
APPENDIX A  
Modelling the Banking Firm 
A  plethora of academic literature exists attem pting to model and explain the 
behavior of banking firms. This literature can basically be divided into three 
approaches: ( 1) models of optimal asset choice, (2 ) models of liability choice, and 
(3) the two sided nature (modelling assets and liabilities simultaneously) of these 
financial firms. This section will review some of these models.
A  financial firm can be viewed as a microeconomic entity that attem pts to 
maximize an objective function in terminal wealth. Santam ero (1984) views a general 
form of the problem  as 
m ax  E [ V ( w t+T) ]  
subject to
Wt+r =  Wt ( 1 + t t+l )  ( l + f t+2) * * * ( 1 +f t +r) 
f t+K -  = a ™
t+K-1 ^t+K-1
where
V ( • )  = the objective function, where <5V / S wt+T>o a n d  <52V/<5W2T+t<0
wt+r = the value of term inal wealth at the horizon time r  
•jrt+K = the stochastic profit per unit of capital during period 
t + k  w h e r e  0 <K < t  
r ai = the stochastic return form asset i 
A , = the asset category i, where 1  < i  < n  
r Dj- = the stochastic cost for deposit j
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D j = the deposit category j, where l  < j  < m 
c  (*) = the operation cost function, where
<SC/<SAi > V i an d  S C / S D j £ 0 Vj 
Specifically, there are three different approaches to modelling the banking 
firm: asset choice, liability choice, and asset-liability choice.
Asset allocation models are of two types: (1) reserve management models 
which address the problem of the optimal amount of reserves to be held by a bank 
and (2 ) portfolio composition models which deal with the selection of assets 
according to risk and return. The concepts underlying these two problems are not 
entirely separable (Pantinkin, 1965); reserves have an associated opportunity cost 
which is decided by the of risk in the portfolio.
The reserve management model dates back to the 1800's (Edgeworth, 1888). 
Other contributions to the literature have been made by O rr and Mellon (1961), 
Poole (1968), Modigliani, Rasche, and Cooper (1970), Cooper (1971), Frost (1971), 
Baltensperger (1972a, 1972b, 1974), Brown (1972), Knobel (1977), and Ratti (1979).
The model is as follows. A bank has only one liability, its deposits, denoted
D. On the other hand, it has two assets: R, nonearning reserves and A, its interest 
bearing assets which earn a net rate of r. Outflow of bank deposits are defined as 
X. When X>R,  the bank incurs a reserve deficiency at a cost of p per $1 of 
deficiency. The bank wishes to maximize its expected profit from its deposit balances 
by maximizing the following function:
The first order conditions result in a reserve quantity that satisfies the condition
Thus, if r is independent of A  (the bank partakes in price taking behavior), profit is 
maximized when the opportunity cost of reserves, on the margin, equals the expected 
reduction in operating or transaction costs devoted to reserve adjustments.
Santam ero (1984) credits the reserve managem ent model with complete and 
sensible results. However, he chides the researchers for assuming that all liquidity 
considerations can be reduced to the reserve managem ent problem. Many important 
issues, such as the definition of liquidity, its m easurem ent or optimal quantity, are 
never taken up in this model.
Portfolio choice models of asset allocation are o f two types. First, the bank 
is viewed as a monopolist, dictating its loan price. Models devised by Shull (1963), 
Klein (1971), and Porter (1961) attem pt to find a bank's optimal asset size from the 
maximization of expected profits. The following typifies this behavior:
These models represent the bank's problem  as a single period maximization. 
Intertem poral demand considerations and multiperiod maximization are rarely 
modelled.
m ax  i t  = S fr afA( 
A , . D,
where
The first order conditions result in
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The second form of portfolio choice models uses risk and return as criteria 
(see Pyle, 1971,1972; Parkin, 1970; H art and Jaffee, 1974; and Sealey, 1980). These 
models maximize a concave function in end of period profit. The firm's preference 
ordering is represented by a quadratic or exponential function
E(ir) “ (b/ 2) a T2 
where profit and variance are defined as
T  =  S i r Ai A i “  S j r D j D j '
<7T2 = E[  (t - E ( t ) ) 2 ] •
The asset choice is restricted to the efficient frontier. A point is selected where the 
objective function's marginal rate of substitution between risk and return is equated 
with the market's opportunity cost.
The modelling of the right hand side of a bank's balance sheet can focus on 
either deposits or capital and leverage. Deposit modelling techniques have been 
proposed by Klein (1971). The bank is viewed as having control over its deposit 
rates. The deposit model is very much like the portfolio choice model of asset 
allocation. First order conditions imply that the marginal cost of funds from deposits 
equal the marginal cost (use) of funds from the competitive market.
This simple analysis is complicated by the introduction of production costs, 
as shown by Sealey and Lindley (1977), Klein and Murphy (1971) and Baltensperger 
(1972). Mitchell (1979) and Startz (1983) extend the analysis to demonstrate the 
importance of implicit payments by banks to attract more deposits. The profit 
function in this case can be written as
TT =  -  EjTpjDj  ”  Ej  [ ( C j - K j )  Hj (D j )  ] .
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The capital and leverage decision has been written about in great length and 
detail in the finance literature. Different approaches have been used to cover this 
topic. Kahane (1977) and Koehn and Santamero (1980) use the portfolio choice 
model. Pringle (1974) uses the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to find optimal 
capital.
Taggart and G reenbaum  (1978) develop a single period model in which the 
bank chooses its level of debt, D, and equity, E, which determines its loan volume, 
L, and maximizes its net present value of equity. W ith the regulation of reserves 
alone and no deposit insurance, the bank is required to hold a  certain amount, r, of 
reserves. The total amount of loans made by the bank is equal to 
L  = D (l-r)  + E
Banks charge a price p  for transaction services and incur an average cost of c per 
transaction; (p - c)T(D) is the profit on transaction services. The rate  paid on 
deposits (or debt) is equal to i; the revenue from loans is equal to 9 G (L) where © 
is a random  variable that takes on the values from zero to one. At some level of e*  
(the bankruptcy point), revenues equals costs 
©*G(L)  +  ( p - C ) T ( D )  =  ( l + i - r ) D  
when © < e * , the bank defaults. As equity increases, the volume of loans increase 
(which produces a benefit to shareholders). W ith deposits held constant, the 
expected return on deposits would, increase, i would have to then decline in order 
to restore equilibrium. With reserve requirem ents and a prohibition of interest on 
deposits, the bank's bankruptcy point then becomes 
9 * G ( L ) + t  =  ( l - r ) D
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As equity increase, it enhances the safety of deposits, but i can no longer decline to 
reflect this. Instead, the expected return on the bank's deposits will increase and 
thus making the bank more attractive to potential depositors. The shareholders will 
view the new equity as a  source of funds and as a protection against risk. With 
deposit insurance, the bankruptcy point is
6*G (L) +n—I  =  ( l - r ) D  
where I is the premium paid for the insurance. The bank then has no incentive to 
raise equity because it no longer affects the safety of its deposits. Shareholders 
realize additional loan revenue only when 0 > 0 * . Orgler and Taggart (1983) 
extend the previous study and attribute variations in bank capital to differential scale 
and efficiency of bank operations.
Merton (1977) and Sharpe (1978) apply the option pricing methodology to the 
insurance of bank deposits. These analyses consider four parties: the bank, the bank 
stockholder, the depositor, and the insurer. The bank promises the depositor a 
return, B, for the use of its funds. If at the end of one period, the bank's assets A, 
are greater that B, then the bank pays the depositor his return and the insurer is not 
involved. The shareholder receives A - B. If, however, B> A, then the depositor still 
receives B. His return is paid from the insurance fund and the residual value of the 
assets. The shareholder receives nothing. Therefore, the payoff to the insurance 
fund is
max [O, B-A] = min [O, A-B]
Again, Santamero (1983,1984) criticized this type of modelling, too, citing that
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it is vague and model specific, leading to a  discrepancy betw een what is theorized 
and what is applied in practice.
Several models have been developed which focus on the two side, or
asset-liability, nature of the banking problem. These models treat the bank as having
to simultaneously deal with both the asset and liability m arkets. Several researchers
such as Parkin (1970), Deshmukh, et.al. (1983), H o and Saunders (1981) and others
have considered two sided modelling. However, the most famous (and most
criticized) is that work done in a paper by Klein (1971). Klein states that the bank
has a utility function which is linear in P, its rate of return on equity. The bank's
problem  then, is to maximize its expected utility, which is equivalent to maximizing
P. The bank can draw on two sources of funds (F): equity (W ) and deposits (B), of
which there are  m (i = l,...,m) types of deposits (SB{=B) which each pay R,. The
percentage of F  obtained through deposit type i is equal to a f . Thus, F = w+SB(
= W+B. But, Bj = a jF , therefore, F  = W + F s a , .  The bank can invest its
funds in any of the following three (j= 3) assets: cash, government securities, or loans
(private securities). Cash holdings have a zero explicit return; its implicit return,
however, is associated with the fact that such holdings reduce the likelihood of a
deficiency. A  penalty is associated with shortages.
n (x r C f  
2 (C-b)
represents the expected loss, expressed as a weighted rate  of return, from the bank's 
cash m anagem ent policy. X, and are the percentage of F  allocated to loans and
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government securities, respectively. E  ̂ and denote the expected return on loans 
and government securities where
El = h ( x L) , h* ( x L) < 0
and
p o o
Eg = .! \  gcj)(g)dg .
g  (<t>) is the probability density function.
With two types of deposits, D1 and D2, the expected return on equity, Ew is equal 
to
B .  = |1  + D .(R ,)+ D ,(R J) | k h W + x g R  -n (x ,- c y  X L  [RID ,(R ,)+ R 2D2(P2)]7  , ,( ,' j p (n )+ x g E , n (» ,- C )g '
X, is chosen at the point at which the marginal return on loans is equal to the 
average (and marginal) expected return on government securities. A  similar result 
holds for cash holdings. The first order conditions for profit maximization yields the 
rates of interest the bank will offer on its deposits:
R1 = E a  -  D, (R 1) / D 1 * (R.|)
R2 = EC* -  D2 (R2) / D 2 ' (R2) .
APPENDIX B
CRSP Listed Intermediaries That Issued Mortgage-Backed Securities, 1983-1987
Table 22 
Insured Interm ediaries
Issuer_______________________ D ate__________ Type of Security*
Alabam a Federal S&L 08-07-86 strips
Alabam a Federal S&L 07-28-87 bonds
Bank of New York 06-18-87 bonds
Boston Five Cents Bank 02-11-85 PT
Central Pennsylvania 08-19-87 REM IC
Citicorp Savings 04-16-85 PT
Citicorp Savings 06-18-86 PT
Citicorp Savings 09-15-86 PT
Citicorp Savings 10-27-86 PT
Citicorp Savings 11-12-86 PT
Citicorp Savings 11-17-86 PT
Citicorp Savings 12-03-86 PT
Citicorp Savings 01-15-87 PT
Citicorp Savings 02-17-87 PT
Citicorp Savings 04-22-87 REM IC
Citizen's Savings 03-06-85 bonds
City Savings 02-27-87 bonds
Columbia Savings 08-25-87 PT
Columbia Savings 12-22-87 PT
ComFed Savings 10-23-87 PT
ComFed Savings 10-26-87 bonds
ComFed Savings 12-29-87 PT
Crossland Savings 12-08-86- bonds
Crossland Savings 03-06-87 bonds
Fidelity Federal S&L 04-10-87 bonds
First Interstate 08-13-87 CMO
Fortune S&L 04-28-87 bonds
Franklin S&L 02-06-87 bonds
G reat W estern Savings 03-15-84 CMO
G reat W estern Savings 07-21-87 PT




Issuer Date Type of Security*
Home Federal S&L 07-16-86 PT
Home Savings 04-08-87 CMO
Lincoln S&L 11-15-84 bonds
Metropolitan Savings 10-16-87 bonds
Nevada S&L 02-06-87 bonds
Northeast Savings 12-17-86 bonds
Northeast Savings 02-06-87 bonds
Pacific S&L 06-03-86 bonds
Republic Savings 11-25-86 PT
Republic Savings 02-24-87 PT
Republic Savings 12-08-87 PT
Suncoast S&L 12-09-86 CMO
Sun S&L 07-10-86 bonds
•Pass-through securities are represented by the letters PT.
Table 23
Uninsured Intermediaries
Issuer________________________ Date___________Type o f Security*
Am erican Pioneer 11-17-86 CMO
Am erican Pioneer 01-22-87 CMO
Bankers Trust NY 06-30-87 bonds
Bear Steam s 04-21-87 CMO
Bear Stearns 04-30-87 strips
Bear Steam s 08-26-87 CMO
B ear Steam s 10-07-87 CMO
B ear Stearns 11-18-87 CMO
Bear Stearns 12-15-87 CMO
Centex Corp 01-27-86 bonds
Centex Corp 01-31-86 CMO
Centex Corp 04-09-86 CMO
Centex Corp 12-22-86 CMO
CFS Financial 02-24-86 CMO
Citadel Holding 03-08-85 bonds
Financial Corp of Santa Barbara 03-17-86 CMO
Financial Corp of Santa Barbara 07-20-87 REM IC
Firem an's Fund 08-20-87 PT
Firem an's Fund 12-30-87 PT
First Boston Inc. 04-07-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 06-03-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 06-24-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 10-23-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 11-03-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 12-03-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 12-05-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 12-09-86 CMO
First Boston Inc. 01-08-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 01-14-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 02-02-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 02-24-87 strips
First Boston Inc. 03-18-87 strips
First Boston Inc. 03-25-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 03-27-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 03-31-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 04-02-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 04-15-87 strips
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Table 23 Continued.
Issuer________________________Date__________ Type of Security*
First Boston Inc. 04-20-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 05-12-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 06-01-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 06-05-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 06-16-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 06-22-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 07-09-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 07-22-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 09-15-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 09-17-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 09-22-87 CMO
First Boston Inc. 12-22-87 CMO
General Homes Corp 10-14-86 CMO
Integrated Resources 06-18-87 REM IC
Lomas and Nettleton 06-18-86 CMO
Lomas and Nettleton 05-21-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 09-29-86 CMO
Merrill Lynch 10-09-86 CMO
Merrill Lynch 10-27-86 CMO
Merrill Lynch 11-19-86 CMO
Merrill Lynch 11-24-86 CMO
Merrill Lynch 01-19-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 02-02-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 03-03-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 03-09-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 04-08-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 04-20-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 08-17-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 08-31-87 PT
Merrill Lynch 09-03-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 09-08-87 PT
Merrill Lynch 10-12-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 11-03-87 CMO
Merrill Lynch 12-21-87 PT








Issuer________________________ D ate__________ Type o f Security*
Pacificorp 09-28-87 CMO
Paine W ebber 03-10-86 CMO
Paine W ebber 06-27-86 CMO
Paine W ebber 07-01-86 CMO
Paine W ebber 12-09-86 CMO
Paine W ebber 01-22-87 CMO
Paine W ebber 07-21-87 CMO
Paine W ebber 08-17-87 REM IC
Paine W ebber 09-17-87 CMO
Ryan Hom es 05-31-85 CMO
Ryan Hom es 01-31-86 CMO
Ryan Hom es 03-25-86 CMO
Ryan Hom es 04-15-86 CMO
Ryan Hom es 05-13-86 CMO
Ryan Hom es 06-02-86 CMO
Ryan Hom es 06-17-86 CMO
Ryan Hom es 07-24-86 CMO
Ryan Hom es 08-12-86 CMO
Ryan H om es 11-07-86 CM O
Ryan H om es 11-21-86 CMO
Ryan H om es 12-16-86 CM O
Ryan Hom es 02-17-87 CM O
Ryan Hom es 02-19-87 CMO
Ryan Hom es 04-09-87 CMO
Ryan Hom es 04-10-87 CMO
Ryland Group 03-11-86 CMO
Ryland Group 04-03-86 CMO
Ryland Group 05-08-86 CM O
Ryland Group 06-05-86 CMO
Ryland Group 06-10-86 CMO
Ryland Group 07-09-86 CMO
Ryland Group 07-11-86 CMO
Ryland Group 08-12-86 CMO
Ryland Group 09-16-86 CMO
Ryland Group 09-22-86 CMO
Ryland Group 11-05-86 CMO
Ryland Group 11-06-86 CMO
Ryland Group 12-03-86 CMO
Ryland Group 12-10-86 CMO
Ryland Group 12-17-86 CMO
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Table 23 Continued.
Issuer Date Type of Security*
Ryland Group 01-09-87 CMO
Ryland Group 01-12-87 CMO
Ryland Group 02-03-87 CMO
Ryland Group 02-19-87 CMO
Ryland Group 03-05-87 CMO
Ryland Group 03-09-87 CMO
Ryland Group 04-21-87 CMO
Ryland Group 04-20-87 CMO
Ryland Group 04-28-87 bonds
Ryland Group 05-13-87 CMO
Ryland Group 06-15-87 CMO
Ryland Group 06-17-87 REM IC
Ryland Group 06-23-87 CMO
Ryland Group 07-08-87 CMO
Ryland Group 07-14-87 CMO
Ryland Group 07-17-87 CMO
Ryland Group 07-28-87 CMO
Ryland Group 09-14-87 CMO
Ryland Group 09-02-87 CMO
Ryland Group 09-23-87 CMO
Ryland Group 11-24-87 CMO
Ryland Group 12-30-87 CMO
Ryland Group 12-17-87 CMO
Travelers Corp 06-19-86 PT
Travelers Corp 07-23-86 PT
Travelers Corp 08-28-86 PT
Travelers Corp 11-12-86 PT
Travelers Corp 12-08-86 PT
Travelers Corp 02-04-87 PT
Travelers Corp 03-26-87 PT
Travelers Corp 06-24-87 PT
Travelers Corp 07-09-87 PT
Travelers Corp 09-29-87 PT
•Pass-through securities are represented by the letters PT,
APPENDIX C 
Additional Results
Appendix C presents the empirical results of the investigation of the effect of 
mortgage-backed security offerings on financial firm value. The reaction of market 
prices to such offerings are examined using the methodology presented in Chapter 
IV. Appendix C is divided into two parts. In the first section, the m arket model will 
be applied using the S&P 500 Index as the m arket proxy. Next, whether or not the 
type of security issued has any effect on the abnormal return experienced by the 
intermediary is investigated using event study methodology.
A. S&P 500 Index Results 
This section presents results which has applied the market model using the 
S&P 500 Index as the market proxy. Tests presented in Chapter VI will be 
replicated.
1. Insured Intermediaries
Table 24 presents the average excess returns and the cumulative average 
excess returns as defined in Chapter IV for insured intermediaries for 60 days prior 
to the event (announcement) date on through 10 days afterward. Z  statistics are 
presented in order to evaluate the statistical significance of the excess returns. These 
statistics allow us to test the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance on any 
particular day or days.
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Table 24 Daily Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries Generated
by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z  Z Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0003 -0.029 44 -0.0003 -0.03 -0.029 44
-59 0.0088 2.289* 44 0.0085 1.60 1.600 44
-58 0.0024 0.976 44 0.0109 1.87 1.868 44
-57 0.0049 1.240 44 0.0158 2.24* 2.233* 44
-56 -0.0036 -0.478 44 0.0122 1.79 1.776 44
-55 -0.0036 -0.667 44 0.0086 1.36 1.342. 44
-54 -0.0006 -0.033 44 0.0079 1.25 1.228 44
-53 0.0031 0.046 44 0.0110 1.18 1.158 44
-52 -0.0022 -0.020 44 0.0088 1.11 1.091 44
-51 0.0065 1.192 44 0.0153 1.43 1.402 44
-50 0.0008 0.349 44 0.0161 1.26 1.231 44
-49 0.0008 0.088 44 0.0169 1.23 1.303 44
-48 -0.0063 -1.197 44 0.0106 0.85 0.932 44
-47 0.0058 1.185 44 0.0165 1.39 1.458 44
-46 -0.0010 -0.388 44 0.0154 1.25 1.308 44
-45 0.0035 0.762 44 0.0190 1.40 1.521 44
-44 0.0011 1.952 44 0.0201 1.83 1.919 44
-43 0.0054 0.775 44 0.0255 1.96* 2.073* 44
-42 -0.0063 -1.275 44 0.0192 1.61 1.733 44
-41 0.0022 0.114 44 0.0214 1.60 1.693 44
-40 -0.0022 -0.625 44 0.0191 1.42 1.509 44
-39 0.0090 1.687 44 0.0282 1.75 1.814 44
-38 -0.0011 -0,401 44 0.0271 1.80 1.846 44
-37 -0.0047 -1.908 44 0.0225 1.37 1.429 44
-36 0.0112 3.217** 44 0.0337 1.98* 1.996* 44
-35 -0.0019 -1.086 44 0.0318 1.73 1.769 44
-34 -0.0048 -1.199 44 0.0270 1.47 1.514 44
-33 -0.0033 -0.540 44 0.0237 1.34 1.380 44
-32 -0.0048 -1.049 44 0.0189 1.12 1.173 44
-31 0.0031 0.342 44 0.0220 1.17 1.205 44
-30 -0.0014 -0.980 44 0.0206 1.32 1.299 44
-29 0.0089 2.200* 44 0.0295 1.69 1.635 44
-28 -0.0005 -1.025 44 0.0290 1.49 1.448 44
-27 0.0037 0.484 44 0.0327 1.55 1.516 44
-26 0.0011 0.526 44 0.0338 1.62 1.570 44
-25 0.0154 1.842 44 0.0489 1.90 1.823 44
-24 0.0026 1.146 44 0.0514 2.06* 1.951 44
-23 0.0021 0.546 44 0.0534 1.94 1.840 44












-21 0.0036 0.874 44 0.0534 1.93 1.825 44
-20 0.0010 0.514 44 0.0544 1.83 1.727 44
-19 -0.0029 -0.020 44 0.0516 1.81 1.703 44
-18 -0.0043 -1.341 44 0.0473 1.59 1.500 44
-17 0.0020 0.120 44 0.0493 1.59 1.496 44
-16 -0.0034 -0.185 44 0.0460 1.54 1.458 44
-15 0.0022 0.106 44 0.0481 1.51 1.408 44
-14 0.0015 0.484 44 0.0495 1.56 1.444 44
-13 -0.0031 -0.325 44 0.0465 1.50 1.384 44
-12 0.0016 0.141 44 0.0481 1.47 1.354 44
-11 0.0032 0.459 44 0.0512 1.51 1.388 44
-10 -0.0040 -0.959 44 0.0472 1.37 1.251 44
-9 -0.0008 -0.664 44 0.0465 1.26 1.158 44
-8 0.0084 1.909 44 0.0547 1.51 1.370 44
-7 -0.0052 -0.839 44 0.0497 1.38 1.262 44
-6 -0.0013 -0.100 44 0.0484 1.38 1.270 44
-5 0.0024 0.318 44 0.0507 1.33 1.274 44
-4 0.0047 1.496 44 0.0554 1.51 1.466 44
-3 -0.0014 -0.515 44 0.0540 1.43 1.381 44
-2 0.0015 0.225 44 0.0554 1.45 1.392 44
-1 -0.0020 -0.447 44 0.0535 1.38 1.325 44
0 0.0058 0.798 44 0.0591 1.47 1.393 44
1 0.0025 1.931 44 0.0615 1.70 1.587 44
2 -0.0109 -0.464 44 0.0509 1.35 1.280 44
3 -0.0022 -0.984 44 0.0488 1.22 1.216 44
4 0.0047 1.412 44 0.0532 1.39 1.352 44
5 0.0186 2.214* 44 0.0720 1.64 1.574 44
6 0.0043 1.581 44 0.0763 1.81 1.710 44
7 -0.0033 -0.742 44 0.0730 1.72 1.617 44
8 -0.0025 -0.340 44 0.0705 1.66 1.565 44
9 0.0036 0.508 44 0.0714 1.71 1.600 44
10 0.0073 1.525 44 0.0814 1.87 1.741 44
’ significant at 0.05 level
’ ’ significant at 0.01 level
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A majority of the daily mean residuals (average excess returns) prior to the 
announcement date for insured intermediaries is positive. Returns on days -59, -36, 
and -29 are significant according to the Z  statistics. The returns on these days are 
also significant when using the value weighted index. The residuals are far away 
from the event date and can probably be attributed to random noise. The average 
residual on the announcement day is positive, but insignificant. Fifty-three percent 
of these residuals are positive. In the period following the announcement, day 5 has 
a significant positive return of 0.0186 with a  Z  statistic of 2.214 another random 
effect. Almost all of the cumulative average residuals in Table 24 are positive, but 
only a handful are significant. Furthermore, those of significance occur early in the 
period under investigation, far from the event date.
Table 25 presents the results for a select number of intervals using the S&P 500 
Index as a  proxy for the market. All the CAER's for these intervals are positive, 
but none are of any significance.
In all, these results offer some very weak evidence that mortgage-backed security 
offerings can affect the riskiness of depository (insured) intermediaries and can result 
in a wealth transfer from deposit insurers to shareholders.
2. Uninsured Intermediaries
Results for uninsured intermediaries using the market model with a value 
weighted index are presented in Tables 26 and 27.
Table 26 gives the average and cumulative average excess returns for 60 days 
prior to the event on through ten days afterward. Most of the average excess returns
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Table 25 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Insured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.0302 1.12 1.259 44
-10 to -1 0.0023 0.00 0.228 44
+1 to +10 0.0221 0.16 0.140 44
-1 to +1 0.0062 1.32 1.294 44
-1 to 0 0.0038 0.25 0.283 44
0 to +1 0.0083 1.93 1.868 44
’ significant at 0.05 level 
*’ significant at 0.01 level
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Table 26 Daily Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Uninsured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z  Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0003 -0.628 150 -0.0003 -0.63 -0.628 150
-59 0.0001 0.210 150 -0.0002 -0.59 -0.582 150
-58 -0.0017 -0.308 150 -0.0019 -0.66 -0.644 150
-57 0.0008 0.829 150 -0.0011 -0.16 -0.142 150
-56 0.0010 1.097 150 -0.0002 -0.35 -0.367 150
-55 0.0005 0.279 150 0.0004 0.43 0.445 150
-54 -0.0012 -0325 150 -0.0008 -0.27 -0.285 150
-53 0.0009 0.865 150 0.0001 0.57 0.570 150
-52 -0.0020 -1.368 150 -0.0019 -0.08 -0.092 150
-51 -0.0013 -0.811 150 -0.0032 -0.18 -0.161 150
-50 -0.0015 -0.304 150 -0.0046 -0.27 -0.325 150
-49 0.0010 0.213 150 -0.0036 -0.19 -0.252 150
-48 -0.0008 -0.494 150 -0.0045 -0.32 -0.364 150
-47 -0.0016 -1.322 150 -0.0061 -0.49 -0.526 150
-46 0.0023 2.082* 150 -0.0038 -0.07 -0.015 150
-45 -0.0029 -1.546 150 -0.0067 -0.32 -0.370 150
-44 -0.0034 -1.500 150 -0.0101 -0.68 -0.751 150
-43 0.0020 0.847 150 -0.0081 -0.46 -0.523 150
-42 -0.0020 -0.967 150 -0.0100 -0.67 -0.771 150
-41 0.0010 0.657 150 -0.0091 -0.50 -0.602 150
-40 -0.0023 -1.643 150 -0.0114 -0.85 -0.947 150
-39 -0.0041 -2.598** 150 -0.0155 -1.39 -1.459 150
-38 0.0017 0.739 150 -0.0138 -1.20 -1.260 150
-37 0.0010 0.444 150 -0.0127 -1.08 -1.132 150
-36 -0.0003 -0.349 150 -0.0131 -1.13 -1.174 150
-35 -0.0014 -1.075 150 -0.0144 -1.32 -1.356 150
-34 0.0016 0.932 150 -0.0128 -1.12 -1.159 150
-33 0.0004 0.281 150 -0.0123 -1.04 -1.086 150
-32 0.0002 0.139 150 -0.0121 -1.00 -1.039 150
-31 0.0005 0.078 150 -0.0116 -0.97 -1.005 150
-30 0.0005 0.580 150 -0.0111 -0.85 -0.889 150
-29 -0.0012 -0.669 150 -0.0123 -0.95 -0.983 150
-28 0.0011 0.394 150 -0.0112 -0.87 -0.903 150
-27 0.0002 0.390 150 -0.0111 -0.79 -0.826 150
-26 -0.0021 -0.758 150 -0.0131 -0.91 -0.972 150
-25 0.0025 1.348 150 -0.0107 -0.67 -0.746 150
-24 -0.0006 -0.340 150 -0.0112 -0.72 -0.785 150
-23 -0.0009 -0.255 150 -0.0122 -0.75 -0.814 150












-21 -0.0016 -0.948 150 -0.0126 -0.74 -0.811 150
-20 0.0021 1.025 150 -0.0105 -0.57 -0.640 150
-19 0.0000 0.229 150 -0.0105 -0.53 -0.599 150
-18 -0.0009 -0.300 150 -0.0114 -0.57 -0.631 150
-17 -0.0011 -0.681 150 -0.0125 -0.67 -0.720 150
-16 -0.0024 -1.461 150 -0.0149 -0.88 -0.908 150
-15 -0.0012 -1.079 150 -0.0161 -1.03 -1.041 150
-14 -0.0018 -0.850 150 -0.0179 -1.14 -1.139 150
-13 0.0008 0.357 150 -0.0171 -1.08 -1.075 150
-12 -0.0017 -0.773 150 -0.0188 -1.18 -1.158 150
-11 -0.0007 -0.360 150 -0.0194 -1.22 -1.205 150
-10 -0.0004 -0.317 150 -0.0198 -1.25 -1.228 150
-9 -0.0009 -1.009 150 -0.0207 -1.38 -1.336 150
-8 -0.0019 -0.953 150 -0.0226 -1.49 -1.436 150
-7 -0.0015 -1.424 150 -0.0241 -1.67 -1.595 150
-6 -0.0011 -0.087 150 -0.0252 -1.67 -1.585 150
-5 -0.0024 -1.424 150 -0.0276 -1.85 -1.738 150
-4 -0.0031 -1.782 150 -0.0307 -2.07* -1.930 150
-3 0.0015 0.800 150 -0.0293 -1.94 -1.817 150
-2 -0.0008 -1.152 150 -0.0301 -2.08* -1.931 150
-1 -0.0002 -0.299 150 -0.0303 -2.02* -1.877 150
0 0.0014 0.548 150 -0.0288 -1.93 -1.797 150
1 -0.0005 -0.535 150 -0.0293 -1.99* -1.839 150
2 -0.0024 -1.797 150 -0.0317 -2.19* -2.017* 150
3 -0.0032 -1.532 150 -0.0348 -2.37* -2.165* 150
4 0.0004 0.456 150 -0.0344 -2.29* -2.096* 150
5 0.0002 0.087 150 -0.0342 -2.29* -2.096* 150
6 0.0013 0.720 150 -0.0330 -2.18* -2.000* 150
7 -0.0012 -0.028 150 -0.0341 -2.16* -1.977* 150
8 -0.0020 -0.903 150 -0.0361 -2.25* -2.053* 150
9 -0.0006 -0.253 150 -0.0366 -2.27* -2.062* 150
10 -0.0010 -0.536 150 -0.0376 -2.31* -2.087* 150
‘significant at 0.05 level
“ significant at 0.01 level
150
Table 27 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with MBS Issuance by Uninsured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z  Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to 10 -0.0184 -2.42* -2.310* 150
-10 to -1 -0.0108 -2.31* -2.254* 150
+1 to +10 -0.0090 -1.49 -1.456 150
-1 to 1 0.0007 0.36 0.350 150
-1 to 0 0.0012 0.69 0.686 150
0 to 1 0.0009 0.04 0.037 150
*signiiicant at 0.05 level 
* ‘significant at 0.01 level
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are negative, but insignificant. Only the mean residuals on days -46 and -39 (which 
are far from the event) are significant, but of different sign. The return on the 
announcement day of 0.0014 is insignificant. Fifty-nine percent of these residuals are 
positive. The CAER's seem to be consistently negative. They become significant 
toward the end of the observation period.
Table 27's results are of varied sign but the CAER's for the intervals of -10 to 
+10 and -10 to -1 are negative and significant.
3. ANOVA Results
Single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) models will be used to analyze the 
effects of the independent variable under study on the dependent variable.
The independent variables (or factors) measure the type of intermediary (insured 
or uninsured) or the type of MBS issued (primary or derivative).
The dependent variable is the average excess return on day zero or the 
cumulative average excess return for one of the following intervals: -60 to +10, -10 
to +10, -1 to +1, -1 to 0, 0 to 1. The dependent variable was estimated using the 
market model with the S&P 500 Index as a proxy for the market.
Table 28 presents the results when the returns from insured intermediaries are 
compared to that from uninsured intermediaries. The F statistic is used to determine 
whether or not the factor level means are equal. Furthermore, several methods of 
multiple comparisons -  Tiikey, Scheffe', and Bonferroni -  are applied to make the 
analysis more complete. The results from equation I leads us to conclude that the 
factor level means are not equal, or that the two different types of intermediaries 
do not lead to the same mean residual. Thus, we conclude that there is a relation
Table 28 ANOVA Results: Insured vs. Uninsured Intermediaries, Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy) Return Estimates
Method of Multiple Comparisons*
Dependent
Variable Treatment F R* Tukey Bonferronl Scheffe'




































"significance tested at 0.05 level
I
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between type of intermediary and returns and that the m ean returns for the 
uninsured intermediaries fall below those for the insured intermediaries by 
somewhere between 0.0047 and 0.0564.
Table 29 examines only the insured interm ediaries and tries to determine 
whether or not there is any relation between type of security issued (primary or 
derivative) and m ean residuals. The F  statistics for all of the equations do not even 
approach significance. The factor level means are equal, thus, the two different types 
of securities lead to the same m ean residual for insured intermediaries. Table 30's 
results for uninsured interm ediaries lead to the same conclusion regarding type of 
security issued.
B. Effect of Type of Security Issued 
W hether or not the type of security issued has any effect on the return 
experienced by the intermediary is investigated. Securities can be of one of two 
types, what we will term  primary MBS's — mortgage pass-throughs and mortgage 
backed-bonds, or derivative MBS's -- CMO's, REM IC's, and strips. As stated earlier 
in Chapter II and III, the issuance of certain types of MBS's, derivative securities 
in particular, are associated with the capture of arbitrage profits by the issuers. Thus, 
it is postulated that the returns to derivative security issuers are positive and 
significant. Returns to issuers of primary securities are  also through to be positive 
and significant.
Table 29 ANOVA Results: Insured Intermediaries, Primary vs. Derivative Securities. Market Model
(S&P 500 Index market proxy) Return Estimates
Dependent
Variable Treatment F R*
I. CAER.„„ 7-172037873 0.29 0.005
II. CAER.,,,, 0.00223542 0.01 0.000
III. CAER,, 0.00960993 0.04 0.000
IV. CAER.I0 0.00000037 0.00 0.000
V. CAER,, 0.12251250 0.12 0.002












VI. AER, 0.00078604 0.72 0.013







Table 30 ANOVA Results: Uninsured Intermediaries, Primary vs. Derivative Securities. Market Model
(S&P 500 Index market proxy) Return Estimates
Method o( Multiple Comparisons*
Dependent. 
Variable Treatment F fl’ Tukey Bonferronl Scheffe*




































'significance tested at 0.05 level
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1. Insured Intermediaries
Tables 31 and 32 present the average excess and cumulative average excess 
returns from the market model with value weighted index as the market proxy (over 
the investigation period and selected intervals) for insured intermediaries which offer 
primary securities. According to our sample, most of the insured intermediaries 
issued primary MBS's during the 1983-1987 time period. Several of the days under 
study exhibit positive and significant average excess returns. The return on day 0 is 
only 0.0071, which has a Z  statistic of 0.796. Fifty-four percent of these residuals, 
however, are positive. A few of the CAER's in Table 31 are significant. They occur 
near the beginning of the period under study and far away from the announcement 
day. Table 32's results for a  select number of intervals show that the returns to 
insured intermediaries which offer primary securities are positive but statistically 
insignificant. The returns on Tables 31 and 32 resemble that presented in Tables 5 
and 6. Days which show sporadic significance in Table 5 also show significance in 
Table 31 in a similar pattern. Several of the CAER's in Table 32 are similar in 
magnitude to that in Table 6.
Tables 33 and 34 show the average excess and cumulative average excess 
returns from the market model with value weighted index as the market proxy (over 
the investigation period and selected intervals) for insured intermediaries which offer 
derivative securities. The mean residuals in Table 33 also show sporadic significance 
similar to that in Table 31. The return on the event day is positive but insignificant. 
The CAER's are positive and exhibit significance prior to the event day. A stretch 
of negative mean returns two weeks before the announcement force the CAER's not
Table 31 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z  Z  Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 0.0003 0.389 37 0.0003 0.39 0.389 37
-59 0.0105 2.716** 37 0.0109 2.20* 2.195* 37
-58 0.0038 1.300 37 0.0147 2.54* 2.541* 37
-57 0.0025 0.396 37 0.0171 2.40* 2.400* 37
-56 -0.0033 -0.374 37 0.0138 1.98* 1.974* 37
-55 -0.0046 -0.741 37 0.0092 1.50 1.497 37
-54 -0.0027 -0.517 37 0.0064 1.20 1.190 37
-53 0.0038 0.264 37 0.0102 1.21 1.201 37
-52 -0.0015 -0.243 37 0.0088 1.22 1.210 37
-51 0.0057 0.668 37 0.0144 1.37 1.354 37
-50 0.0012 0.321 37 0.0156 1.21 1.196 37
-49 0.0025 0.450 37 0.0181 1.29 1.380 37
-48 -0.0069 -1.281 37 0.0112 0.89 1.008 37
-47 0.0068 2.222* 37 0.0192 0.92 1.118 37
-46 -0.0011 -0.290 37 0.0169 1.32 1.419 37
-45 0.0057 1.072 37 0.0226 1.55 1.705 37
-44 0.0000 1.336 37 0.0226 1.83 1.987* 37
-43 0.0038 0.252 37 0.0264 1.72 1.923 37
-42 -0.0086 -1.708 37 0.0178 1.28 1.493 37
-41 0.0012 0.253 37 0.0190 1.19 1.394 37
-40 -0.0030 -0.780 37 0.0161 0.99 1.199 37
-39 0.0111 2.048* 37 0.0272 1.41 1.590 37
-38 -0.0020 -0.117 37 0.0252 1.40 1.577 37
-37 -0.0060 -2.186* 37 0.0192 0.92 1.118 37
-36 0.0110 2.730** 37 0.0302 1.45 1.612 37
-35 -0.0004 -0.482 37 0.0298 1.33 1.501 37
-34 -0.0057 -1.142 37 0.0241 1.08 1.255 37
-33 -0.0037 -0.503 37 0.0204 0.97 1.133 37
-32 -0.0067 -1.600 37 0.0137 0.65 0.836 37
-31 0.0015 0.562 37 0.0151 0.54 0.732 37
-30 -0.0040 -0.289 37 0.0111 0.58 0.728 37
-29 0.0109 2.673** 37 0.0220 1.05 1.154 37
-28 -0.0002 -0.898 37 0.0218 0.88 0.992 37
-27 0.0048 0.578 37 0.0266 0.96 1.073 37
-26 0.0024 0.898 37 0.0290 1.10 1.188 37
-25 0.0197 2.346* 37 0.0482 1.47 1.532 37
-24 -0.0011 -0.253 37 0.0471 1.41 1.466 37
-23 0.0016 0.613 37 0.0487 1.29 1.351 37












-21 0.0047 1.195 37 0.0503 1.41 1.453 37
-20 0.0015 0.445 37 0.0517 133 1.370 37
-19 -0.0029 -0.003 37 0.0489 1.31 1.346 37
-18 -0.0048 -1.412 37 0.0442 1.08 1.134 37
-17 0.0016 0.012 37 0.0458 1.07 1.121 37
-16 -0.0041 -0.209 37 0.0418 1.03 1.082 37
-15 0.0022 0.142 37 0.0439 1.00 1.043 37
-14 0.0008 0.088 37 0.0447 1.00 1.029 37
-13 -0.0027 -0.187 37 0.0420 0.96 0.992 37
-12 0.0053 1.071 37 0.0472 1.10 1.112 37
-11 0.0022 0.167 37 0.0493 1.12 1.124 37
-10 -0.0046 -1.208 37 0.0448 0.94 0.959 37
-9 0.0001 0.140 37 0.0449 0.91 0.937 37
-8 0.0082 1.368 37 0.0528 1.09 1.085 37
-7 -0.0048 -0.534 37 0.0481 1.00 1.012 37
-6 0.0005 0.575 37 0.0486 1.07 1.072 37
-5 0.0025 0.411 37 0.0511 1.01 1.069 37
-4 0.0060 1.465 37 0.0569 1.19 1.279 37
-3 -0.0024 -0.865 37 0.0545 1.07 1.174 37
-2 -0.0003 -0.327 37 0.0542 1.02 1.128 37
-1 -0.0022 -0.420 37 0.0520 0.95 1.075 37
0 0.0071 0.796 37 0.0590 1.05 1.146 37
1 0.0010 0.675 37 0.0599 1.12 1.203 37
2 -0.0122 -0.806 37 0.0481 0.78 0.910 37
3 -0.0023 -1.371 37 0.0459 0.61 0.800 37
4 0.0030 0.339 37 0.0487 0.65 0.825 37
5 0.0236 3.019** 37 0.0710 1.00 1.140 37
6 0.0015 0.195 37 0.0723 1.02 1.154 37
7 -0.0066 -1.673 37 0.0665 ' 0.82 0.979 37
8 -0.0031 -0.126 37 0.0637 0.80 0.960 37
9 0.0041 0.401 37 0.0674 0.84 0.990 37
10 0.0103 2.030* 37 0.0766 1.06 1.176 37
•significant at 0.05 level 
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 32 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Insured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.0281 0.23 0.525 37
-10 to -1 0.0028 0.16 0.173 37
+1 to +10 0.0181 0.24 0.328 37
-1 to +1 0.0059 0.61 0.600 37
-1 to 0 0.0049 0.27 0.310 37
0 to +1 0.0081 1.04 0.995 37
•significant at 0.05 level 
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 33 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0025 -0.736 7 -0.0025 -0.74 -0.736 7
-59 0.0013 0.148 7 -0.0012 -0.62 -0.619 7
-58 -0.0050 -0.505 7 -0.0062 -0.80 -0.797 7
-57 0.0173 2.185* 7 0.0111 0.40 0.391 7
-56 -0.0055 -0.435 7 0.0055 0.16 0.149 7
-55 0.0020 0.025 7 0.0075 0.16 0.133 7
-54 0.0099 0.918 7 0.0175 0.49 0.467 7
-53 -0.0005 -0.518 7 0.0170 0.28 0.250 7
-52 -0.0069 -0.781 7 0.0101 0.00 0.003 7
-51 0.0110 1.420 7 0.0211 0.45 0.434 7
-50 0.0002 0.020 7 0.0213 0.42 0.404 7
-49 -0.0082 -0.834 7 0.0131 0.16 0.160 7
-48 0.0035 0.450 7 0.0166 0.28 0.273 7
-47 0.0338 1.765 7 0.0641 1.84 1.648 7
-46 0.0014U 0.073 7 0.0179 0.32 0.312 7
-45 -0.0056 -0.216 7 0.0123 0.26 0.265 7
-44 0.0141 2.389* 7 0.0264 0.83 0.803 7
-43 0.0124 2.297* 7 0.0388 1.35 1.282 7
-42 0.0078 0.963 7 0.0467 1.53 1.458 7
-41 0.0077 0.951 7 0.0544 1.71 1.590 7
-40 0.0020 0.310 7 0.0563 1.73 1.585 7
-39 -0.0004 -0.237 7 0.0559 1.64 1.488 7
-38 0.0046 0.858 7 0.0605 1.79 1.607 7
-37 0.0037 0.466 7 0.0641 1.84 1.648 7
-36 0.0105 1.482 7 0.0746 2.10* 1.865 7
-35 -0.0092 -1.420 7 0.0654 1.78 1.576 7
-34 0.0020 0.092 7 0.0674 1.73 1.541 7
-33 0.0008 0.105 7 0.0682 1.72 1.527 7
-32 0.0067 1.287 7 0.0749 1.93 1.723 7
-31 0.0107 1.937 7 0.0856 2.25* 1.993* 7
-30 0.0118 1.650 7 0.0975 2.51* 2.203* 7
-29 -0.0008 -0.495 . 7 0.0967 2.38* 2.075* 7
-28 -0.0023 -0.647 7 0.0943 2.24* 1.945 7
-27 -0.0022 -0.117 7 0.0921 2.18* 1.921 7
-26 -0.0053 -0.692 7 0.0867 2.03* 1.790 7
-25 -0.0061 -0.758 7 0.0806 1.88 1.625 7
-24 0.0225 3.473** 7 0.1031 2.42* 2.095* 7
-23 0.0040 0.065 7 0.1071 2.38* 2.057* 7












-21 -0.0015 -0.373 7 0.1002 2.12* 1.818 7
-20 0.0002 0.071 7 0.1004 2.09* 1.783 7
-19 -0.0036 -0.110 7 0.0968 2.05* 1.749 7
-18 -0.0016 -0.066 7 0.0951 2.01* 1.725 7
-17 0.0043 0.273 7 0.0995 2.03* 1.738 7
-16 0.0009 0.126 7 0.1004 2.03* 1.741 7
-15 0.0033 0.234 7 0.1037 2.04* 1.721 7
-14 0.0043 0.911 7 0.1080 2.15* 1.823 7
-13 -0.0056 -0.467 7 0.1025 2.06* 1.741 7
-12 -0.0164 -2.655** 7 0.0861 1.66 1.400 7
-11 0.0086 0.830 7 0.0946 1.76 1.459 7
-10 -0.0017 -0.226 7 0.0929 1.77 1.471 7
-9 -0.0051 -1.309 7 0.0878 1.57 1.286 7
-8 0.0083 1.388 7 0.0960 1.75 1.438 7
-7 -0.0064 -0.808 7 0.0896 1.62 1.338 7
-6 -0.0084 -0.911 7 0.0812 1.49 1.233 7
-5 0.0033 0.402 7 0.0845 1.53 1.279 7
-4 0.0045 0.874 7 0.0890 1.63 1.357 7
-3 0.0059 0.711 7 0.0949 1.71 1.403 7
-2 0.0113 1.441 7 0.1062 1.88 1.548 7
-1 0.0010 0.076 7 0.1072 1.88 1.522 7
0 0.0030 0.619 7 0.1102 1.94 1.577 7
1 0.0125 3.550** 7 0.1226 2.37* 1.965* 7
2 0.0008 0.066 7 0.1234 2.35* 1.939 7
3 -0.0015 -0.600 7 0.1219 2.40* 2.028* 7
4 0.0113 2.478* 7 0.1332 2.69** 2.279* 7
5 -0.0071 -1.369 7 0.1261 2.50* 2.100* 7
6 0.0195 3.547** 7 0.1457 2.92** 2.419* 7
7 0.0132 1.955 7 0.1589 3.13** 2.592** 7
8 0.0004 0.471 7 0.1593 3.05** 2.505* 7
9 0.0011 0.381 7 0.1604 3.08** 2.522* 7
10 -0.0077 -0.849 7 0.1528 2.96* 2.432* 7
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
162
Table 34 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Insured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z  Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.0581 2.72♦♦ 2.576" 7
-10 to -1 0.0126 0.66 0.624 7
+1 to +10 0.0426 3.09" 2.996" 7
-1 to +1 0.0164 2AS* 2.442^ 7
-1 to 0 0.0040 0.49 0.498 7
0 to +1 0.0154 2.95" 2.943" 7
♦significant at 0.05 level
♦♦significant at 0.01 level
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to be significant. However, the cumulative average residuals in the post 
announcement period are significant according to the ordinary Z  statistics and the 
statistics. Evidence from Table 34 shows that several subperiods of investigation 
exhibit positive and significant excess returns. However, since the sample size of 
seven is so small, no conclusion can be reached concerning the type of security 
issued.
The results in the preceding tables seem to provide implications for portfolio 
restructuring. Insured interm ediaries appear to be selling off high quality assets 
through MBS offerings. They are then left with only low quality assets on their 
books. Thus, the m arket responds to the announcement of such offerings in a 
positive m anner due to the increased risk now associated with the issuer.
Tables 35 and 36 present the average excess and cumulative average excess 
returns (over the investigation period and selected intervals) derived from the m ean 
adjusted returns model for insured intermediaries which offer primary securities. A 
few days offer significant residuals, which are probably random  effects. They occur 
well before the announcement (days -59, -48, -39) or sometime afterward (day +5) 
and are inconsistent in sign (days -59, -39, and +5 are positive, day -48 is negative). 
The return on the event day is positive but insignificant. The CAER's are also hardly 
worth noting. CAER_60i_59, CA ER.60,-59, and CAER_60>. 57 are positive and 
statistically significant. However, a run of negative, but insignificant, CAER's occur 
thereafter. Significance is barely regained after the announcem ent for CAER_60i+2 
and CAER_60(+3 . The selected intervals investigated in Table 36 show no significance 
and are inconsistent in sign.
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Table 35 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean t t
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic N
-60 -0.0011 -0.03 37 -0.0011 -0.03 37
-59 0.0117 2.97** 37 0.0106 2.12* 37
-58 0.0016 0.61 37 0.0122 2.08* 37
-57 0.0055 1.46 37 0.0162 2.13* 37
-56 0.0016 0.31 37 0.0115 1.52 37
-55 -0.0046 -0.68 37 0.0069 1.11 37
-54 -0.0005 -0.66 37 0.0036 0.78 37
-53 0.0052 0.71 37 0.0087 0.98 37
-52 0.0055 1.16 37 0.0085 1.10 37
-51 0.0033 0.26 37 0.0118 1.13 37
-50 0.0060 1.06 37 0.0109 0.90 37
-49 0.0027 0.39 37 0.0047 0.55 37
-48 -0.0096 -2.23* 37 -0.0049 -0.09 37
-47 0.0071 0.09 37 -0.0061 -0.22 37
-46 -0.0042 -1.15 37 -0.0020 -0.07 37
-45 0.0000 0.29 37 -0.0020 -0.01 37
-44 -0.0048 -1.36 37 -0.0068 -0.06 37
-43 0.0071 1.39 37 0.0003 0.23 37
-42 -0.0067 -1.51 37 -0.0098 -0.20 37
-41 0.0023 0.18 37 -0.0075 -0.15 37
-40 0.0032 0.40 37 -0.0133 -0.50 37
-39 . 0.0124 2.11* 37 -0.0009 -0.03 37
-38 0.0071 1.01 37 -0.0028 -0.00 37
-37 -0.0033 -1.08 37 -0.0061 -0.22 37
-36 0.0134 1.69 37 0.0074 0.45 37
-35 0.0068 1.71 37 0.0044 0.27 37
-34 -0.0032 -1.14 37 -0.0078 -0.22 37
-33 -0.0009 -0.19 37 -0.0087 -0.25 37
-32 0.0022 0.93 37 -0.0177 -0.61 37
-31 0.0020 0.20 37 -0.0157 -0.64 37
-30 0.0062 0.47 37 -0.0196 -0.54 37
-29 0.0089 0.28 37 -0.0108 -0.19 37
-28 -0.0020 -0.75 37 -0.0127 -0.39 37
-27 0.0071 1.03 37 -0.0056 -0.21 37
-26 0.0018 0.49 37 -0.0038 -0.12 37
-25 0.0208 0.98 37 0.0165 1.33 37
-24 0.0007 0.41 37 0.0172 1.27 37
-23 0.0032 0.75 37 0.0203 1.31 37










-21 0.0047 0.95 37 0.0228 1.20 37
-20 0.0003 0.43 37 0.0231 1.27 37
-19 -0.0013 -0.42 37 0.0218 1.21 37
-18 0.0002 0.24 37 0.0196 1.34 37
-17 0.0048 0.93 37 0.0242 1.20 37
-16 -0.0019 -0.39 37 0.0196 1.29 37
-15 0.0035 0.34 37 0.0230 1.25 37
-14 0.0020 0.47 37 0.0250 1.18 37
-13 0.0004 0.03 37 0.0224 1.22 37
-12 0.0010 0.01 37 0.0234 1.22 37
-11 0.0047 0.73 37 0.0279 1.12 37
-10 -0.0032 -0.80 37 0.0248 1.24 37
-9 0.0024 0.53 37 0.0250 1.27 37
-8 0.0124 1.04 37 0.0371 0.90 37
-7 -0.0004 -0.41 37 0.0307 1.04 37
-6 -0.0028 -0.23 37 0.0279 1.08 37
-5 -0.0015 -0.17 37 0.0228 1.30 37
-4 0.0017 0.60 37 0.0245 1.23 37
-3 0.0040 1.03 37 0.0269 1.18 37
-2 0.0066 1.04 37 0.0254 1.30 37
-1 -0.0051 -0.90 37 0.0204 1.42 37
0 0.0036 0.12 37 0.0239 1.40 37
1 -0.0056 -1.09 37 0.0162 1.68 37
2 0.0036 0.64 37 0.0050 1.98* 37
3 0.0058 1.25 37 0.0057 1.96* 37
4 0.0025 0.10 37 0.0080 1.95 37
5 0.0275 2.42* 37 0.0340 1.45 37
6 0.0006 0.01 37 0.0346 1.45 37
7 0.0056 1.04 37 0.0295 1.59 37
8 0.0079 1.83 37 0.0264 1.66 37
9 0.0043 0.48 37 0.0303 1.60 37
10 0.0096 1.89 37 0.0389 1.39 37
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 36 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Insured
Intermediaries Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, Selected Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER t Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.0795 0.35 37
-10 to -1 0.0141 0.62 37
+1 to +10 0.0618 0.77 37
-1 to +1 -0.0071 -1.72 37
-1 to 0 -0.0015 -0.55 37
0 to +1 -0.0020 -1.04 37
♦significant at 0.05 level
♦♦significant at 0.01 level
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Tables 37 and 38 present the average excess and cumulative average excess 
returns derived from the mean adjusted returns model (over the investigation period 
and selected intervals) for insured intermediaries which offer derivative securities. 
The pattern  of mean residuals in Table 37 is reminiscent of that displayed by the 
market model returns of Table 32. They are mostly positive and exhibit significance 
on days -44, -43, -24, -9, +1, +3, +4, and + 6 . Day 0's return is equal to 0.0016. Its 
t statistic of only 0.31 is insignificant. The CAER's are positive and statistically 
significant in a stretch prior to the event day. Several of the CAER's in the post 
announcement period are also significant according to the t statistics. The subperiods 
of -10 to -1, +1 to + 1-, and 0 to 1 investigated in Table 38 show positive and 
significant results. However, it is again emphasized that since the sample size of 
seven is so small, no conclusion can be reached concerning the type of security 
issued.
Tables 39 and 40 present the average excess and cumulative average excess 
returns (over the investigation period and selected intervals) derived from the market 
model using the S&P 500 Index as the m arket proxy for insured intermediaries which 
offer primary securities. M ean residuals are positive and significant on the same days 
as that presented in Table 24, as well as days -25 and +10 (day -37 has a significant 
but negative return). The return on the announcement day is also positive, but 
insignificant. The CAER's in Table 39 are positive and significant only in intervals 
far from the event. Table 40's insignificant results for intervals closer to the event 
confirms this observation.
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Table 37 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries








-60 -0.0066 -1.19 7 -0.0066 -1.19 7
-59 0.0021 0.14 7 -0.0045 -0.74 7
-58 0.0173 1.99 7 -0.0041 -0.55 7
-57 0.0150 1.86 7 0.0088 0.38 7
-56 0.0104 1.31 7 0.0048 0.30 7
-55 0.0056 0.57 7 0.0104 0.50 7
-54 0.0103 1.00 7 0.0207 0.85 7
-53 0.0028 0.16 7 0.0235 0.85 7
-52 0.0011 0.47 7 0.0178 0.59 7
-51 0.0085 0.86 7 0.0263 0.83 7
-50 0.0050 0.54 7 0.0314 0.95 7
-49 0.0114 1.36 7 0.0256 0.74 7
-48 0.0055 0.69 • 7 0.0310 0.90 7
-47 0.0303 1.74 7 0.0737 2.26* 7
-46 0.0024 0.34 7 0.0323 0.97 7
-45 0.0100 1.29 7 0.0286 0.97 7
-44 0.0146 2.17* 7 0.0431 1.47 7
-43 0.0170 2.21* 7 0.0555 1.90 7
-42 0.0049 0.63 7 0.0604 1.99* 7
-41 0.0055 0.95 7 0.0659 2.15* 7
-40 0.0016 0.33 7 0.0675 2.17* 7
-39 0.0000 0.00 7 0.0675 2.12* 7
-38 0.0041 0.76 7 0.0716 2.24* 7
-37 0.0021 0.36 7 0.0737 2.26* 7
-36 0.0100 1.32 7 0.0836 2.48* 7
-35 0.0011 0.02 7 0.0707 2.08* 7
-34 0.0032 0.26 7 0.0739 2.10* 7
-33 0.0022 0.27 7 0.0744 2.07* 7
-32 0.0037 0.93 7 0.0780 2.20* 7
-31 0.0097 1.69 7 0.0878 2.48* 7
-30 0.0129 1.68 7 0.1007 2.74** 7
-29 0.0030 0.47 7 0.1011 2.65** 7
-28 -0.0035 -0.48 7 0.0955 2.48* 7
-27 -0.0052 -0.48 7 0.0894 2.33* 7
-26 -0.0005 -0.02 7 0.0842 2.18* 7
-25 -0.0082 -0.58 7 0.0760 2.05* 7
-24 0.0222 3.32** 7 0.0982 2.57** 7
-23 0.0001 0.22 7 0.0983 2.50* 7










-21 0.0102 1.44 7 0.0894 2.23* 7
-20 0.0033 0.30 7 0.0885 2.18* 7
-19 -0.0039 -0.04 7 0.0837 2.13* 7
-18 0.0117 1.31 7 0.0765 1.97* 7
-17 -0.0010 -0.06 7 0.0712 1.79 7
-16 -0.0029 -0.47 7 0.0683 1.68 7
-15 0.0037 0.44 7 0.0720 1.73 7
-14 0.0094 1.28 7 0.0810 1.90 7
-13 0.0094 1.63 7 0.0780 1.84 7
-12 -0.0011 -0.13 7 0.0608 1.51 7
-11 0.0105 1.27 7 0.0713 1.67 7
-10 -0.0002 -0.10 7 0.0689 1.67 7
-9 0.0118 2.41* 7 0.0660 1.50 7
-8 0.0001 0.32 7 0.0662 1.53 7
-7 -0.0001 -0.17 7 0.0523 1.28 7
-6 0.0086 0.93 7 0.0375 1.02 7
-5 0.0030 0.30 7 0.0383 1.00 7
-4 0.0060 1.38 7 0.0443 1.17 7
-3 0.0101 1.50 7 0.0544 1.36 7
-2 0.0122 1.41 7 0.0666 1.53 7
-1 0.0003 0.22 7 0.0670 1.54 7
0 0.0016 0.31 7 0.0685 1.57 7
1 0.0139 3.21** 7 0.0824 1.97* 7
2 0.0013 1.37 7 0.0791 1.83 7
3 0.0269 2.80** 7 0.0763 1.79 7
4 0.0102 2.30* 7 0.0864 2.06* 7
5 0.0065 1.55 7 0.0801 1.91 7
6 0.0213 3.64** 7 0.1014 2.34* 7
7 0.0104 1.35 7 0.1118 2.49* 7
8 0.0020 0.17 7 0.1138 2.46* 7
9 0.0077 1.11 7 0.1207 2.56** 7
10 -0.0022 -0.91 7 0.1102 2.41* 7
•significant at 0.0S level
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 38 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Insured
Intermediaries Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, Selected Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER t Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.1514 1.85 7
-10 to -1 0.0518 2.04* 7
+1 to +10 0.0980 2.55* 7
-1 to +1 0.0158 2.16* 7
-1 to 0 0.0019 0.38 7
0 to +1 0.0155 2.49* 7
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
Table 39 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z  Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 0.0001 0.286 37 0.0001 0.29 0.286 37
-59 0.0103 2.576** 37 0.0104 2.02* 2.022* 37
-58 0.0038 1.287 37 0.0142 2.39* 2.392* 37
-57 0.0026 0.420 37 0.0167 2.28* 2.282* 37
-56 -0.0032 -0.335 37 0.0135 1.89 1.885 37
-55 -0.0047 -0.759 37 0.0088 1.42 1.409 37
-54 -0.0026 -0.431 37 0.0062 1.15 1.140 37
-53 0.0037 0.235 37 0.0099 1.16 1.144 37
-52 -0.0015 -0.249 37 0.0084 1.18 1.160 37
-51 0.0056 0.667 37 0.0140 1.33 1.305 37
-50 0.0010 0.353 37 0.0150 1.16 1.139 37
-49 0.0024 0.441 37 0.0174 1.24 1.320 37
-48 -0.0082 -1.530 37 0.0092 0.76 0.859 37
-47 0.0069 0.318 37 -0.0161 -0.68 -0.828 37
-46 -0.0015 -0.387 37 0.0146 1.18 1.254 37
-45 0.0053 0.944 37 0.0199 1.38 1.512 37
-44 -0.0013 -1.087 37 0.0186 1.60 1.713 37
-43 0.0041 0.165 37 0.0227 1.52 1.671 37
-42 -0.0089 -1.798 37 0.0137 1.06 1.227 37
-41 0.0012 0.292 37 0.0149 0.97 1.127 37
-40 -0.0030 -0.810 37 0.0119 0.77 0.930 37
-39 0.0109 1.953 37 0.0227 1.17 1.307 37
-38 -0.0021 -0.077 37 0.0207 1.16 1.294 37
-37 -0.0062 -2.253* 37 0.0145 0.68 0.828 37
-36 0.0114 2.852** 37 0.0258 1.23 1.349 37
-35 -0.0005 -0.564 37 0.0253 1.10 1.229 37
-34 -0.0061 -1.246 37 0.0193 0.84 0.970 37
-33 -0.0041 -0.654 37 0.0152 0.70 0.827 37
-32 -0.0069 -1.658 37 0.0083 0.38 0.525 37
-31 0.0017 0.472 37 0.0100 0.29 0.442 37
-30 -0.0039 -0.347 37 0.0061 0.35 0.453 37
-29 0.0107 2.623** 37 0.0169 0.80 0.876 37
-28 -0.0002 -0.851 37 0.0167 0.64 0.726 37
-27 0.0048 0.565 37 0.0215 0.73 0.809 37
-26 0.0024 0.907 37 0.0239 0.87 0.930 37
-25 0.0196 2.348* 37 0.0430 1.25 1.278 37
-24 -0.0012 -0.251 37 0.0418 1.19 1.218 37
-23 0.0018 0.564 37 0.0435 1.08 1.113 37












-21 0.0047 1.140 37 0.0450 1.19 1.210 37
-20 0.0012 0.530 37 0.0462 1.10 1.118 37
-19 -0.0028 -0.067 37 0.0434 1.10 1.106 37
-18 -0.0048 -1.439 37 0.0387 0.87 0.894 37
-17 0.0016 0.013 37 0.0403 0.86 0.884 37
-16 -0.0042 -0.224 37 0.0362 0.82 0.846 37
-15 0.0020 0.186 37 0.0382 0.78 0.804 37
-14 0.0009 0.128 37 0.0391 0.79 0.799 37
-13 -0.0028 -0.179 37 0.0364 0.76 0.765 37
-12 0.0051 1.015 37 0.0414 0.89 0.881 37
-11 0.0021 0.121 37 0.0434 0.90 0.890 37
-10 -0.0046 -1.184 37 0.0390 0.73 0.731 37
-9 0.0001 0.138 37 0.0390 0.70 0.711 37
-8 0.0085 1.478 37 0.0473 0.89 0.876 37
-7 -0.0048 -0.534 37 0.0426 0.81 0.805 37
-6 0.0001 0.512 37 0.0427 0.88 0.860 37
-5 0.0024 0.453 37 0.0450 0.81 0.853 37
-4 0.0048 1.242 37 0.0496 0.96 1.027 37
-3 -0.0029 -0.894 37 0.0468 0.84 0.912 37
-2 -0.0004 -0.396 37 0.0464 0.78 0.861 37
-1 -0.0025 -0.486 37 0.0439 0.71 0.803 37
0 0.0062 0.549 37 0.0500 0.78 0.847 37
1 0.0006 0.566 37 0.0505 0.84 0.892 37
2 -0.0131 -1.033 37 0.0378 0.47 0.568 37
3 -0.0022 -1.283 37 0.0357 0.31 0.467 37
4 0.0033 0.413 37 0.0388 0.36 0.504 37
5 0.0237 3.021** 37 0.0625 0.72 0.821 37
6 0.0012 0.163 37 0.0637 0.73 0.834 37
7 -0.0068 -1.729 37 0.0569 0.53 0.656 37
8 -0.0031 -0.140 37 0.0538 0.51 0.638 37
9 0.0041 0.384 37 0.0579 0.55 0.669 37
10 0.0105 2.049* 37 0.0684 0.78 0.860 37
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 40 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Insured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z  Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.0249 0.04 0.261 37
-10 to -1 0.0005 -0.27 -0.001 37
+1 to +10 0.0182 0.16 0.192 37
-1 to +1 0.0043 0.36 0.342 37
-1 to 0 0.0037 0.04 0.080 37
0 to +1 0.0068 0.79 0.723 37
*significant at 0.05 level
“♦significant at 0.01 level
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Tables 41 and 42 show the results for insured intermediaries which offer 
derivative securities. Several days offer significant and positive mean residuals (days 
-57, -47, -44, -43, -24, +1, +4, + 6 , +7). Event day return is equal to 0.0036. Its Z 
statistic is only 0.732. Many CAER's from table 41 are also significant. These results 
are very similar to that derived from the market model with value weighted index. 
Table 42 presents the results for a select number of intervals. All of the CAER's for 
these intervals are positive. Several are of significance. Again, however, because the 
sample size is so small, no inferences can be made from these results.
2. Uninsured Intermediaries
Tables 43 and 44 present the average excess and cumulative average excess 
returns derived from the market model with value weighted market proxy (over the 
investigation period and selected intervals) for uninsured intermediaries which offer 
primary securities. Only 20 out of the 150 uninsured intermediaries in our sample 
chose to issue primary MBS's during the 1983-1987 time frame. The average excess 
returns and the cumulative average residuals in Table 43 show no statistical 
significance. The CAER's in Table 44 are equally nonimpressive. They are of varied 
sign and are insignificant according to the Z  and statistics.
However, in sharp contrast to that obtained for insured intermediaries which 
offer derivative securities, the mean residuals for uninsured intermediaries which 
offer derivative securities are mostly negative. In Table 45, only the return for day 
-39 is significant. The return on the event day is positive and insignificant.
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Table 41 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Insured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z  Z  Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0025 -0.730 7 -0.0025 -0.73 -0.730 7
-59 0.0011 0.183 7 -0.0014 -0.65 -0.639 7
-58 -0.0051 -0.511 7 -0.0065 -0.82 -0.817 7
-57 0.0170 2.144* 7 0.0105 0.36 0.354 7
-56 -0.0055 -0.431 7 0.0051 0.13 0.118 7
-55 0.0021 0.073 7 0.0072 0.15 0.125 7
-54 0.0099 0.910 7 0.0170 0.48 0.456 7
-53 0.0000 0.424 7 0.0170 0.30 0.273 7
-52 -0.0060 -0.623 7 0.0109 0.08 0.070 7
-51 0.0112 1.455 7 0.0222 0.53 0.514 7
-50 0.0000 0.064 7 0.0222 0.49 0.467 7
-49 -0.0079 -0.791 7 0.0143 0.24 0.232 7
-48 0.0039 0.516 7 0.0182 0.37 0.360 7
-47 0.0001 2.240* 7 0.0183 1.88 1.679 7
-46 0.0014 0.082 7 0.0197 0.41 0.396 7
-45 -0.0059 -0.259 7 0.0138 0.33 0.335 7
-44 0.0141 2.394* 7 0.0280 0.90 0.873 7
-43 0.0126 2.322* 7 0.0406 1.42 1.356 7
-42 0.0076 0.936 7 0.0482 1.60 1.523 7
-41 0.0076 0.958 7 0.0558 1.77 1.655 7
-40 0.0018 0.295 7 0.0577 1.80 1.645 7
-39 -0.0006 -0.261 7 0.0571 1.70 1.541 7
-38 0.0043 0.828 7 0.0614 1.83 1.653 7
-37 0.0033 0.397 7 0.0647 1.88 1.679 7
-36 0.0105 1.507 7 0.0751 2.14* 1.901 7
-35 -0.0092 -1.428 7 0.0659 1.82 1.609 7
-34 0.0017 0.141 7 0.0676 1.76 1.565 7
-33 0.0010 0.148 7 0.0686 1.75 1.557 7
-32 0.0060 1.181 7 0.0746 1.94 1.735 7
-31 0.0106 1.942 7 0.0852 2.26* 2.005* 7
-30 0.0119 1.659 7 0.0971 2.53* 2.216* 7
-29 -0.0009 -0.515 7 0.0962 2.40* 2.085* 7
-28 -0.0022 -0.614 7 0.0939 2.25* 1.960* 7
-27 -0.0021 -0.086 7 0.0919 2.20* 1.941 7
-26 -0.0059 -0.768 7 0.0860 2.04* 1.798 7
-25 -0.0062 -0.760 7 0.0798 1.89 1.632 7
-24 0.0220 3.410** 7 0.1018 2.42* 2.092* 7
-23 0.0039 0.074 7 0.1057 2.38* 2.053* 7












-21 -0.0017 -0.419 7 0.0979 2.10* 1.794 7
-20 0.0002 0.071 7 0.0982 2.06* 1.759 7
-19 -0.0037 -0.102 7 0.0945 2.02* 1.727 7
-18 -0.0016 -0.060 7 0.0929 1.99* 1.705 7
-17 0.0042 0.269 7 0.0971 2.01* 1.717 7
-16 0.0005 0.048 7 0.0976 1.99* 1.710 7
-15 0.0029 0.158 7 0.1004 1.99* 1.680 7
-14 0.0045 0.910 7 0.1049 2.10* 1.783 7
-13 -0.0051 -0.399 7 0.0998 2.02* 1.709 7
-12 -0.0164 -2.652” 7 0.0834 1.63 1.370 7
-11 0.0088 0.864 7 0.0922 1.73 1.434 7
-10 -0.0013 -0.307 7 0.0909 1.76 1.456 7
-9 -0.0052 -1.332 7 0.0858 1.56 1.268 7
-8 0.0082 1.378 7 0.0940 1.73 1.419 7
-7 -0.0068 -0.868 7 0.0872 1.60 1.312 7
-6 -0.0085 -0.913 7 0.0787 1.46 1.207 7
-5 0.0025 0.238 7 0.0812 1.48 1.233 7
-4 0.0045 0.891 7 0.0857 1.58 1.314 7
-3 0.0060 0.751 7 0.0918 1.67 1.366 7
-2 0.0116 1.455 7 0.1033 1.84 1.512 7
-1 0.0006 0.006 7 0.1039 1.83 1.477 7
0 0.0036 0.732 7 0.1075 1.90 1.545 7
1 0.0123 3.503” 7 0.1197 2.33* 1.928 7
2 0.0006 0.079 7 0.1204 2.31* 1.901 7
3 -0.0022 -0.458 7 0.1182 2.34* 1.975* 7
4 0.0115 2.535* 7 0.1297 2.64** 2.232* 7
5 -0.0069 -1.333 7 0.1229 2.46* 2.058* 7
6 0.0190 3.467” 7 0.1419 2.86** 2.369* 7
7 0.0134 1.981* 7 0.1553 3.08** 2.546* 7
8 0.0002 0.508 7 0.1555 3.00” 2.455* 7
9 0.0011 0.379 7 0.1566 3.02** 2.472* 7
10 -0.0074 -0.802 7 0.1491 2.90** 2.388* 7
’ significant at 0.05 level
’ ’ significant at 0.01 level
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Table 42 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Insured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z  Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.0569 2.67” 2.527’ 7
-10 to -1 0.0117 0.60 0.564 7
+ 1 to +10 0.0417 3.04” 2.948” 7
-1 to +1 0.0164 2.44* 2.433* 7
1 o o 0.0041 0.51 0.519 7
0 to +1 0.0158 3.00” 2.991” 7
’significant at 0.05 level
’ ’significant at 0.01 level
Table 43 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Uninsured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0014 -0.64 20 -0.0014 -0.64 -0.64 20
-59 -0.0018 -1.21 20 -0.0032 -1.31 -1.06 20
-58 0.0004 0.22 20 -0.0028 -1.20 -0.94 20
-57 0.0012 0.40 20 -0.0016 -0.84 -0.71 20
-56 0.0013 0.29 20 -0.0003 -0.62 -0.58 20
-55 -0.0004 -0.10 20 -0.0008 -0.52 -0.51 20
-54 -0.0020 -0.09 20 -0.0028 -0.52 -0.49 20
-53 0.0011 0.19 20 -0.0017 -0.42 -0.43 20
-52 -0.0028 -0.62 20 -0.0045 -0.60 -0.47 20
-51 0.0032 0.77 20 -0.0013 -0.33 -0.37 20
-50 0.0008 0.16 20 -0.0006 -0.36 -0.38 20
-49 -0.0066 -1.88 20 -0.0072 -0.89 -0.52 20
-48 0.0019 0.03 20 -0.0053 -0.84 -0.49 20
-47 0.0033 1.07 20 -0.0020 -0.22 -0.25 20
-46 0.0072 1.93 20 0.0052 0.01 0.25 20
-45 -0.0012 -0.08 20 0.0040 0.03 0.25 20
-44 -0.0001 -0.61 20 0.0039 0.12 0.23 20
-43 0.0005 0.01 20 0.0044 0.12 0.22 20
-42 0.0015 0.20 20 0.0059 0.07 0.22 20
-41 0.0000 0.46 20 0.0059 0.17 0.20 20
-40 -0.0057 -1.48 20 0.0002 0.16 0.26 20
-39 0.0005 0.03 20 0.0007 0.16 0.25 20
-38 0.0013 0.37 20 0.0020 0.08 0.23 20
-37 0.0008 0.70 20 0.0029 0.22 0.25 20
-36 0.0020 0.17 20 0.0048 0.18 0.24 20
-35 -0.0011 -0.46 20 0.0037 0.27 0.25 20
-34 0.0060 1.10 20 0.0097 0.05 0.21 20
-33 -0.0006 -0.46 20 0.0090 0.04 0.19 20
-32 -0.0029 -0.89 20 0.0062 0.13 0.22 20
-31 -0.0013 -0.41 20 0.0049 0.20 0.23 20
-30 -0.0003 -0.08 20 0.0046 0.19 0.22 20
-29 0.0024 0.31 - 20 0.0070 0.13 0.21 20
-28 0.0014 0.22 20 0.0083 0.09 0.20 20
-27 0.0033 1.27 20 0.0117 C.13 0.16 20
-26 -0.0018 -0.89 20 0.0099 0.02 0.18 20
-25 0.0010 0.10 20 0.0108 0.00 0.18 20
-24 -0.0040 -1.41 20 0.0068 0.24 0.21 20
-23 0.0007 0.53 20 0.0075 0.15 0.19 20












-21 -0.0039 -1.12 20 0.0051 0.28 0.21 20
-20 0.0032 0.79 20 0.0083 0.16 0.19 20
-19 0.0044 1.76 20 0.0127 0.12 0.15 20
-18 0.0009 0.62 20 0.0135 0.21 0.13 20
-17 -0.0050 -1.14 20 0.0086 0.04 0.16 20
-16 0.0004 0.54 20 0.0090 0.12 0.14 20
-15 -0.0047 -1.80 20 0.0043 0.15 0.18 20
-14 -0.0003 -0.64 20 0.0040 0.24 0.19 20
-13 -0.0004 -0.34 20 0.0036 0.29 0.19 20
-12 0.0023 0.43 20 0.0058 0.22 0.18 20
-11 -0.0001 -0.19 20 0.0058 0.19 0.18 20
-10 0.0042 0.85 20 0.0100 0.07 0.16 20
-9 -0.0050 -1.10 20 0.0050 0.23 0.18 20
-8 0.0058 1.55 20 0.0108 0.01 0.15 20
-7 -0.0037 -1.06 20 0.0070 0.16 0.17 20
-6 0.0032 0.74 20 0.0102 0.05 0.15 20
-5 -0.0019 -0.86 20 0.0083 0.17 0.17 20
-4 -0.0045 -1.36 20 0.0038 0.35 0.18 20
-3 0.0026 0.66 20 0.0064 0.26 0.17 20
-2 -0.0020 -0.62 20 0.0045 0.34 0.18 20
-1 0.0016 0.81 20 0.0061 0.23 0.17 20
0 0.0014 0.45 20 0.0075 0.17 0.16 20
1 -0.0041 -1.26 20 0.0034 0.33 0.18 20
2 -0.0032 -0.98 20 0.0003 0.45 0.19 20
3 -0.0006 -0.05 20 -0.0003 -0.45 -0.19 20
4 0.0023 0.78 20 0.0020 0.35 0.18 20
5 0.0003 0.03 20 0.0023 0.34 0.17 20
6 0.0024 0.64 20 0.0047 0.26 0.16 20
7 0.0015 0.52 20 0.0062 0.20 0.16 20
8 -0.0004 -0.12 20 0.0058 0.21 0.16 20
9 0.0024 0.76 20 0.0082 0.12 0.15 20
10 -0.0018 -0.03 20 0.0064 0.11 0.14 20
'significant at 0.05 level
"significant at 0.01 level
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Tabic 44 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by uninsured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z  Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 0.0006 0.09 0.07 20
-10 to -1 0.0003 0.13 0.06 20
+ 1 to +10 -0.0011 -0.11 -0.28 20
-1 to +1 -0.0011 -0.00 -0.23 20
-1 to 0 0.0030 0.89 0.79 20
0 to +1 -0.0026 -0.57 -031 20
"significant at 0.05 level
""significant at 0.01 level
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Table 45 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Uninsured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z  Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0001 -0.355 130 -0.0001 -0.36 -0.355 130
-59 0.0006 0.382 130 0.0005 0.02 0.034 130
-58 -0.0019 -0.252 130 -0.0014 -0.13 -0.110 130
-57 0.0005 0.590 130 -0.0009 -0.18 -0.201 130
-56 0.0008 0.982 130 -0.0001 -0.60 -0.622 130
-55 0.0008 0.364 130 0.0007 .* 0.70 0.713 130
-54 -0.0012 -0.409 130 -0.0005 -0.49 -0.502 130
-52 0.0010 0.904 130 0.0005 0.78 0.787 130
-52 -0.0018 -1.189 130 -0.0013 -0.34 -0.355 130
-51 -0.0020 -1.179 130 -0.0032 -0.05 -0.027 130
-50 -0.0018 -0.339 130 -0.0051 -0.15 -0.178 130
-49 0.0027 1.268 130 -0.0023 -0.22 -0.179 130
-48 -0.0013 -0.537 130 -0.0037 -0.06 -0.018 130
-47 -0.C024 -1.116 130 -0.0113 -0.73 -0.744 130
-46 0.0018 1.637 130 -0.0040 -0.23 -0.174 130
-45 -0.0028 -1.462 130 -0.0068 -0.15 -0.181 130
-44 -0.0037 -1.809 130 -0.0105 -0.58 -0.593 130
-43 0.0027 1.169 130 -0.0078 -0.29 -0.297 130
-42 -0.0025 -1.002 130 -0.0103 -0.51 -0.566 130
-41 0.0014 0.726 130 -0.0089 -0.34 -0.395 130
-40 -0.0015 -1.072 130 -0.0105 -0.56 -0.625 130
-39 -0.0042 -2.581** 130 -0.0147 -1.10 -1.133 130
-38 0.0019 0.723 130 -0.0128 -0.93 -0.945 130
-37 0.0012 0.847 130 -0.0116 -0.73 -0.743 130
-36 -0.0006 -0.448 130 -0.0122 -0.81 -0.809 130
-35 -0.0013 -0.989 130 -0.0136 -0.99 -0.983 130
-34 0.0010 0.558 130 -0.0126 -0.86 -0.862 130
-33 0.0004 0.027 130 -0.0122 -0.84 -0.840 130
-32 0.0006 0.451 130 -0.0116 -0.74 -0.743 130
-31 0.0005 0.082 130 -0.0111 -0.71 -0.714 130
-30 0.0006 0.601 130 -0.0105 -0.59 -0.598 130
-29 -0.0018 -0.895 130 -0.0123 -0.74 -0.735 130
-28 0.0011 0.364 130 -0.0112 -0.67 -0.663 130
-27 -0.0004 -0.110 130 -0.0116 -0.68 -0.670 130
-26 -0.0020 -0.415 130 -0.0135 -0.74 -0.766 130
-25 0.0030 1.625 130 -0.0105 -0.46 -0.505 130
-24 -0.0001 -0.200 130 -0.0106 -0.42 -0.468 130
-23 -0.0010 -0.452 130 -0.0116 -0.49 -0.531 130












-21 -0.0007 -0.446 130 -0.0112 -0.41 -0.449 130
-20 0.0019 0.751 130 -0.0093 -0.28 -0.321 130
-19 -0.0006 -0.395 130 -0.0099 -0.34 -0.372 130
-18 -0.0012 -0.584 130 -0.0111 -0.43 -0.448 130
-17 -0.0006 -0.380 130 -0.0116 -0.48 -0.498 130
-16 -0.0028 -1.757 130 -0.0145 -0.74 -0.728 130
-15 -0.0006 -0.385 130 -0.0150 -0.78 -0.770 130
-14 -0.0019 -0.572 130 -0.0169 -0.86 -0.835 130
-13 0.0011 0.565 130 -0.0158 -0.77 -0.748 130
-12 -0.0022 -0.927 130 -0.0180 -0.89 -0.855 130
-11 -0.0004 -0.278 130 -0.0184 -0.92 -0.897 130
-10 -0.0009 -0.549 130 -0.0193 -0.99 -0.952 130
-9 -0.0003 -0.644 130 -0.0196 -1.07 -1.019 130
-8 -0.0032 -1.742 130 -0.0228 -1.30 -1.220 130
-7 -0.0008 -0.872 130 -0.0236 -1.41 -1.314 130
-6 -0.0017 -0.362 130 -0.0253 -1.44 -1.338 130
-5 -0.0026 -1.256 130 -0.0279 -1.60 -1.473 130
-4 -0.0030 -1.458 130 -0.0309 -1.78 -1.630 130
-3 0.0014 0.701 130 -0.0295 -1.67 -1.532 130
-2 -0.0007 -1.098 130 -0.0302 -1.80 -1.643 130
-1 -0.0004 -0.067 130 -0.0306 -1.77 -1.618 130
0 0.0013 0.367 130 -0.0292 -1.71 -1.560 130
1 0.0001 0.038 130 -0.0291 -1.70 -1.549 130
2 -0.0021 -1.518 130 -0.0312 -1.88 -1.700 130
3 -0.0032 -1.431 130 -0.0344 -2.04* -1.841 130
4 0.0003 0.302 130 -0.0341 -1.99’ -1.791 130
5 0.0004 0.063 130 -0.0337 -1.97* -1.780 130
6 0.0015 0.831 130 -0.0322 -1.85 -1.674 130
7 -0.0016 -0.214 130 -0.0338 -1.86 -1.680 130
8 -0.0017 -0.644 130 -0.0355 -1.93 -1.729 130
9 -0.0007 -0.465 130 -0.0362 -1.97* -1.760 130
10 -0.0007 -0.438 130 -0.0369 -2.01* -1.776 130
’significant at .05 level
*’significant at .01 level
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Furthermore, the CAER's which show statistical significance begin in the post 
announcement period and are negative. Only CAER -10+10 and CAER-m ^  from 
Table 46 are significant. They likewise are negative.
Tables 47 and 48 present the average excess and cumulative average excess 
returns derived from the m ean adjusted returns model (over the investigation period 
and selected intervals) for uninsured intermediaries which offer primary securities. 
Nothing substantial is reported here. In Table 47, only four days show statistical 
significance (Days -50, -44, -42, and -19), but are of varied sign and far from the 
announcement day. The event day has a positive return but is insignificant. Only 
CAER .60 _49, a random effect, has any statistical significance (barely). It is negative 
in sign. The CAER's in Table 48 do not even approach significance.
Tables 49 and 50 show results using the m ean adjusted returns model for 
u.. isured intermediaries which issued derivative MBS's during 1983-1987. The 
issuance of derivative securities is associated with the capture of positive arbitrage 
profits by issuers. Negative mean and cumulative average excess residuals of 
statistical significance are present in Table 49. However, the average excess returns 
on day 0 and day +1 are both positive, though insignificant. Table 50's results for 
CAER's during various subperiods show negative and significant returns for 
CAER_10 +10 and C A E R ^ +10. However, various subperiods which include the event 
day (-1  to + 1, -1 to 0 , and 0  to + 1) are all positive, though insignificant.
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Table 46 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by
Uninsured Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (value weighted market proxy),
Selected Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 -0.0185 -2.26* -2.143* 130
-10 to -1 -0.0121 -2.28* -2.222* 130
+ 1 to +10 -0.0077 -1.12 -1.075 130
-1 to +1 0.0011 0.23 0.232 130
-1 to 0 0.0010 0.31 0.309 130
0 to +1 0.0015 0.23 0.234 130
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
Table 47 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Uninsured Intermediaries
Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, 1983-1987
Mean t t
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic N
-60 -0.0041 -1.55 20 -0.0041 -1.55 20
-59 -0.0003 -0.56 20 -0.0044 -1.50 20
-58 0.0000 0.22 20 -0.0044 -1.35 20
-57 0.0013 0.33 20 -0.0031 -1.00 20
-56 -0.0001 -0.23 20 -0.0032 -1.00 20
-55 0.0041 1.39 20 0.0009 0.35 20
-54 -0.0040 -0.84 20 -0.0031 -0.64 20
-53 -0.0053 -1.46 20 -0.0083 -1.11 20
-52 -0.0025 -0.65 20 -0.0108 -1.27 20
-51 0.0012 0.29 20 -0.0097 -1.11 20
-50 -0.0067 -2.29* 20 -0.0163 -1.75 20
-49 -0.0035 -1.00 20 -0.0198 -1.96* 20
-48 0.0054 1.33 20 -0.0144 -1.52 20
-47 -0.0100 -0.90 20 -0.0244 -1.73 20
-46 0.0047 1.09 20 -0.0101 -1.15 20
-45 -0.0066 -1.21 20 -0.0167 -1.42 20
-44 -0.0099 -2.17* 20 -0.0266 -1.90 20
-43 -0.0001 -0.24 20 -0.0267 -1.90 20
-42 0.0097 2.10* 20 -0.0170 -1.37 20
-41 -0.0017 -0.13 20 -0.0187 -1.37 20
-40 -0.0047 -1.01 20 -0.0234 -1.55 20
-39 -0.0035 -1.02 20 -0.0269 -1.74 20
-38 0.0010 0.06 20 -0.0259 -1.68 20
-37 0.0015 0.38 20 -0.0244 -1.73 20
-36 0.0037 0.51 20 -0.0207 -1.59 20
-35 -0.0023 -0.66 20 -0.0230 -1.69 20
-34 0.0050 0.67 20 -0.0179 -1.53 20
-33 -0.0030 -0.48 20 -0.0209 -1.59 20
-32 -0.0033 -0.93 20 -0.0242 -1.73 20
-31 -0.0006 -0.31 20 -0.0247 -1.76 20
-30 -0.0019 -0.28 20 -0.0266 -1.78 20
-29 -0.0003 -0.51 20 -0.0269 ~ -1.84 20
-28 0.0014 0.26 20 -0.0255 -1.77 20
-27 0.0058 1.74 20 -0.0198 -1.45 20
-26 -0.0004 -0.45 20 -0.0202 -1.50 20
-25 0.0017 0.18 20 -0.0185 -1.45 20
-24 -0.0034 -1.06 20 -0.0219 -1.61 20
-23 -0.0019 -0.38 20 -0.0238 -1.65 20










-21 -0.0071 -1.61 20 -0.0278 -1.76 20
-20 0.0045 1.20 20 -0.0234 -1.55 20
-19 0.0078 2.32* 20 -0.0156 -1.65 20
-18 0.0010 0.60 20 -0.0146 -1.07 20
-17 -0.0046 -0.97 20 -0.0192 -1.20 20
-16 0.0029 0.86 20 -0.0163 -1.06 20
-15 -0.0038 -1.21 20 -0.0201 -1.23 20
-14 0.0011 0.03 20 -0.0189 -1.21 20
-13 -0.0043 -1.26 20 -0.0233 -1.38 20
-12 0.0011 0.33 20 -0.0222 -1.32 20
-11 -0.0002 -0.12 20 -0.0224 -1.29 20
-10 0.0048 1.13 20 -0.0176 -1.12 20
-9 -0.0038 -0.46 20 -0.0214 -1.17 20
-8 0.0059 1.09 ■20 -0.0155 -1.01 20
-7 -0.0030 -0.87 20 -0.0185 -1.12 20
-6 0.0024 0.52 20 -0.0161 -1.04 20
-5 0.0021 0.34 20 -0.0140 -0.99 20
-4 -0.0042 -0.79 20 -0.0182 -1.08 20
-3 0.0016 0.35 20 -0.0166 -1.03 20
-2 -0.0059 -1.25 20 -0.0225 -1.18 20
-1 0.0015 0.62 20 -0.0209 -1.09 20
0 0.0013 0.21 20 -0.0196 -1.05 20
1 -0.0053 -1.47 20 -0.0249 -1.23 20
2 -0.0033 -1.04 20 -0.0280 -1.35 20
3 -0.0020 -0.39 20 -0.0299 -1.39 20
4 -0.0006 -0.25 20 -0.0305 -1.41 20
5 -0.0017 -0.61 20 -0.0321 -1.47 20
6 0.0029 0.84 20 -0.0294 -1.36 20
7 0.0023 0.52 20 -0.0272 -1.29 20
8 -0.0014 -0.35 20 -0.0284 -1.32 20
9 -0.0007 -0.22 20 -0.0290 -1.33 20
10 -0.0034 -0.62 20 -0.0321 -1.39 20
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 48 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance By Uninsured
Intermediaries Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, Selected Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER t Statistic N
-10 to +10 -0.0105 -0.57 20
-10 to -1 0.0014 0.21 20
+1 to +10 -0.0132 -1.10 20
-1 to +1 -0.0025 -0.37 20
-1 to 0 0.0028 0.58 20
0 to +1 -0.0040 -0.89 20
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 49 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Uninsured
Intermediaries Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, 1983-1987
Mean t t
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic N
-60 0.0013 0.29 130-• 0.0013 0.29 130
-59 -0.0007 -0.39 130 0.0006 0.07 130
-58 -0.0010 -0.13 130 -0.0004 -0.01 130
-57 0.0026 1.73 130 0.0022 0.88 130
-56 0.0016 1.55 130 0.0025 1.27 130
-55 0.0002 0.03 130 0.0027 1.18 130
-54 0.0008 0.25 130 0.0035 1.18 130
-53 0.0008 0.78 130 0.0037 1.32 130
-52 -0.0016 -0.96 130 0.0021 0.92 130
-51 -0.0023 -1.28 130 -0.0006 -0.42 130
-50 -0.0038 -1.38 130 -0.0044 -0.01 130
-49 0.0036 1.77 130 -0.0009 -0.50 130
-48 -0.0005 -0.17 130 -0.0013 -0.43 130
-47 -0.0040 -1.67 130 -0.0199 -1.33 130
-46 0.0011 0.87 130 -0.0047 -0.17 130
-45 -0.0048 -2.24* 130 -0.0097 -0.42 130
-44 -0.0025 -1.18 130 -0.0122 -0.69 130
-43 0.0032 1.77 130 -0.0102 -0.35 130
-42 -0.0048 -2.41* 130 -0.0150 -0.89 130
-41 0.0024 1.03 130 -0.0125 -0.64 130
-40 -0.0033 -1.96* 130 -0.0173 -1.17 130
-39 -0.0051 -2.52* 130 -0.0224 -1.68 130
-38 0.0041 1.71 130 -0.0183 -1.29 130
-37 -0.0008 -0.14 130 -0.0195 -1.32 130
-36 0.0001 0.21 130 -0.0195 -1.26 130
-35 -0.0020 -1.13 130 -0.0216 -1.46 130
-34 0.0021 0.92 130 -0.0197 -1.27 130
-33 0.0032 1.39 130 -0.0180 -1.08 130
-32 0.0030 1.63 130 -0.0150 -0.76 130
-31 0.0025 0.93 130 -0.0125 -0.58 130
-30 0.0013 0.77 130 -0.0122 -0.49 130
-29 -0.0014 -0.58 130 -0.0138 -0.60 130
-28 0.0024 0.87 130 -0.0115 -0.44 130
-27 -0.0007 -0.14 130 -0.0130 -0.51 130
-26 -0.0038 -1.43 130 -0.0173 -0.77 130
-25 0.0036 1.84 130 -0.0139 -0.47 130
-24 0.0008 0.49 130 -0.0138 -0.42 130
-23 -0.0018 -0.91 130 -0.0156 -0.57 130










-21 -0.0017 -0.87 130 -0.0168 -0.64 130
-20 0.0026 1.06 130 -0.0143 -0.46 130
-19 -0.0006 -0.30 130 -0.0150 -0.51 130
-18 0.0001 0.13 130 -0.0150 -0.49 130
-17 -0.0006 -0.40 130 -0.0171 -0.62 130
-16 -0.0020 -1.34 130 -0.0196 -0.83 130
-15 -0.0004 -0.37 130 -0.0202 -0.89 130
-14 -0.0025 -1.29 130 -0.0226 -1.07 130
-13 0.0009 0.53 130 -0.0222 -1.01 130
-12 -0.0005 -0.32 130 -0.0227 -1.04 130
-11 -0.0029 -1.61 130 -0.0266 -1.31 130
-10 -0.0001 -0.16 130 -0.0267 -1.32 130
-9 0.0013 0.27 130 -0.0264 -1.32 130
-8 -0.0032 -1.79 130 -0.0296 -1.55 130
-7 -0.0004 -0.42 130 -0.0302 -1.60 130
-6 -0.0027 -0.75 130 -0.0328 -1.69 130
-5 -0.0008 -0.09 130 -0.0346 -1.73 130
-4 -0.0032 -1.47 130 -0.0380 -1.92 130
-3 0.0018 0.74 130 -0.0362 -1.81 130
-2 -0.0001 -0.45 130 -0.0371 -1.88 130
-1 0.0004 0.13 130 -0.0371 -1.87 130
0 0.0028 1.17 130 -0.0344 -1.70 130
1 0.0012 0.58 130 -0.0338 -1.65 130
2 -0.0045 -2.51* 130 -0.0383 -1.95 130
3 -0.0030 -1.07 130 -0.0413 -2.07* 130
4 -0.0022 -1.10 130 -0.0434 -2.19* 130
5 -0.0027 -1.68 130 -0.0461 -2.38* 130
6 0.0020 0.82 130 -0.0441 -2.26* 130
7 -0.0013 -0.14 130 -0.0453 -2.23* 130
8 -0.0047 -2.24* 130 -0.0499 -2.48* 130
9 -0.0010 -0.67 130 -0.0509 -2.54* 130
10 0.0017 0.69 130 -0.0497 -2.46* 130
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
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Table 50 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by
Uninsured Intermediaries Generated by Mean Adjusted Returns Model, Selected Intervals,
1983-1987
Interval CAER t Statistic N
-10 to +10 -0.0070 -238* 130
-10 to -1 -0.0204 -1.47 130
+1 to +10 -0.0162 -2.35* 130
-1 to +1 0.0044 1.00 130
-1 to 0 0.0032 0.81 130
0 to +1 0.0040 1.13 130
^significant at 0.05 level
* ‘significant at 0.01 level
191
Table 51 and 52 present the average excess and cumulative average excess returns 
derived from the market model with the S&P 500 Index serving as a proxy for the 
m arket portfolio (over the investigation period and selected intervals) for uninsured 
intermediaries which offer primary MBS's. All of the results in these two tables are 
of varied sign and show no statistical significance.
Table 43 shows the average excess returns associated with derivative MBS 
issuance by uninsured intermediaries. None of the m ean residuals are significant. 
The return on the event day is positive, but insignificant. The CAER's are mostly 
negative and gain significance close to the event day in a pattern similar to that 
displayed by the total uninsured sample. The CAER's in Table 54 are of varied sign. 
CAER10>+10 and CAER-m -! are negative and significant. However, intervals such 
as -1 to +1, -1 to 0, and 0 to +1, which include the event day, are positive, but 
insignificant.
Table 51 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Uninsured Intermediaries
Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0013 -0.63 20 -0.0013 -0.63 -0.63 20
-59 -0.0021 -1.34 20 -0.0034 -1.39 -1.11 20
-58 0.0005 0.16 20 -0.0028 -1.22 -0.96 20
-57 0.0017 0.57 20 -0.0011 -0.78 -0.69 20
-56 0.0013 0.27 20 0.0002 0.57 0.56 20
-55 -0.0006 -0.02 20 -0.0004 -0.51 -0.51 20
-54 -0.0018 -0.00 20 -0.0022 -0.48 -0.47 20
-53 0.0010 0.13 20 -0.0013 -0.40 -0.42 20
-52 -0.0032 -0.77 20 -0.0045 -0.63 -0.48 20
-51 0.0031 0.76 20 -0.0014 -0.36 -0.38 20
-50 0.0004 0.20 20 -0.0009 -0.40 -0.40 20
-49 -0.0082 -2.26* 20 -0.0092 -1.04 -0.57 20
-48 0.0020 0.01 20 • -0.0071 -0.99 -0.54 20
-47 0.0032 0.47 20 -0.0040 -0.56 -0.34 20
-46 0.0070 1.85 20 0.0030 0.19 0.31 20
-45 -0.0021 -0.35 20 0.0009 0.27 0.33 20
-44 -0.0001 -0.61 20 0.0008 0.11 0.30 20
-43 -0.0011 -0.44 20 -0.0003 -0.21 -0.31 20
-42 0.0020 0.09 20 0.0017 0.23 0.31 20
-41 0.0000 0.44 20 0.0017 0.12 0.28 20
-40 -0.0057 -1.47 20 -0.0040 -0.44 -0.34 20
-39 0.0000 0.15 20 -0.0040 -0.46 -0.34 20
-38 0.0008 0.18 20 -0.0032 -0.41 -0.32 20
-37 0.0007 0.75 20 -0.0025 -0.56 -0.34 20
-36 0.0021 0.20 20 -0.0004 -0.51 -0.33 20
-35 -0.0003 -0.22 20 -0.0007 -0.54 -0.33 20
-34 0.0057 1.06 20 0.0050 0.33 0.29 20
-33 -0.0008 -0.41 20 0.0042 0.24 0.27 20
-32 -0.0030 -0.94 20 0.0012 0.41 0.30 20
-31 -0.0011 -0.37 27 0.0001 0.48 0.30 20
-30 -0.0002 -0.10 20 -0.0002 -0.45 -0.29 20
-29 0.0024 0.31 20 0.0022 0.39 0.28 20
-28 0.0012 0.17 20 0.0035 0.35 0.27 20
-27 0.0032 1.24 20 0.0067 0.13 0.23 20
-26 -0.0023 -1.04 20 0.0044 0.31 0.26 20
-25 0.0011 0.15 20 0.0055 0.28 0.25 20
-24 -0.0041 -1.44 20 0.0014 0.51 0.28 20
-23 0.0011 0.67 20 0.0025 0.39 0.26 20












-21 -0.0039 -1.13 20 0.0001 0.53 0.28 20
-20 0.0033 0.87 20 0.0035 0.39 0.25 20
-19 0.0042 1.70 20 0.0077 0.12 0.21 20
-18 0.0010 0.67 20 0.0087 0.02 0.20 20
-17 -0.0048 -1.06 20 0.0039 0.18 0.22 20
-16 -4 0.0007 0.59 20 0.0046 0.09 0.20 20
-15 -0.0048 -1.83 20 -0.0002 -0.36 -0.24 20
-14 -0.0002 -0.59 20 -0.0004 -0.44 -0.25 20
-13 -0.0004 -0.31 20 -0.0008 -0.48 -0.25 20
-12 0.0019 0.30 20 0.0011 0.43 0.24 20
-11 -0.0005 -0.05 20 0.0006 0.42 0.24 20
-10 0.0043 0.90 20 0.0049 0.29 0.22 20
-9 -0.0054 -1.17 20 -0.0005 -0.45 -0.24 20
-8 0.0060 1.62 20 0.0055 0.22 0.21 20
-7 -0.0036 -1.08 20 0.0019 0.37 0.22 20
-6 0.0032 0.76 20 0.0052 0.26 0.21 20
-5 -0.0020 -0.89 20 0.0032 0.38 0.22 20
-4 -0.0043 -1.31 20 -0.0011 -0.55 -0.24 20
-3 0.0025 0.65 20 0.0014 0.46 0.23 20
-2 -0.0020 -0.60 20 -0.0006 -0.54 -0.24 20
-1 0.0013 0.73 20 0.0007 0.44 0.22 20
0 0.0018 0.56 20 0.0025 0.36 0.21 20
1 -0.0042 -1.31 20 -0.0017 -0.53 -0.23 20
2 -0.0033 -0.97 20 -0.0050 -0.64 -0.24 20
3 -0.0007 -0.11 20 -0.0057 -0.65 -0.24 20
4 0.0021 0.73 20 -0.0036 -0.56 -0.23 20
5 0.0000 0.10 20 -0.0036 -0.56 -0.23 20
6 0.0023 0.59 20 -0.0012 -0.49 -0.22 20
7 0.0016 0.54 20 0.0003 0.42 0.21 20
8 -0.0006 -0.18 20 -0.0002 -0.44 -0.21 20
9 0.0022 0.67 20 0.0019 0.36 0.20 20
10 -0.0021 -0.08 20 -0.0002 -0.36 -0.20 20
‘ significant at 0.05 level
“ significant at 0.01 level
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Table 52 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Primary MBS Issuance by Uninsured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), Selected
Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z  Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 -0.0008 -0.02 -0.05 20
-10 to -1 0.0001 0.13 0.06 20
+ 1 to +10 -0.0027 -0.07 -0.36 20
-1 to +1 -0.0011 -0.02 -0.21 20
-1 to 0 0.0031 0.91 0.79 20
0 to +1 -0.0024 -0.53 -0.26 20
'significant at 0.05 level
"significant at 0.01 level
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Table 53 Daily Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by Uninsured
Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy), 1983-1987
Mean Z Z Zmp
Day Residual Statistic N CAER Statistic Statistic N
-60 -0.0002 -0.429 130 -0.0002 -0.43 -0.429 130
-59 0.0005 0.299 130 0.0003 0.09 0.079 130
-58 -0.0020 -0.270 130 -0.0017 -0.23 -0.214 130
-57 0.0006 0.667 130 -0.0011 -0.13 -0.149 130
-56 0.0009 1.073 130 -0.0002 -0.60 -0.615 130
-55 0.0007 0.291 130 0.0005 0.67 0.678 130
-54 -0.0011 -0.348 130 -0.0006 -0.49 -0.491 130
-53 0.0009 0.878 130 0.0004 0.76 0.768 130
-52 -0.0018 -1.168 130 -0.0015 -0.33 -0.343 130
-51 -0.0020 -1.169 130 -0.0035 -0.06 -0.037 130
-50 -0.0018 -0.249 130 -0.0052 -0.13 -0.163 130
-49 0.0025 1.114 130 -0.0028 -0.20 -0.158 130
-48 -0.0013 -0.534 130 -0.0040 -0.04 -0.003 130
-47 -0.0024 -1.487 130 -0.0064 -0.95 -0.978 130
-46 0.0016 1.513 130 -0.0049 -0.14 -0.097 130
-45 -0.0031 -1.523 130 -0.0079 -0.24 -0.277 130
-44 -0.0039 -1.851 130 -0.0118 -0.68 -0.716 130
-43 0.0025 1.082 130 -0.0093 -0.41 -0.436 130
-42 -0.0026 -1.001 130 -0.0119 -0.63 -0.703 130
-41 0.0011 0.535 130 -0.0108 -0.49 -0.563 130
-40 -0.0018 -1.190 130 -0.0125 -0.74 -0.816 130
-39 -0.0047 -2.731** 130 -0.0172 -1.31 -1.361 130
-38 0.0019 0.722 130 -0.0154 -1.13 -1.168 130
-37 0.0010 0.773 130 -0.0143 -0.95 -0.978 130
-36 -0.0007 -0.454 130 -0.0150 -1.02 -1.041 130
-35 -0.0015 -1.068 130 -0.0165 -1.21 -1.225 130
-34 0.0010 0.587 130 -0.0155 -1.07 -1.094 130
-33 0.0006 0.142 130 -0.0149 -1.03 -1.046 130
-32 0.0007 0.516 130 -0.0142 -0.91 -0.934 130
-31 0.0007 0.231 130 -0.0134 -0.85 -0.876 130
-30 0.0006 0.584 130 -0.0128 -0.74 -0.761 130
-29 -0.0018 -0.841 130 -0.0146 -0.87 -0.887 130
-28 0.0011 0.355 130 -0.0135 -0.80 -0.814 130
-27 -0.0003 -0.069 130 -0.0138 -0.80 -0.811 130
-26 -0.0020 -0.408 130 -0.0158 -0.85 -0.906 130
-25 0.0027 1.390 130 -0.0131 -0.61 -0.674 130
-24 0.0000 0.198 130 -0.0132 -0.57 -0.632 130
-23 -0.0013 -0.535 130 -0.0144 -0.65 -0.706 130












-21 -0.0012 -0.576 130 -0.0145 -0.59 -0.654 130
-20 0.0019 0.759 130 -0.0126 -0.46 -0.522 130
-19 -0.0007 -0.422 130 -0.0133 -0.52 -0.575 130
-18 -0.0012 -0.583 130 -0.0145 -0.61 -0.647 130
-17 -0.0006 -0.315 130 -0.0150 -0.65 -0.686 130
-16 -0.0029 -1.802 130 -0.0179 -0.91 -0.920 130
-15 -0.0007 -0.441 130 -0.0186 -0.96 -0.967 130
-14 -0.0020 -0.680 130 -0.0206 -1.05 -1.043 130
-13 0.0010 0.504 130 -0.0196 -0.97 -0.963 130
-12 -0.0022 -0.947 130 -0.0218 -1.09 -1.070 130
-11 -0.0007 -0.407 130 -0.0225 -1,14 -1.125 130
-10 -0.0011 -0.694 130 -0.0236 -1.23 -1.196 130
-9 -0.0002 -0.624 130 -0.0238 -1.30 -1.256 130
-8 -0.0031 -1.658 130 -0.0269 -1.52 -1.444 130
-7 -0.0012 -1.105 130 -0.0281 -1.65 -1.564 130
-6 -0.0018 -0.391 130 -0.0298 -1.69 -1.590 130
-5 -0.0025 -1.181 130 -0.0323 -1.83 -1.714 130
-4 -0.0029 -1.399 130 -0.0353 -2.00* -1.861 130
-3 0.0013 0.605 130 -0.0340 -1.91 -1.772 130
-2 -0.0006 -1.000 130 -0.0346 -2.02* -1.869 130
-1 -0.0004 -0.036 130 -0.0350 -2.00* -1.846 130
0 0.0014 0.370 130 -0.0337 -1.93 -1.785 130
1 0.0001 0.060 130 -0.0336 -1.93 -1.775 130
2 -0.0022 -1.542 130 -0.0358 -2.10* -1.926 130
3 -0.0036 -1.599 130 -0.0393 -2.29* -2.083* 130
4 0.0002 0.201 130 -0.0392 -2.24* -2.042* 130
5 0.0002 0.056 130 -0.0390 -2.23* -2.041* 130
6 0.0011 0.541 130 -0.0378 -2.15* -1.963* 130
7 -0.0016 -0.182 130 -0.0394 -2.16* -1.963* 130
8 -0.0022 -0.893 130 -0.0416 -2.25* -2.038* 130
9 -0.0010 -0.536 130 -0.0425 -2.30* -2.079* 130
10 -0.0008 -0.540 130 -0.0433 -2.34* -2.104* 130
•significant at 0.05 level
••significant at 0.01 level
197
Table 54 Cumulative Average Excess Returns Associated with Derivative MBS Issuance by
Uninsured Intermediaries Generated by Market Model (S&P 500 Index market proxy),
Selected Intervals, 1983-1987
Interval CAER Z  Statistic Zmp Statistic N
-10 to +10 -0.0208 -2.55* -2.434* 130
-10 to -1 -0.0125 -2.34* -2.285* 130
+ 1 to +10 -0.0097 -1.47 -1.446 130
-1 to +1 0.0010 0.20 0.201 130
-1 to 0 0.0009 0.29 0.287 130
0 to +1 0.0014 0.22 0.220 130
*significant at 0.05 level
*‘ significant at 0.01 level
ENDNOTES
Chapter I
1986, over $529 billion of mortgage debt had already been securitized 
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1986).
2For example, due to liquidity, capital, or cost constraints large intermediaries 
are often unable to fund loans. However, they are able to use their expertise and 
reputation to act as originators, which allows them to collect origination and servicing 
fees for their efforts. The assets are removed from the originators balance sheet, 
which rids the originator of credit and interest rate risks while providing liquidity. 
On the other hand, smaller intermediaries usually act to provide funding. 
Securitization offers these institutions the opportunity to purchase certain types of 
loans previously unavailable to them in their local markets. Securitization enables 
small intermediaries to diversify their loan portfolios.
Chapter II
1High premium MBSs and some derivative securities do not behave this way. 
For example, a decrease in yields has no effect on the value of a premium MBS. 
(For more information, see Jacob, et.al., 1987).
2Senft (1985) acknowledges that there are two other reasons besides a change 
in interest rates that may prompt prepayment:
1. sale of the property -- the property owner uses his sales proceeds to pay off 
his mortgage loan.
2. disaster -  insurance proceeds (due to fire, flood, death, etc.) may be used to 
repay the loan.
3Kau et.al. (1986), p. 5.
4Kau et.al. (1985), p. 261.
5Besides usual methods of trading, FNMA pass-throughs trade in the forward 
delivery market. A lender can arrange for a sale of securities to an investor several 
months into the future.
6The mortgages remain on the issuer's books as assets and the MBBs are 
reported as liabilities.
7This may not be so for regulated issuers. MBBs may be more expensive than 
mortgage pass-throughs. Because MBB collateral remains on an institution's balance 




8Senft (1985), p. 110.
9According to FHLM C and FNMA Mortgage security program guidelines, 
nonconfirming loans are those with principal amounts greater than $153,100.
10This section draws heavily on Hu (1988).
11 Smith and D'Annolfo (1987), p. 30.
12A  floating rate CMO tranche is indexed to the LIBOR corresponding to its 
payment frequency, which is usually three or six months. Resetting of the floater's 
interest rate is usually done two business days prior to the payment date. The CMO 
bond trustee determines the LIBOR on the reset day by surveying interest rate 
quotations from the London offices of four reference banks. The index rate is 
arrived at by averaging the four quotations to the nearest sixteenth. By assuming a 
30/360 basis, the interest payment on the floater is then calculated.
13Hu (1988), p. 105.
14 A  formula for the reset of the coupon, C, could take the form of 
C = R - (M x LIBOR) 
where R  is a high interest rate, which is arbitrarily given, and M is an integer. In an 
example taken from Hu (1988), if R  were 24% and M equal to 2, then the reverse 
floater's coupon would be reset on a 3 month basis to 10%, if the LIBOR is 7%. 
However, if LIBOR rises to 10% by the next reset date, the reverse floater's coupon 
would fall to 4%. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the 3 month LIBOR and 
reverse floater rates if the above reset formula is employed.
Chapter III
1 There are also three main barriers to intermediaries which wish to securitize: 
size, recourse, and risk.
Securitization presents barriers to entry due to large financial requirements. 
Mortgage-backed security offerings are expensive undertakings, largely due to legal 
and investment banking fees. Arnold (1986) estimates that it takes about a $50 
million pool of mortgages to break even on a private placement; $100 million on a 
public offering. Most intermediaries, especially banks and S&Ls, are simply not 
large enough to deliver pools of such magnitude.
When recourse is available, the issuer of mortgage-backed securities is 
responsible for any losses incurred by investors should the securitized assets default. 
In such a  case, the assets are not removed from the issuer's balance sheet. Thus, 
banks and S&Ls are required to hold capital against these assets, decreasing their 
ability to effectively compete in the credit markets.
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MBS issuers must decide what quality pools they will offer to the market. If 
an intermediary securitizes its risky mortgages, it will gain a reputation as a "lemons" 
issuer and its creditability in the marketplace will be damaged. Its portfolio will be 
composed of only high-quality assets. On the other hand, an intermediary which 
chooses to market only its best assets will preserve its reputation. However, its 
portfolio will consist of low quality (high yielding) assets. In such a case, regulated 
MBS issuers may find themselves the subject of regulatory investigation.
2Sinkey (1989) also posits that in an efficient market, the securitization of an 
intermediary's best assets is likely to bring regulatory intervention in the form of 
higher deposit insurance premiums and/or capital constraints since the intermediary's 
loan portfolio is composed of bad credits. However, these actions are unlikely. 
Deposit insurance is levied at a flat rate against deposits without regard for risks. 
The imposition of capital constraints force intermediaries to take on even lower 
quality assets (or disposing of higher quality assets) in order to offset the impact of 
capital regulations (see Kim and Santamero, 1988).
3Intermediaries originate and service mortgages. Those which are chosen for 
securitization are sold to a trust which issues the certificates. Credit enhancement 
is provided by a bank letter of credit or an insurance bond. Certain rating agencies 
assign the issue a rating (similar to that assigned to corporate bonds) based on the 
credit enhancement. Underwriters then purchase the certificates from the trustee. 
The underwriter sets the securities' initial market price and sells them to investors.
4Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), p. 383.
5Especially if a  < 0 , a subsidy.
6Inside Mortgage Capital Markets. April 15, 1988, Financial World 
Publications.
7Mortgage-backed bonds, CMOs, and some REMICs are treated as debt of 
the issuing institution and are taxed in the traditional manner - interest on debt is 
deductible for purposes of computing a firm's tax bill.
0Closely related to a selling off of assets is a spinoff. A  spinoff occurs when 
a firm transfers some of its assets to a  newly incorporated firm whose shares are 
distributed to the shareholders of the original firm. Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), 
Hite and Owers (1983), and Shipper and Smith (1983) have also found that spinoff 
announcements include common stock excess returns.
9See Appendix A for a review of some of the other models used to examine 
banking firms.
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10The three major lenders in the mortgage market are: commercial banks, 
thrifts, and mortgage bankers. Each face different market environments. 
Commercial banks have access to federal deposit insurance. Thrifts also have access 
to deposit insurance, but the premiums demanded of thrifts are higher than those 
paid by banks for the same type of coverage (deposits insured up to $100,000 per 
account) and are at a competitive disadvantage to commercial banks. Banks and 
S&Ls are also forced to have capital requirements assessed on their institutions 
(which as previously mentioned, encourages these institutions to hold onto risky 
assets). Mortgage bankers have no deposit insurance and are not forced to hold 
capital requirements. Therefore, banks and thrifts have regulatory subsidies which 
they can pass on to their shareholders. The mortgage bankers have no subsidy to 
pass on to their shareholders.
11 The intermediary invests in risk free securities in order to cover the cost of 
deposits.
12Kim, and Santomero (1988), p. 1224.
13Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that in the absence of any market 
imperfections, including corporate taxes, a firm cannot change its value or weighted 
average cost of capital through changes in financial leverage.
14Tender offers have also been studied by Woods and Brigham (1966), 
Bierman and West (1966), Young (1967), Elton and Gruber (1968), Stewart (1976), 
Coates and Fredman (1976), and Lane (1976).
Chapter IV
1The market model has been used extensively to study the announcement 
effects of security offerings. The evidence from Masulis (1980b, 1983) on exchange 
offers and Masulis (1980a), Vermaelen (1981), and Dann (1981) on tender offer 
repurchases is consistent with leverage increasing transactions having a positive 
impact on firm value. Wansley and Dhillon (1987) examine the effect of security 
announcements by large banks. They expect the impact to be different from previous 
analyses of industrial firms and utilities. The evidence shows that the announcement 
of the issue of common stock has a significant negative effect on the value of the 
firm; announcement effects for debt are small and insignificant.
2 Some may call this a t-statistic.
3 An alternative Z-statistic will also be presented which is computed as follows
1 N
Zmp = ____ S





(1 + 1 )2 + t^ r
i=l
Mikkelson and Partch (1988) reason that this calculation adjusts for any dependence 
in the variance of the individual excess returns caused by cumulating individual 
excess returns calculated from only a single set of OLS estimates.
4 Another event study methodology is the market/risk adjusted returns model. 
See Brown and Warner (1980) for details.
5Neter et.al. (1985), p.520.
6 Officer and Smith (1986) note that attempts to explain cross sectional 
variation in abnormal equity returns have not been very successful. However, 
Wansley and Dhillon (1987) argue that the regulation which banks must adhere to 
provide a possible explanation as to why the determinants of the market response for 
banks may be different from prior findings.
7If r  = 2, the F test is the equivalent of a  two population, two sided t test.
8 A contrast is a  comparison involving two or more factor level means.
9 For more on the comparison of the three methods, see Neter et.al. (1985), 
Chapter 17.'
10The Scheffe' method usually leads to wider confidence intervals than the 
Bonferroni method. However, when only pairwise comparisons are made, the two 
methods lead to the same intervals (which are very close to the intervals provided 
by the Tukey method).
Chapter V
1 Daily returns appear to be superior to monthly or weekly returns because 
they seem better able to pinpoint the market's reaction to the announcements. 
Returns were computed over a period from 60 days prior to the announcement of 
each issue up through 10 days afterward. Each day's closing quotes were used to 
compute returns. In the case of a holiday, the following day's closing quote was 




1 The other statistic, Z ^ , as described by Mikkelson and Partch (1988), will not 
be reported for average excess returns because it is equivalent to the Dodd and 
W arner Z  statistic. Only when the period under study lasts more than one day will 
the Z  statistic and the Z ^ p be dissimilar. Thus, the Z^p will be reported only for 
cumulative average excess returns.
2 Sanger (1982), p. 70.
3The dependent variable was estimated using the m arket model with the value 
weighted index as a proxy for the market (Appendix C provides the results for the 
market model when the S&P 500 Index is used as the market proxy) and the mean 
adjusted returns approach.
Chapter VII
1Senft (1985), p. 532.
2For a general discussion of the literature focusing on the reasons for yield 
differentials among securities, see Van Horne (1984).
3There is an observed cyclical behavior associated with spreads. Van Horne 
(1984) shows that the yield spread between Treasury bonds and Baa bonds widened 
during recessionary periods and narrowed during expansion. The pattern between 
Treasuries and Aaa bonds is not as distinct. Studies by Hickman (1958), Joehn and 
Nielson (1975), Jaffee (1975), Cook and Hendershott (1978), Kidwell and Trzcinka 
(1979), Benson et.al. (1981), and Kidwell and Koch (1982) also support the idea that 
spreads vary inversely with the level of economic activity.
“Altarescu and Hinkle. (1988), p. 10.
5This methodology to compare yield spreads has been used by Jen and Wert 
(1967), Frankena (1970), and Van H om e (1980).
6 However, issues which were examined in the event study may not have been 
included in the yield spread sample due to an incompleteness in information. For 
example, 44 insured issues were investigated using event study methodology because 
all that needed to be known was the name of the issuer, date of the announcement 
and whether the issuer was insured. Only 16 issues had the necessary information 
(yield, maturity date, etc.) to be used in the yield spread study.
7The yield curue was positively sloped during the entire sample period.
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